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Abstract
It is important to have an adequate model of uncertainty, since decisions must be
made before the uncertainty can be resolved. For instance, flood defenses must be
designed before we know the future distribution of flood events. It is standardly
assumed that probability theory offers the best model of uncertain information. I
think there are reasons to be sceptical of this claim.
I criticise some arguments for the claim that probability theory is the only
adequate model of uncertainty. In particular I critique Dutch book arguments,
representation theorems, and accuracy based arguments.
Then I put forward my preferred model: imprecise probabilities. These are sets
of probability measures. I offer several motivations for this model of uncertain
belief, and suggest a number of interpretations of the framework. I also defend
the model against some criticisms, including the so-called problem of dilation.
I apply this framework to decision problems in the abstract. I discuss some
decision rules from the literature including Levi’s E-admissibility and the more
permissive rule favoured by Walley, among others. I then point towards some
applications to climate decisions. My conclusions are largely negative: decision
making under such severe uncertainty is inevitably difficult.
I finish with a case study of scientific uncertainty. Climate modellers attempt
to offer probabilistic forecasts of future climate change. There is reason to be
sceptical that the model probabilities offered really do reflect the chances of future
climate change, at least at regional scales and long lead times. Indeed, scientific
uncertainty is multi-dimensional, and difficult to quantify. I argue that probability
theory is not an adequate representation of the kinds of severe uncertainty that
arise in some areas in science. I claim that this requires that we look for a better
framework for modelling uncertainty.
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. Introduction
But whatever Socrates may
say, it remains the case, as
anyone can see, that people
who stick to philosophy
become strange monsters, not
to say utter rogues; even the
best of them are made useless
by philosophy.
(Bertrand Russell)
Uncertainty is ubiquitous. It is important to understand what uncertainty is, and
where it comes from. It is also important to know how to reason about uncer-
tainty, and particularly how to make decisions when faced with uncertainty. The
standard set of formal methods for dealing with uncertainty is built around the
mathematical theory of probability. This has been a remarkably successful theory,
with a huge number of applications. I will argue that there are circumstances
where probability theory is too restrictive a representation of uncertainty. There
are alternatives to probability theory. I will argue that in cases of severe uncer-
tainty, they are better suited to represent uncertainty than probability theory is.
More generally, I want to argue that we shouldn’t expect rationality to determine
the right course of action in every circumstance. In cases of severe uncertainty, it
might be that all that rationality can do is rule out some options as impermissible.
This is an important project because one area where severe uncertainty is
prevalent is in the field of climate science. Decisions of global importance need to
be made that rely on scientific evidence from climate science. Thus, it is important
to properly represent the uncertainty present in order to facilitate good decisions.
The standard precise probabilistic methodology might suggest an unwarranted
level of certainty. This certainty could encourage decision makers to attempt to
optimise their responses. But such optimisation with possibly faulty probabilities
does not give any guarantee of success.
Before we can start a study of the alternatives to the orthodox probabilistic
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theory, it will be instructive to study that theory in detail. I outline the formal
preliminaries and introduce the central concepts of the dissertation in chapter .
There will be some work to do here in justifying particular choices I make about
how to set up the framework. Many arguments have been put forward that
purport to show that probability theory is the best model of uncertain reasoning
and decision making. Call the view that probability theory is the best model of
uncertain reasoning “Probabilism”. So a prerequisite for this project is that we
show how and why these arguments fail or are not appropriate in the current
context. This is the aim of chapter .
I do not argue that probability theory is never an appropriate model of uncer-
tainty. Often it is a very good one, and I hope to be conservative in the ways I
go beyond the standard theory. I discuss a variety of methods for going beyond
orthodox probability theory in chapter . Various arguments for my preferred
framework will be offered, and two problems with learning in this imprecise prob-
ability framework will be discussed. My favoured framework will be used in
chapter  to discuss decision making under severe uncertainty. The conclusions
are somewhat negative. Decision making under severe uncertainty is difficult,
perhaps unavoidably so. It is, however, important to recognise that difficulty,
and to not be misled into making poor decisions by over-precise estimates of
uncertainty. More generally I think it is asking too much of rationality to always
determine a fully precise probability function that represents your uncertainty,
whatever the state of your evidence. Furthermore, I think that in situations of
severe uncertainty it is not a good idea to attempt to look for optimal courses of
action. Optimising on weak evidence like this isn’t necessarily a good idea.
I will offer a case study of scientific uncertainty in chapter . The claim is that
given the multitude of sources of uncertainty and error, perhaps we would be
better off using a more permissive formal framework for reasoning about the
uncertain scientific propositions. Finally, chapter  returns to the issue of decision
making and climate change, and the particular problems that we encounter there.
.. Characterisations of uncertainty
I should mention something about my use of the word “uncertainty”. I am using
this as a catch-all term for all the ways one might fail to be certain about things.
Economists and decision theorists sometimes make a distinction between “risk”
where the probabilities are known, and “uncertainty” where they are not. This
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distinction is traced back to the work of Frank Knight (Knight ). Unfortu-
nately, physicists have the opposite view: “uncertainty” connotes a situation where
you know the probabilities and “ambiguity” is the term for a situation where the
probabilities are unknown. I use uncertainty to cover both of these possibilities.
The terminology is not as stable as this suggests, but to the extent that it is stable,
it has stabilised in incompatible ways in different disciplines.
There have been several attempts to classify kinds of uncertainty. For example
Walker et al. () offer a framework for understanding uncertainty when using
evidence from models to make decisions. They identify three distinct “axes” of
uncertainty of relevance for “model-based decision support”. These are:
Location Where exactly the error enters into the process
Level How much the uncertainty affects the model-relevant predictions
Nature Whether the uncertainty is due to a deficiency in the modelling, or due to
unavoidable natural variation
The National Institute of Standards and Technology’s Guidelines for Evaluating and
Expressing Uncertainty also note the distinction between Random and Systematic
errors (Taylor and Kuyatt ). This is a distinction that falls under the Walker et
al. category of nature of uncertainty. The NIST document notes that this distinction
often matches up with a difference in how the uncertainty can be reported: random
errors are often evaluated statistically, systematic errors are not. They also note
that the categories are somewhat dependent on perspective:
The nature of an uncertainty component is conditioned by the use
made of the corresponding quantity, that is, on how that quantity
appears in the mathematical model that describes the measurement
process. When the corresponding quantity is used in a different way, a
“random” component may become “systematic” and vice versa.
Taylor and Kuyatt (, p. )
On a similar note, Lo and Mueller () distinguish a number of types of
uncertainty, based on what techniques can be used to deal with them and what
amount of data you need to overcome them. The view of physics they present is
rather naïve, but their main aim is to draw a distinction between the “easy” cases
in physics and the “hard” cases in economics and finance. They take uncertainty in
physics to be a lot more clear-cut than it often is; they are keen to stress that finance
and economics are much less certain – riddled with more severe uncertainties –
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than physics. In chapter  I will argue that many of the kinds of uncertainty that
Lo and Mueller think are worrying in finance and economics are also troubling
in areas like climate science. There may be differences in the severity of the
uncertainties encountered in physics and in finance, but it is a difference of degree,
not a difference in kind. They distinguish what is often called “risk” (known
probabilities) from uncertainty. They then go on to distinguish three grades of
uncertainty. The first they call reducible uncertainty which is uncertainty where
the state space is known, and it is reasonable to assume a fixed stable background.
Classical statistics uses observations to reduce the uncertainty to risk. Below this
we have partially reducible uncertainty where the above conditions no longer hold
straightforwardly. There might be time-varying parameters, model uncertainty,
non-linearities and so on. In short, there may be aspects of the target system
that render invalid the standard statistical results necessary to warrant statistical
inference (for example the Law of Large Numbers or the Central Limit Theorem).
At this level, more sophisticated modelling techniques will be necessary, perhaps
only a coarse-grained model of the phenomena is possible. There are however
enough regularities in the target system that progress can be made, however
piecemeal and tentative. Below this there is the level of irreducible uncertainty.
Irreducible uncertainty is our epistemic situation with respect to those things that
are not governed by any regularities or statistical laws at all. No amount of data,
no sophistication of technique is enough to accommodate things that fall in this
category. As Lo and Mueller point out,
irreducible uncertainty seems more likely to be the exception rather
than the rule. After all, what kinds of phenomena are completely
impervious to quantitative analysis?. . . The usefulness of the concept is
precisely in its extremity. By defining a category of uncertainty that
cannot be reduced to quantifiable risk – essentially an admission of
intellectual defeat – we force ourselves to stretch our imaginations to
their absolute limits before relegating any phenomenon to this level.
Lo and Mueller (, p. )
These categories are not wholly distinct, nor are they unrevisable. Solar eclipses
would have been irreducibly uncertain for primitive tribes, but they can now be
predicted with such accuracy that no uncertainty remains. Assigning something to
some category or another will be relative to a state of information: more evidence,
better theories or better model techniques might change what level something sits
at. This is pushing in the same direction as the NIST Guidelines passage quoted
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earlier. For the statistics to help at the level of reducible uncertainty, for instance,
we need to know things like that there is a stable background. But on reflection,
we might take Hume’s worry about induction seriously and conclude that we
can never be certain of that sort of thing. This undermines pretty much every
reduction of uncertainty to risk. What we take ourselves to know and to believe
depends in part on what we take for granted. Consider betting on the roll of some
dice. If we take for granted that the dice are fair, then this is a case of risk. If
however we don’t take this for granted, we are in a case of reducible uncertainty.
Nothing about the dice has changed. The difference in epistemic situation is due to
what is taken for granted. What decides what can be taken for granted in a given
situation is something extra-rational: we must appeal to some sort of Duhemian
Scientific Good Sense (Duhem ) and leave it at that.
Kandlikar, Risbey, and Dessai () discuss how to represent different kinds
of uncertainty. We can understand this as a cashing out of the level of uncertainty
category from Walker et al. (). The best case scenario is that you know enough
to produce a probability density function (PDF) that encapsulates all there is to
know about the uncertain process at issue. Failing this, perhaps you can only put
upper and lower bounds on the possible values of the variables of interest. If even
this isn’t possible, then you might still be able to assess the order of magnitude of
the expected effect. The lowest useful level of information is just to say whether the
change in the variable will be positive or negative (the sign of the effect): whether
the trend is upwards or downwards. If none of these factors can be usefully drawn
from the evidence, then you are effectively in a state of complete ignorance.
Regan, Colyvan, and Burgman () offer a typology of uncertainty for ecol-
ogists. They define two broad kinds of uncertainty: Epistemic and Linguistic.
Epistemic uncertainty is due to unknown factors in the world; linguistic uncer-
tainty is uncertainty we have in virtue of the inexact way language matches up
with nature. I am particularly interested in the epistemic uncertainties, and my
characterisation of epistemic uncertainties is not all that different from theirs.
Understanding the nature and diversity of scientific uncertainty is important
for policy making. Oversimplifying scientific evidence, or downplaying the un-
certainties involved is to the detriment of model based decision making (Covey
; Stirling ). This is an important theme for the thesis: an adequate under-
standing of uncertainty must be communicated to – and used by – the decision
makers.
It is often assumed that probability theory offers the right representation of
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uncertain information. The aim of this thesis is to explore this idea. Given the
above diversity of kinds of uncertainty and severity of uncertainty, perhaps there
is room for other formal frameworks.
.. General lessons
I would like to briefly set out the aims of the current dissertation.
The first important lesson I would like to draw out in this dissertation is that
uncertainty comes in many forms. Chapter  makes this point explicitly for the
case of climate science uncertainty. But the multifariousness of uncertainty is an
important motivation for exploring extensions of probability theory (chapter ).
And indeed, the multidimensional nature of uncertainty is one important reason
to be sceptical of those arguments that purport to show that probability theory is
the correct formal model of uncertainty (chapter ).
A consequence of the myriad forms of uncertainty is that representing un-
certainty is important for good decision making. Furthermore, we need this
representation of uncertainty to be part of what decision makers use to make their
decisions. In section .. I give an example of how an inadequate representation
of the state of your evidence can lead to an intuitively bad decision. Related to
this point is the idea that we aren’t always in a position to choose optimal acts. In
cases of severe uncertainty, we can’t know what is “really” optimal, and what ap-
pears optimal given our incomplete evidence needn’t be a good option. Adequate
representation of severe uncertainty blocks these “premature optimisations”. This
is an important point to bear in mind when it comes to making decisions based on
(uncertain) climate evidence (chapter ).
My most general claim, the one that perhaps best brings together the disparate
chapters of this work is this: we need a subtler understanding of what rationality
is, and what we can expect of it. Rationality is a theme that runs through this
dissertation: what is it rational to believe?; what is it rational to choose? Rationality
is often taken to be part of what determines the answer to these questions. I think
in the case of severe uncertainty, we shouldn’t expect there to be determinate
answers to these questions. So what rationality is doing is simply ruling out some
of the options as irrational. This shift in understanding of rationality allows us
to focus on what conditions are required for rationality to do more. Imprecise
probabilism is a representation of uncertainty that is only definite to the extent
that the evidence sanctions definite degree of belief (chapter ). This is a formal
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model of uncertainty that is true to the idea that rationality needn’t always give
determinate answers. Once we commit to moving beyond the standard probability
theory framework, we need to look at what decision making looks like (chapter ).
This is another place where our subtler understanding of rationality becomes
important. The discussion of interpreting the choice function is an example of
where this arises.
The same theme arises in chapter  as well: we shouldn’t take evidence from
climate models as giving us determinate answers to questions about the future
evolution of the climate, but rather as giving us some indications of what sorts of
scenarios to prepare for. The final chapter (chapter ) again stresses this point
that it is important to be clear what we can expect – in terms of decision relevant
advice – from our modelling of the climate. Of course, this negative conclusion
is not of much help to policy makers who actually have to make decisions based
on this incomplete picture of the future evolution of the climate; the last chapter
discusses some strategies for making decisions when the evidence doesn’t give
you enough advice.
These last two chapters should be seen as a case study of uncertainty in science
that is motivated by the same concerns that led to the formal conclusions of
the earlier chapters. That is, in both cases I am motivated by my interest in a
weaker standard of rationality, and by a concern for adequate representation of
uncertainty for the purposes relevant to the context.
. A framework for belief,
uncertainty, value and action
The greatest challenge to any
thinker is stating the
problem, in a way that will
allow a solution.
(Bertrand Russell)
This chapter serves as a summary of the formalism used throughout the rest of the
dissertation. It also serves as an introduction to the ideas and concepts appealed
to. Ultimately, I am interested in rational belief and action under severe uncertainty.
These concepts – “rational”, “belief”, “action”, “severe uncertainty” – will all need
explanation, as will some other related concepts.
I will first discuss modelling decision problems in the abstract. Then I will move
on to a discussion of the formal details. I have split this discussion into two parts.
These are the objective and subjective parts of decision problems. This distinction
is not sharp, and it is a little arbitrary. The idea is that the objective aspects of a
decision problem will be common to all agents. Agents may, however, differ in
the subjective parts. The same acts will be available to all agents, but different
agents might value the outcomes differently. The distinction is not sharp because
sometimes the chances of the events determine the beliefs in them. The intuition
behind drawing the distinction where I do is that there is nothing “normative”
going on in the objective half: this is supposed to be just a neutral characterisation
of the problem. The normativity comes in in the subjective part.
Bermúdez () discusses the possibility of normatively assessing the way you have framed the
decision problem. I don’t assess that sort of thing here.
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.. Modelling decision problems
When one is modelling a decision scenario, there are three kinds of things that are
relevant. There are objects of value, objects of belief, and objects of choice. This is
“object” in a grammatical sense: these are objects in that they are the object of a
verb. In the current context, it is the decision maker who is the subject of those
verbs. For example, the objects of value are the things the subject values. I don’t
mean to suggest that all objects of value are material objects.
The objects of value are the things you are concerned to bring about, or to
prevent from happening. For example, “getting caught in the rain”; “winning the
bet”. If there were no such objects of value, then there’d be no reason to “decide”
anything. The objects of belief are the contingencies that will affect what happens.
They influence which of the objects of value end up occurring. For example, “it
is raining”; “your horse wins the race”. Finally, the objects of choice also affect
which outcomes come about, but the objects of choice are those eventualities you
have it in your power to control. For example “take the umbrella”; “bet on the
horse called Categorical Imperative”.
Let’s take a simple example. In this example, the objects of value are “get wet”
which is a contingency you are keen to avoid; “carry umbrella” which is a nuisance,
but not so bad as being caught in the rain; and “don’t get wet”. The objects of belief
are “it rains” or “it doesn’t rain”. The objects of choice are “bring umbrella” and
“don’t bring umbrella”. It should be clear that both the objects of belief and the
objects of choice influence which of the objects of value ends up coming about. It
should also be clear that it is in your power to choose between the objects of choice
– you have it in your power to bring about the fact that you take an umbrella or
not – but you don’t have the same power over the objects of belief (whether or not
it rains).
It rains It doesn’t rain
Bring umbrella Don’t get wet Carry umbrella
Don’t bring Get wet Don’t get wet
Table ..: A simple decision problem
Fixing the relevant elements of these three categories is the first part of mod-
elling a decision problem. One might worry that these types of objects all seem
to be somewhat “subjective”. That is to say, it isn’t really the proposition “it is
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raining” that influences whether or not you get wet, but rather, it is what makes
it true that it is raining that causes the getting wet. It might be that “it is raining”
logically entails “you get caught in the rain”, but what you value is not the truth
value of that proposition: you (dis)value the actual state of getting caught in the
rain. This subtlety can be glossed over by assuming that the logical relationships
between these subjective objects mirror the relationships between the things in the
world that determine your happiness. That is, the “world” makes the proposition
true. The other way of sweeping this issue aside is to make sets of possible worlds
be the objects of belief. I discuss this later, when I introduce events and truth.
How sharp this tripartite distinction between objects of value, belief and action
is, is a matter of controversy. Savage ( []) makes the separation of the
categories absolute. Jeffrey () makes these things less distinct. I return to
this question later in section .., once I have set out the formal details of the
frameworks.
.. Objective elements of decision problems
Ultimately, we are interested in rational belief and rational action, but first we need
to work out what beliefs are, and what action involves. Belief is a propositional
attitude. It is important for a number reasons. There are norms that govern
rational belief: directly through what it is reasonable to believe; and indirectly
through belief’s action-guiding role and what actions are reasonable. Before we
get to belief, we need a characterisation of what the objects of belief are.
... Events
Belief is belief about something: You can have beliefs about whether it will rain,
about which horse will win the race and so on. When we model belief, we make
the objects of belief sentences that say things about the world. A belief is an
attitude directed at things in the world. The content of a belief can be something
like “It is raining” or “The die lands on a four”. These are sentences about states
of affairs; about events in the world. Using these basic sentences we can construct
compound sentences like “The die lands on a four or it is raining”. This “or” is
formalised as “_”. Using “X” to stand for “The die lands on a four” and “Y ” to
I leave it open for now whether these relationships are logical, causal, evidential. . .
While it is possible to construct these logical compounds, I’m not sure how a decision problem
would rest on the truth value of a disjunction with disjuncts from different domains like this.
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stand for “It is raining”, we can rewrite this compound as “X_Y ”. More generally,
for any X1,X2 sentences, we can construct the compound X1_X2. This is also a
sentence, we can have beliefs about it. Of course, what beliefs we have about the
compound will be somehow related to what beliefs we have in the basic sentences.
It is useful to have some other kinds of compound sentences available to us: let
“X ^Y ” mean the proposition “X and Y ”; and let “ X” mean “it is not the case
that X” or “not X” for short. Again, what beliefs you have in these compounds
is related to your beliefs in the basic sentences. We can then write complex
compound sentences like this: pX _Y q^ p Z ^Y q.
More formally, we have a set of elementary letters L“ {x1,x2 . . .xn}which is finite
unless otherwise stated. The infinite case introduces some complexity which is, for
the most part, besides the point in the current project. We have a set of sentences
built up from these propositions and the usual logical connectives  ,^,_. Two
important elements of this logic, the tautology and the contradiction, will be
identified as J and K respectively. The tautology is always true, the contradiction
is never true. This terminology follows Paris (). We can identify J with
X _ X and K with X ^ X. Jeffrey’s system is importantly different: Jeffrey’s
algebra is atomless. This means that, among other things, there are infinitely many
elementary letters.
One might want to disagree with the understanding of belief as a propositional
attitude. “No,” you might say, “my beliefs are about the world.” The objects of
belief are in the world. However, I think this way of speaking doesn’t do justice
to the intuition that beliefs are intensional. For example, you can believe that
Clark Kent is in the room, but not believe that Superman is in the room: this is
not contradictory. However, Clark Kent’s being in the room is extensionally the
same as Superman’s being in the room. So it seems that if beliefs are about the
world directly, you can’t have the above pair of beliefs. That’s not to say that you
can’t make sense of this aspect of intensionality and have your beliefs be about the
world, but it’s subtle. Weisberg () makes the same point. Having the objects of
belief be “in the world” also makes i somewhat mysterious what compounds like
However, there are cases where it is necessary to work with an infinite language. Most notably,
the theorems of Savage (..), Fine/Villegas (..) and Cox (..) don’t work unless the
language is infinite.
More carefully, the tautology is true under all assignments of truth values to the elementary
letters; the contradiction, false under all such assignments.
Whether the atomlessness is a requirement of rationality, rather than a structural feature
required for the representation theorem will be discussed later.
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X _Y correspond to. Are these logical operators to be understood as operating on
the things in the world? What would that mean? It seems more straightforward to
have the objects of belief be linguistic: we know how to handle logical operators
on linguistic things.
The sentences that are the objects of belief are sentences about the world, so
belief isn’t totally divorced from the world. This intermediate step allows us to
deal with intensionality in a natural way. That said, this property of my preferred
way of understanding belief won’t feature in this dissertation.
We are going to be discussing degrees of belief in these sentences. It is per-
haps reasonable, and certainly convenient, to stipulate that logically equivalent
sentences are believed equally strongly. So we will build this constraint into
our framework by only defining our belief functions over equivalence classes of
logically equivalent sentences. So take the set of compounds build up from L and
the logical connectives, and then use the equivalence relation “”” to partition this
into classes of equivalent sentences. We will use elements of the equivalence class
to stand for the class. Call such equivalence classes propositions. This is called the
“Lindenbaum algebra” and behaves well under the logical connectives. Call this
SL.
Real human reasoners typically don’t believe all logically equivalent proposi-
tions equally strongly. I am uncertain of many mathematical expressions which
are equivalent either to J or to K. But as long as I don’t know which, I am uncer-
tain. However, logical omniscience does still seem normatively compelling, even
if it is unrealistic. What reason could you have for believing logically equivalent
propositions to different degrees apart from logical ignorance? It does at least
seem required of you that if you know P and Q are equivalent, then you should be-
lieve them to the same degree. I think Kyburg () has it right when he says that
belief in X involves a commitment to appropriate beliefs in things logically related
to X. For example, Kyburg believes the axioms of set theory, and he thereby takes
himself to be committed to all the theorems of set theory, even those he doesn’t
know. He might act against such a commitment through ignorance, but he should
feel foolish if such a failure was pointed out to him. Full logical omniscience of
the kind built in by the focus on the Lindenbaum algebra is obviously too strong a
I haven’t yet introduced the machinery to make precise exactly what this “”” relation is, but I
hope it is obvious from standard accounts of propositional logic. In fact, later I will discuss
different sorts of equivalence relation, so this initial vagueness serves a purpose.
Note that it follows that it doesn’t matter what X we use to pick out J and K: they are all in the
same equivalence class anyway.
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requirement. Relaxing this assumption would be an interesting project, but it is
not a project I shall undertake here.
As we have seen, events have a structure: we can use logical operators like
^,_, on them. Specifically, they have the structure of an algebra. For our
purposes, this basically means that if X,Y P SL then so are X ^Y ,X _Y and  X.
As hinted at earlier, there is an alternative way to cash out what an event is.
This is to say that an event is a set of possible worlds. And then define beliefs as
being about sets of possible worlds. This is the way Halpern () starts. Then
events have a kind of set-structure, rather than logical structure: X Y Y is an
event that corresponds to X _Y as described above. That is, it is an event which
obtains whenever at least one of X or Y does. This way, which corresponds to the
“extensional” understanding of belief alluded to earlier, doesn’t allow the kind of
Superman/Clark Kent beliefs, nor does it allow failures of logical omniscience.
Again, logical omniscience and intensionality won’t feature in this dissertation, I
mention these subjects only to justify my choice of logical rather than set-theoretic
framework. These two understandings of what the content of belief are are not
really in conflict, anyway. Indeed, the translation between them is straightforward.
But to discuss it, I need to introduce another new idea.
... Truth
Believing true propositions is the aim of rational belief. What propositions are
true is what decides which actions lead to which outcomes. So let’s look at truth.
We have a truth valuation function v which outputs vpXq “ 1 if X is true and
vpXq “ 0 if X is false. That is,
Definition .. v : SLÑ {0,1} is a (classical) truth valuation function if
• vpX _Y q “max {vpXq,vpY q}
• vpX ^Y q “min {vpXq,vpY q}
As a matter of fact, since all the belief functions I look at have the property of being monotonic,
I don’t need to stipulate this. It follows from monotonicity that logically equivalent sentences
are believed equally strongly. However, I include this discussion of the Lindenbaum algebra
here because I want to make it clear that this is a choice about how I am conceptualising the
objects of belief. In the current setting, logically equivalent sentences being believed equally
strongly is overdetermined: either of the Lindenbaum algebra move or monotonicity would be
sufficient to secure the property.
Or that is at least part of the aim of rational belief. Disbelieving false propositions is just as
important. In any case, truth and falsity are inextricably linked concepts, duals of each other.
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• vp Xq “ 1´ vpXq
Let’s call the set of such functions V. Your intuitions about how truth interacts
with the standard logical operators should allow you to see the reasonableness of
these properties for functions in V. v describes how the world is with respect to
all the propositions of interest.
With this terminology in place, we can now see how to translate between sets of
possible world talk and proposition talk. Since v assigns a 1 or a 0 to all members
of SL, it effectively picks out a unique “possible world”. Call rXs the set of v PV
such that vpXq “ 1. rXs is the set of possible worlds where X is true. It should
be clear that rX _ Y s “ rXs Y rY s and rX ^ Y s “ rXs X rY s. Also, r Xs “ rJszrXs.
Finally, rXs Ď rY s if and only if X ( Y . Thus, talking of propositions or of sets of
worlds amounts to the same thing.
Sometimes I will borrow some “set talk” to talk about propositions. I will often
use “A partition of SL” to mean “A set of sentences of SL such that every v P V
makes exactly one of them true.” I hope it’s clear that if the Xi have this property,
the rXis do indeed partition the set V. I will also, on occasion talk of a “subset”
of Y . By this I mean an X such that rXs Ď rY s. X is a “subset” of Y when Y is a
consequence of X.
We can now properly define the equivalence relation at the basis of our Linden-
baum algebra as follows: X ” Y iff rXs “ rY s. We are operating purely semantically
here. This might seem a rather round-about way of doing things. Why not just
start with beliefs being over sets of “possible worlds” and be done with it? This is
a very common approach in the literature. The reason to take this long way round
is that the sets of possible worlds approach builds in the assumption of logical
omniscience at the most basic level, and it is thus hard to relax. By taking this cir-
cuitous route to the basic set up, I have left open the possibility of relaxing logical
omniscience. That is, I can replace “”” with “–”, some alternative equivalence
relation signifying “known mutual entailment” or something like that. As long as
this “plays nicely” with the logical connectives, then we can construct a quotient
algebra in the same way we can construct the Lindenbaum algebra out of the “””
relation.
If L contains n elementary letters {x1, . . . ,xn}, then there are 2n distinct propo-
sitions of the form: ˘x1^˘x2^ ¨¨ ¨ ^˘xn. Where `xi means xi and ´xi means
Once we have in place the Lindenbaum algebra, that is.
Meaning, if X – X1 and Y – Y 1 then X ˚Y – X1 ˚Y 1 for any connective “˚”. In other words, “–”
is a congruence relation. Thanks to David Makinson for helping with this point. Note that such
an approach would require a weaker version of monotonicity as well.
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 xi . For every vi there is exactly one such proposition that it makes true. Call it
ti . That is, viptiq “ 1 and for j ‰ i, viptjq “ 0. The tis partition SL. These ti are the
atoms of the algebra SL.
To recap, we have a set of basic elementary letters L “ {x1,x2, . . . ,xn} and a
collection of compounds of L made by using the connectives ^,_, . We take
equivalence classes of these things using the logical equivalence relation, we call
this SL. These are the things we have beliefs over.
... Outcomes
Another kind of thing of interest in the context of decision making is outcomes:
consequences, objects of value. Outcomes are the kinds of thing that you value or
disvalue; the kind of thing you have preferences over; the things that result from
your choosing to act one way or another. For example “Eat ice cream” might be
the outcome of choosing to have dessert. Savage ( []) leaves outcomes
as more or less structureless, uninterpreted primitives in his theory. They simply
form a set; you have preferences over this set; acts are functions which map into
this set. That’s all there is to say about them.
Jeffrey () on the other hand, makes outcomes the same sort of thing as
events (and everything else): outcomes are simply a type of proposition. They are
a type of proposition that we have preferences over. Outcomes are propositions of
the form X ^A where X is a state of the world and A is an act. An outcome just is
the conjunction of the act you perform and the state of the world. Understanding
what an act is, is just understanding the conjunctions of the act with the possible
propositions. Joyce () points out that “Jeffrey outcomes” can’t appear in more
than one space in the decision matrix. So Joyce distinguishes fine-grained Jeffrey
outcomes from coarse-grained Savage outcomes which are disjunctions of Jeffrey
outcomes that you are indifferent between. In another sense, Savage outcomes are
more fine-grained than Jeffrey outcomes. This is so since Savage outcomes must
specify all the value-relevant details of the combination of act and event, whereas
Jeffrey outcomes can leave many details underspecified. The relationship between
these two concepts is subtle, and need not concern us here, since in what follows I
will be mostly sticking to outcomes that are of fixed monetary value.
Anscombe and Aumann () give some structure to their outcomes. Some
outcomes are just basic goods like Savage’s. But others are “lotteries”. A lottery
In fact, according to Savage, you only have preferences over them in virtue of having preferences
over the constant acts, but intuitively outcomes are the things we have preferences over.
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gives you one of a number of prizes with a certain probability. If the probabilities
are known, it is called a roulette lottery. If the probabilities are unknown, it is
called a horse lottery. The prizes can either be basic goods, or they can be more
lotteries. The former sort are called simple lotteries, the latter compound lotteries. I
won’t discuss this addition much. For my purposes, it will suffice to take outcomes
to be unstructured, unalloyed goods.
If we effect the same liberalisation with outcomes as we did for events – namely
to have differently described but logically equivalent outcomes treated differently
– we can rationalise some kinds of experimentally observed preferences that don’t
fit the standard model. Lois Lane can prefer being saved by Superman to
being saved by Clark Kent, despite those outcomes being extensionally equivalent.
Consider two different descriptions of extensionally the same outcome. Tversky
and Kahneman () discuss how people can have different preferences over
these outcomes depending on how the outcome is framed. For instance, people
respond differently to an act framed in terms of the number of deaths it would
cause rather than the number of lives it would save, even if the prospects are
extensionally the same. In effect, we allow the outcomes to be intensional in the
same way we might allow the events to be intensionally described. This isn’t a
project I pursue here, but I note that it is possible.
The set of outcomes in a decision problem will be called O. Outcomes are
going to be described using o1, o2 . . . and sets of outcomes shall be O1,O2 . . . So
O Ą O1 Q o1. This is a convention I shall try to roughly stick to with all my
formalism. An “x” will be referred to by a small letter, a set of xs by a capital “X”
and “the set of (all) the xs” by a bold capital “X”. Capital blackboard bold (X) and
script letters (X ) will then be used for other complex entities. Lowercase boldface
will typically denote important types of function.
... Acts
A third important aspect of decision problems is what the agent can do about
it. If you are in a decision problem, you need to know what acts are available
to you; what the objects of choice are. Savage thought of acts as functions from
states to outcomes. In the current set up, this seem a little strange. Having acts
be functions from propositions to outcomes seems to gloss over the fact that it is
Later, we will see that I allow myself mixed acts. One can interpret mixed acts as being lotteries
over basic acts. The difference is purely cosmetic.
Bermúdez (, Chapter ) discusses this possibility.
. A framework for belief, uncertainty, value and action 
not the propositions that really determine which acts are successful. What makes
taking your umbrella a successful act is that it is raining; not that the proposition
“it is raining” is true. Despite this, I hope it is clear that this sort of approach
will work fine, as long as what determines the truth of the propositions that are
arguments of the act functions is completely distinct from the decision problem.
In slogan form: “The world decides what propositions are true”. Or perhaps “The
truth of event propositions and the success conditions of acts have a common
cause: the world”. If some of the relevant propositions are in your control – or are
correlated with propositions in your control – then lots of weird stuff can happen.
To keep things simple, I demand that what act you perform cannot influence what
event obtains. Bringing an umbrella cannot influence whether or not it rains. This
is the condition of act independence of states: which state occurs is independent of
which act is performed.
Jeffrey thought of acts as propositions you have it in your power to make true.
To recover “Savage acts” in Jeffrey’s framework, you have to enrich your language
with a new kind of connective which is a kind of non-truth-functional conditional
(Bradley ; Joyce ).
Acts are the things you choose among and which – along with the true state of
the world – determine which outcome comes about. Given how outcomes were
characterised, it seems clear that this is how things should be. Not having the
clear distinction between the elements of the decision problem makes Jeffrey’s
theory harder to deal with, in some ways. Joyce follows Jeffrey in making acts be
propositions. I will go against Jeffrey and side with Savage. Not because I think
Jeffrey is wrong, but because I think that Savage’s abstraction is suitable for my
purposes. I discuss the differences between the frameworks in section ...
The set of available acts is A and elements of A will be a1, a2 . . . and sometimes
f ,g . . . Typically the set of basic acts available will be finite. From these basic
acts, other acts can be built up. If we have some kind of random device that, say,
outputs a 1 with probability p and a 0 otherwise, we can generate mixed acts.
pf `p1´pqg is the act “get whatever f gets you with probability p, get whatever g
gets you otherwise”. Anscombe and Aumann, and von Neumann and Morgenstern
allow themselves this kind of mixed act. There might be some subtlety attached
to how mixed acts are generated, but I don’t think this will impact on my current
project (Schwarz ms.).
A paradigm example of an act is a bet or wager. I will have a lot more to say
about bets when we get to the Dutch book argument in section .. When you
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bet on a horse, or on your football team, you are betting on a proposition like
“The horse will win” or “My team will win”. How much money you end up with
depends on the eventual truth or falsity of that proposition. In the case of bets,
it is clear what factors of the state of the world determine the success of the act.
And thus, it is obvious which propositions serve as the proxies for those factors.
Acts can be defined as functions from propositions to outcomes or as functions
from the atoms to outcomes or as functions from a partition of SL to outcomes.
.. Subjective elements of decision problems
We have now seen the “objective” parts of a decision problem: the events, the
outcomes and the acts. As the agent facing the decision problem, you must bring
with you the “subjective” parts of it: beliefs and values. These are the things
that can be normatively assessed. It seems reasonable to say “Bob’s beliefs are
irrational” but it does not seem reasonable to say “Bob’s options are irrational”.
There are two important things to consider when evaluating the available acts
in a decision problem. The first is “how good are the possible outcomes?” and
second “how likely is it that each of these outcomes will obtain?” Answering these
questions in tandem gives you the concept of “expectation”. How good do you
expect an act to be? The goodness of an act will depend on what outcomes it leads
to under what circumstances, and how likely those circumstances (events) are.
These ideas are encapsulated in several functions, which we shall discuss in
turn. The basic functions are the belief function, which maps events to numbers;
and the value function which maps outcomes to numbers. The derived function is
the expected value function, which maps acts to numbers. We also look at some
related concepts: preference, and choice functions.
For the time being, I am going to focus on belief functions, which are my main
interest. I will, for the most part, just take it as read that there is a value function
which behaves appropriately in whatever context I am discussing.
For this to be a good example, it needs to be the case that you are otherwise uninterested in
which outcome eventuates. That is, if you have a basic preference for your team to win, whether
or not you have bet on them, then this isn’t quite so straightforward.
Of course, if you take the modelling of the decision problem to be a subjective process on the
part of the agent, then it’s reasonable to say that Bob has modelled the problem in an irrational
way. But I hope my main point is clear. Bermúdez () discusses rational assessment of the
decision modelling procedure.
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... Relations and representation
Before moving on to the meat of this section, I want to review a couple of ideas
that crop up in various places, and so are worth discussing briefly. The first is that
of a relation. The second, that of a representation.
At various points we shall discuss a variety of different relations. One important
kind of relation is the preference relation which relates outcomes, or sometimes
acts. Say “ϕ  ψ” means “ϕ is at least as good as ψ”. Sometimes one considers a
relation among events, with “ϕ  ψ” meaning “ϕ is at least as likely as ψ”. We
have already met the entailment relation where “ϕ ( ψ” means “ϕ entails ψ”.
Different kinds of relations will have different properties. What properties are
appropriate for a relation depends on what the relation is for. Some properties
that will be important in what follows are listed below.
Transitivity If ϕ  ψ and ψ  ξ then ϕ  ξ
Completeness ϕ  ψ or ψ  ϕ for all ϕ,ψ
Weakly Connected If ϕ ‰ ψ then ϕ  ψ or ψ  ϕ
Reflexivity ϕ  ϕ for all ϕ
Irreflexivity  pϕ  ϕq for all ϕ
Symmetry If ϕ  ψ then ψ  ϕ
Asymmetry If ϕ  ψ then  pψ  ϕq
Antisymmetry If ϕ  ψ and ψ  ϕ then ϕ “ ψ
“” will be understood as a reflexive relation, while “” will be the irreflexive part
of it. That is, we have the following two definitions.
Definition .. From the reflexive relation  define its irreflexive and symmetric
parts:
• ϕ  ψ iff ϕ  ψ and  pψ  ϕq
• ϕ „ ψ iff ϕ  ψ and ψ  ϕ
Some trivial conclusions that we will need to appeal to later are collected in this
lemma:
Some of the relations in what follows will have subscripts: X . The relations X ,„X relate to
X in the obvious way.
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Lemma .. For reflexive  and ,„ defined as in Definition ..:
• If ϕ  ψ then  pψ  ϕq
•  pϕ  ϕq
Two important weakenings of transitivity should be mentioned here.
Acyclic For all ϕ1,ϕ2, . . . ,ϕn we have ϕ1  ϕ2,ϕ2  ϕ3, . . . ,ϕn´1  ϕn implies
 pϕn  ϕ1q
Suzumura consistent For all ϕ1,ϕ2, . . . ,ϕn we have ϕ1  ϕ2,ϕ2  ϕ3, . . . ,ϕn´1 
ϕn implies  pϕn  ϕ1q
A transitive reflexive relation is known as a preorder. An antisymmetric pre-
order is a partial order. A set equipped with a partial order is known as a poset. A
complete relation is sometimes called total or connected. A complete antisymmetric
preorder is a complete order, total order or linear order. A complete, transitive, sym-
metric relation is called an equivalence relation. The relation of logical equivalence
in our discussion of the Lindenbaum algebra is an equivalence relation in this
sense.
One can think of a relation as a set of ordered pairs of elements in its domain.
Call this set R. We have ϕ  ψ if and only if pϕ,ψq P R. It then makes sense to
talk about the intersection of relations, or their union in terms of the intersection
(union) of the corresponding sets of ordered pairs. I will use this trick later. Note
that R “ R”YR.
There are at least two places where we will have a relation over some domain
(events, acts) and we will want to represent it by a function from that domain into
another domain (typically the real numbers). We will see one example of this in
the next section, but since this is something that will happen more than once, we
discuss it briefly in abstract here.
The idea is that a function f : XÑ R represents a relation f if and only if:
If x f x1 then f pxq ě f px1q (.)
For example, if the objects were sticks of various lengths, and the relation of
interest was “is longer than” then the function that returns the length of the stick
in centimetres represents the structure in the right way. That is x is longer than x1
iff lenpxq ą lenpx1q. I will return to this length example in detail in section ...
One can generalise this to representations where f is a function into an arbitrary
space equipped with its own relation, but in general we will stick to representing
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things with real numbers. Chu and Halpern (, ) provide a very general
theory of decision with representations by arbitrary posets, rather than the reals.
For representation more generally, the classic work is Krantz et al. ().
... Representing belief
From qualitative probability to belief functions
There are some things you believe more strongly than others. For example, I
currently have a stronger belief in “It will rain tomorrow” than I do in “I will win
the lottery this week”. So there is a relation of qualitative probability or strength
of belief between propositions in SL. The idea is that there is some relation b
over SL where “X b Y ” is understood to mean “X is at least as likely as Y ”. We
might proceed by considering what properties this relation of qualitative belief
should have, but I will postpone that project until section ... Typically, one
understands degree of belief as being characterised by the belief functions that
represent this relation.
Definition .. A belief function is a function b : SLÑ R.
Let B be the set of all such belief functions. Belief comes in degrees and belief
functions are supposed to capture this notion of strength of belief. A higher
number assigned to an event should be interpreted as a stronger belief. We’ve
already seen one such kind of function: V. We won’t typically be thinking of the
valuation functions as belief functions, but they do satisfy the basic definition.
Consider bpJq and bpKq for some arbitrary b P B. It seems reasonable that
no proposition is more strongly believed than a tautology is believed. And no
proposition is less believed than a contradiction. So it makes sense to restrict our
attention to functions with the following property:
Bounded For all X we have bpKq ď bpXq ď bpJq
Now it also makes sense to fix the values of bpKq and bpJq. The actual value of
the numbers is not important, only the relations among them (which encode the
relations of relative strength of belief among the propositions). So let’s fix these
values:
Normalised bpKq “ 0 bpJq “ 1
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Probability
The most important kind of belief function, the probability function, satisfies both
of the above properties, and another important property.
Additive bpX _Y q`bpX ^Y q “ bpXq`bpY q
This isn’t typically how you’ll find additivity defined, but it’s my favourite way. It
is from Joyce ().
Definition .. A probability measure pr P B is a belief function that is Bounded,
Normalised and Additive
This is my “official definition” of probability. Note that probabilities so defined
are finitely additive, but not necessarily countably additive. Throughout this
dissertation, I will restrict myself to finite additivity. There is some controversy
over whether countable additivity is rationally required of belief, but that is a
concern that does not have a bearing on the current project.
The more standard way to define probability, I call the “incompatible proposi-
tions” definition. A probability measure pr P B is a belief function that satisfies
these properties:
iI For all X we have prpXq ě 0
iiI For all X,Y incompatible propositions, prpX _Y q “ prpXq`prpY q
iiiI prpJq “ 1
Note that by induction, (iiI ) entails that for incompatible X1,X2 . . .Xn, we have
prp∨ni“1Xiq “∑nprpXiq.
Yet another way of defining probability – the “partition additivity” approach –
is to say that pr P B is a probability if:
iP For all X we have prpXq ě 0
Countable additivity is the property that countable infinite disjunctions of propositions are
equal to the sum of their individual beliefs.
In fact, Williamson () shows that any finitely additive probability function over a logical
language has a unique extension to a countably additive probability function. So in the current
setting, the only question is whether or not we allow infinitary disjunctions to be objects of
belief. But the general point stands: one might want to consider beliefs over slightly different
logic structures – structures for which Williamson’s result does not hold. In these circumstances
there would be a genuine question as to whether countable additivity was a requirement of
rationality.
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iiP If Xi partition SL then
∑
prpXiq “ 1
These three ways of defining probability amount to the same thing.
Theorem .. The following things are equivalent:
• A belief function pr P B is Bounded, Normalised and Additive:
• pr satisfies the incompatible propositions definition
• pr satisfies the partition additivity definition
Proof Let pr P B be a probability function as defined by the official definition.
I show it also satisfies the incompatible propositions definition. (iI ) and (iiiI )
follow straightforwardly from pr being Bounded and Normalised. If X and Y are
incompatible, then X^Y ” K, so prpX^Y q “ 0. So, by Additivity: prpX_Y q`0“
prpXq`prpY q. So (iiI ) is satisfied.
Next I show that the incompatible propositions definition implies the partition
additivity definition. (iP ) is the same as (iI ). The elements of a partition Xi are
such that their disjunction is J. So by (iiiI ) prp∨Xiq “ 1. Elements of a partition
are incompatible, so by (iiI ) we know that 1“ prp∨Xiq “∑prpXiq.
Once we have shown that the partition additivity definition entails our official
definition, we will be done. Let pr P B now satisfy the partition definition. For
incompatible X,Y we have {X,Y , pX _Y q} is a partition. So is {X _Y , pX _Y q}.
From this it follows that prpXq`prpY q “ prpX_Y q. Now take X 1,Y 1 which are not
necessarily incompatible. We have X 1^ Y 1, X 1^Y 1 and X 1^Y 1 are incompatible,
and their disjunction is X 1_Y 1. So:
prpX 1q`prpY 1q “ prpX 1^Y 1q`prpX 1^ Y 1q`prpY 1^X 1q`prpY 1^ X 1q
“ prpX 1^Y 1q`prpX 1_Y 1q
So pr satisfies our official definition of additivity. Since pr is nonnegative, and
every proposition can be a member of some partition, boundedness and normali-
sation are also satisfied. 
We turn now to a relationship between truth and belief. This relationship will
be important later.
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Definition .. Let V` be the convex hull of V. That is, V` is the set of b P B such





λi vipXq for all X
That is, b is a weighted sum of truth valuations.
With this definition, we can state a theorem that shows that V` is exactly the
set of probability functions in B when SL is finite. This result is apparently due
to De Finetti, though I haven’t found it in his Theory of Probability. Paris ()
contains something close to this result on pp. –, but it isn’t as general as I’d
like. That is, it only applies to classical truth value functions, and only applies
to spaces that contain atoms. This is more or less the result I prove below. Paris
mentions a different result due to Glenn Shafer, but gives no reference in Paris
( []). Whether this also holds for infinite spaces I am not sure.
Theorem .. V` is the set of all and only the probability functions over SL.
Proof This proof sketch follows Paris (). First we show that if pr is a prob-





Recall, that for each atom ti there exists exactly one vi with viptiq “ 1. That is,
exactly one valuation function makes true exactly one maximally specific of the
ways the world could be. Let λi “ prptiq. Since pr is bounded and normalised,
λi ě 0.
Now we must show that
∑
λi “ 1 and that for every X P SL, prpXq “
∑
λi vipXq.




prptiqvipXq. Now the vipXq in
the sum means that we effectively only count those ti that are true when X is
true. So the sum becomes the sum of the prptiqs where ti is a disjunct of X. Thus∑
prptiqvipXq “ prpXq.
We now prove the other direction: given λi , we show that bpXq “
∑
λi vipXq is
a probability function. bpXq ě 0 since all the λis are non-negative, and so are the
outputs of vi . Take some partition of SL, call it {Xj}. To prove b is a probability
function, all we need to do now is show that
∑
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Now since Xj partition SL, for any v PV we have
∑









This theorem will be useful later. For example, it is the basis of Joyce’s argument
discussed in section .. Williams (a,b) discusses modified versions of this
theorem for convex hulls of different kinds of sets of nonclassical valuation func-
tions. For a set of nonclassical truth valuations W, we can ask how to characterise
the set of convex combinations of W. Call it W`. For some particular sets W, we
know what the convex hull contains, but there doesn’t seem to be a general result.
Conditional probability
Before moving on, I’d like to briefly consider an important modification to the
probability framework. Instead of taking these unconditional probabilities prpXq
as the basic entity, we might consider taking our probability functions to be two-
placed conditional probability functions prpX|Y q. We read this as “the probability
of X given Y ”. We often interpret the conditional probability of X given Y as what
your belief in X would be if you learned Y was true. In this section I talk as if this
link between conditional probability and updated probability is uncontroversial.
It is not, but it is intuitive, and it makes the presentation slightly less awkward.
One could replace “learning X” with “supposing that X” throughout this section.
Before we can define conditional probability, we need a slightly more sophisticated
concept of the space of belief. My presentation follows that of Halpern (, p. –
). Instead of being defined over the set of sentences SL, conditional probability
functions are defined over SLˆSL1 where SL1 is a subset of SL that is closed under
consequence. That is, if X P SL1 and X ( Y then Y P SL1. Often SL1 is taken to
be SLz{K}. A conditional probability function is a function pr : SLˆ SL1 Ñ R.
Conditional probability measures satisfy versions of Bounded, Normalised and
Additive for all X,X1,X2 P SL and Y P SL1
Bounded prpK|Y q ď prpX|Y q ď prpJ|Y q
Normalised prpK|Y q “ 0 and prpJ|Y q “ 1 and prpY |Y q “ 1
Additive prpX1|Y q`prpX2|Y q “ prpX1^X2|Y q`prpX1_X2|Y q
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These are basically the unconditional properties rewritten, replacing every in-
stance of prp¨q with prp¨|Y q and they hold for all Y P SL1. The only addition is the
third component of the Normalised axiom which says that the conditional prob-
ability of Y given Y is also 1. This is plausible: on learning Y , you should come
to believe Y to the highest degree. This isn’t so much a substantive assumption
as a characterisation of the kind of learning we are concerned with. So for each
Y the function prp¨|Y q is an unconditional probability function. In particular, it
is common to identify the unconditional probability prp¨q with the conditional
probability function conditioned on J: prp¨q “ prp¨|Jq Conditional probabilities
also have a new axiom that describes how the first and second arguments interact:
Conditional If X2,X3 P SL1 and X1 P SL then:
prpX1^X2|X3q “ prpX1|X2^X3qprpX2|X3q
Using the convention that prp¨q “ prp¨|Jq, and setting X1 “ X,X2 “ Y ,X3 “ J
we can rearrange the terms in the above equation to give us the following:
prpX|Y q “ prpX ^Y q
prpY q (.)
This equation is typically understood as the definition of conditional probability
out of basic unconditional probabilities. On the current view, this equation is a
consequence of the definition of basic conditional probabilities. This approach has
the advantage that conditional probabilities can be defined even if the conditioning
event – Y in the above example – has prpY q “ 0. The ratio analysis, as Hájek ()
calls it, is undefined if the denominator is zero. Taking SL1 to be the set of X P SL
such that prpXq ą 0, we have a perfect agreement between the two definitions of
probability. The advantage of taking conditional probabilities to be the basic units
is that it allows us to define larger SL1 and still have everything work nicely.
Halpern offers a nice argument for why the ratio formula should characterise
a kind of learning. Given that this formula is a simple manipulation of Con-
ditional, this argument lends weight to the reasonableness of that axiom. I will
describe the theorem in words, and then give it formally. First, if you learn X,
it seems reasonable that you now assign  X minimum belief. This is basically
just a characterisation of what kind of learning we are talking about: you learn
The argument works just as well if you think of it as an argument about a certain kind of
supposing.
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X with certainty. Second, learning X with certainty (and nothing else) shouldn’t
change your beliefs with respect to how likely the various realisations of X are.
Imagine you learn that your horse Categorical Imperative has placed: has finished
in the top three. This information shouldn’t change your attitudes to the relative
likelihoods that the horse came first or second or third. That is, it would be strange
if you thought it much more likely that the horse would come third than it is
that it would come second, but on learning only that he placed, you become more
confident of a second place relative to a third place. Halpern – using the “possible
worlds” talk we discussed above – put the intuition this way:
One reasonable intuition is that if all that the agent has learned is X,
the the relative likelihood of worlds in X should remain unchanged.
Halpern (, p. , with notational changes)
This is a condition of rigidity. The following theorem proves that any updated
probability measure that accords with the above intuitions will satisfy the ratio
formula with respect to the prior probability.
Theorem .. If the following properties hold for X1,X2 P SL and Y P SL1 with
X1 ( Y , X2 ( Y and prpX2q ą 0:





then for any Z P SL:
prpZ|Y q “ prpZ ^Y q
prpY q
Proof The proof can be found in Halpern (, p. ) 
I think that Hájek (, ) is right that conditional probabilities are the
better basic building block. However, for my purposes the distinction will not
matter. I will therefore simplify the formalism by sticking to unconditional
probability functions. But it should be borne in mind that these are “really”
conditional probabilities conditioned on J.
For the alternative belief functions that I discuss below, there may well be
conditional counterparts to the unconditional ones I discuss, but I shall not
discuss them: Interesting as they may be, and foundationally superior as they may
be, their interest is orthogonal to mine. I thus dispense with the extra formalism
required to treat them and remain resolutely unconditional.
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Capacities
In characterising probability theory above, I mentioned a few properties of belief
functions. I think that (Bounded) is non-negotiable. I also think that (Normalised)
is effectively the articulation of a convention, rather than a substantive restric-
tion on belief functions. So all the alternative belief functions will satisfy these
properties. I call these the basic conditions.
Another property that I feel is pretty important is the following:
Monotonic If X ( Y then bpXq ď bpY q
Note however that anyone committing the conjunction fallacy violates this prop-
erty. Non-monotonic reasoning is a big research area in logic, and an important
one. But that is about inference whereas this property is about static beliefs at a
time. I think it has some intuitive weight.
Our first, most permissive set of belief functions is the Choquet capacity:
Definition .. cq P B is a Choquet capacity if it is Bounded, Normalised and
Monotonic.
See Eichenberger and Kelsey () for a discussion of Choquet capacities. Call CQ
the set of all Choquet capacities. This is quite a permissive framework. Indeed,
for most purposes, Choquet capacities will not be informative enough. The
(Monotonic) property is quite a weak property. It only tells us, for instance, that
bpX _Y q ě bpXq. It doesn’t tell us how bpX _Y q relates to, say, the sum of bpXq
and bpY q. This motivates our next definition:
Definition .. A belief function b P B is 2-monotone if:
bpX _Y q ě bpXq`bpY q´bpX ^Y q
A 2-monotone capacity is (Monotonic). Why this property is called “2-monotone”
will become clear once we introduce the more general n-monotone property. Before
Since X^Y ( X, we must have bpX^Y q ď bpXq. But this is exactly what doesn’t happen with
people committing the conjunction fallacy: they take “Linda is a bank teller” to be less probable
than “Linda is a bank teller and an active feminist.” See Tversky and Kahneman () for
more on the conjunction fallacy.
If X ( Y then Y ” X_p X^Y q. So bpY q “ bpX_p X^Y q ě bpXq`bp X^Y q´bpX^ X^Y q.
So bpY q ě bpXq`bp X^Y q. The result follows since b is nonnegative.
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we do that, let’s have a look at one more instance of it: 3-monotone:
bpX _Y _Zq ě bpXq`bpY q`bpZq
´bpX ^Y q´bpX ^Zq´bpY ^Zq
`bpX ^Y ^Zq
The degree of belief in the disjunction is the sum of the singleton beliefs, minus
the sum of the beliefs about pairs, plus the belief in the triple conjunction. n-
monotone just extends this basic inclusion-exclusion idea to arbitrary n. The idea
is simple, its actual description takes some getting used to.














This is basically an “inclusion-exclusion” rule. It says that belief in n-element
disjunctions is related to sums of belief values of conjunctions of subsets of the





 I is some subset of {1, . . . ,n}
so this is the belief in the
conjunction of some subset






 The p´1qi`1 means we add
conjunctions with an odd
number of elements, and






 I ranges over all i-element
subsets of our big disjunc-
tion. So we add or subtract
all the i element conjuncts,










 Finally we sum over the
size of the subsets from 1
to n.
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In the 2-monotone case this amounts to adding the singletons and subtracting
the conjunction of the two. 3-monotonicity amounts to adding the singletons,
subtracting all the conjunctions or pairs and then adding the conjunction of all
three. An n-monotone function is pn´ 1q-monotone.
Dempster-Shafer belief
Now we can introduce Dempster-Shafer belief functions. DS Belief functions will
offer a middle ground between the informative, restrictive probabilities, and the
looser Choquet framework.
Definition .. A Dempster-Shafer belief function is an infinite-monotone capac-
ity.
A DS belief function has the n-monotone property for all n.
A useful way to think about DS belief is in terms of the associated concept of a
mass function.





Note that a mass function is not a representation of belief in the same way that b is.
That is, more strongly believed events needn’t have more mass. A mass function
characterises “how much belief to associate with X, that can’t be associated with
subsets of X”. A mass function represents belief through the associated belief
function.
With this concept of a mass function we can characterise DS belief in a different
way. We also characterise the related concept of a plausibility function plaus.
Definition .. Call belpXq a D-S belief function and plauspXq a D-S plausibility








Add K as a final disjunct and it all cancels out.
. A framework for belief, uncertainty, value and action 
The belief, or support, of X is the sum of the masses of the subsets of X. If the
mass function is non-zero for atoms only, then the belief function is a probability
measure.
The DS belief function bel is interpreted as the extent to which the evidence
supports the conclusion X. The plausibility function plaus represents the extent
to which the evidence fails to support the contrary hypothesis. In other words, plaus
represents the extent to which the evidence is consistent with X.
Call DS the set of all DS belief functions. It is clear that, for all X we have
plauspXq “ 1´belp Xq, so DS adequately captures both functions.
Theorem .. of Halpern (, p. ) shows that the two formulations of DS
belief functions are effectively interchangeable in finite domains. That is, whether
you take a DS function defined as an infinite-monotone capacity or defined by its
associated mass function amounts to the same thing, at least for finite domains. For
infinite domains, there are belief functions with no corresponding mass function.
These classes of belief functions are not unrelated. Every probability function
is a D-S belief function, and every D-S belief function is a Choquet capacity. In
other words: VĂV` ĂDSĂ CQĂ B.
... Representing value
Preference relations
We need a way to express an agent’s having a preference between things. We take
ϕ  ψ to mean “ϕ is at least as good as ψ” and ϕ  ψ to mean “ϕ is better than ψ”.
Call these weak preference and strong preference, respectively.
In section ., the preference relation will be among bets, but in section .
the preference will be among acts more generally. Elsewhere, one might wish to
consider a preference relation among outcomes.
Value functions
As in the case of qualitative probability and belief functions, preference can
be represented by value functions or utility functions. The idea is the same as
for representing belief. The preference relation “u” is represented by a value
function, or utility function u iff: whenever o u o1 we have upoq ě upo1q.
We extend this u function on outcomes to an “expected value” function on
acts as follows. The idea is that in making a decision you weight the values you
associate with the outcomes by how likely you consider those outcomes to be. As
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we have seen, what event obtains influences what outcome occurs. So the weights
on the outcomes should connect with the degrees of belief in the events, somehow.
In the standard Savage framework, this amounts to multiplying the utility of
the outcome which is the result of the act function acting on an event, by the
probability of that event, and summing over the possible events. That is, we find
some partition of SL, {Xi} such that the acts we are considering are constant on
each Xi and we sum over these events.






Choice of partition isn’t that important here, since any refinement of the partition
will give you the same value. The same is not true for other kinds of belief function.
This problem will be taken up later.
The time spent on representations of belief versus representations of value is
indicative of my concerns in the rest of the dissertation. For the most part, I take
it for granted that the value of an outcome is adequately represented by the cash
value associated with it.
.. Difficulties, caveats, alternatives
This section collects a miscellany of things I feel I should mention before moving
on to the more substantive chapters.
... Some standard caveats
Before continuing, we need to make clear a couple more caveats. These are fairly
standard simplifying assumptions in the literature and nothing hangs on these
details. We assume that you are risk neutral. This means, for instance that a
preference among bets reflects your opinion of the relative value of the bets rather
than a preference to avoid taking risks. (See Allingham , Chapter ; Binmore
, pp. –; Peterson , pp. –). For example consider flipping a fair
coin. Risk neutrality would mean that you would be indifferent between the
following two bets: (a) paying one Euro for the chance to win two Euros if Heads
comes up (b) paying one million Euros for the chance to win two million Euros
if Heads comes up. Most people are happier to take the first rather than the
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second bet. In general, people are sensitive to the variance of a bet, not just its
mean. This illustrates that people are not normally risk-neutral, but that they are
risk-averse: they tend to avoid big risks. In general people are more wary of bigger
gambles, even if the potential winnings are proportionally bigger as well. In fact,
conceptually, there are two distinct things going on here – even if in practice they
are dealt with formally in the same way. First, people tend to disvalue big risks:
gambles with high variance in expectation are dispreferred. Second, the value of
one Euro depends on how much money you already have: A million Euros is not a
million times as good as one Euro. In both cases the standard formal assumption
is that utility is linear with money. This builds in both that risk has no disutility,
and also that money does not have diminishing marginal value. I am somewhat
unhappy with the conceptual identification of these things that is often made, but
for the present, I am happy to make both assumptions. I am not endorsing the
claim that risk neutrality is rational. Indeed, I think there may be good reasons for
thinking it isn’t, except in very special cases. Okasha () gives an evolutionary
argument for the rationality of some level of risk aversion. Buchak (ms.) sets out a
decision theory that allows a level of risk aversion to be rational. I think these are
interesting projects, but I think I can safely bracket these issues given my focus.
We also assume a “state independence”. That is, how good the outcome is does
not depend on whether you have bet on it or not. The sort of things we want
to rule out are the following: imagine you are betting on the weather and the
possible prizes include an umbrella, sunglasses and so on. Now, which weather
event occurs affects your attitude toward the prizes: presumably you value the
umbrella much more if it is raining versus its being sunny, and vice versa for the
sunglasses. This makes things messy, so let’s stipulate that the value of the prizes
is independent of the state that is actualised. I discuss state independence in more
depth when I deal with representation theorems in section ..
There are some further simplifications I shall be making. The decisions I
consider take place at a time. So there are no sequences of decisions. I also keep
your utility function determinate: I will not allow imprecise utilities for the time
being. I will also avoid the issue of whether sets of probability ought to be
convex, I don’t think they need be, although in this dissertation I normally assume
they are.
I am not arguing that these caveats are always reasonable to impose. But I think
But see Bradley ()
But see Kyburg and Pittarelli (, §) for some discussion of problems with convexity. See also
Bradley () for comments on convexity when both probabilities and utilities are imprecise.
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they are a useful abstraction, and the problems arising from relaxing them are
orthogonal to the problems I am focusing on here.
... Jeffrey’s system, computer architecture and abstraction
It may seem strange that Jeffrey makes everything into propositions: intuitively,
acts, states and outcomes are all rather different kinds of things. I want to explain
why Jeffrey’s approach makes sense, and then explain why I don’t follow him.
Think about an integrated circuit. Everything is just a number: the machine
code instructions, the data, the addresses of the data. . . But, what makes things
work is the way the number is treated: that’s what makes something a machine
code, or an address or what have you. A number in memory is treated as an
instruction if, when it is read, it leads to particular transistors to turn particular
circuits on or off. What makes some number a piece of data is if it is used to decide
whether to send a high or a low signal through those circuits controlled by the
instruction. What makes a number a memory address is if the instruction that
preceded it is the sort of instruction that takes an address as an argument.
In the same way, despite acts, outcomes and states all being the same sort of
things, they are dealt with differently. Indeed, one might think of Savage’s ap-
proach as formalising the separation that is implicit in the attitudes we have to
the various kinds of propositions. To stretch the analogy further, higher level
computer programming languages will abstract away from the machine code. This
involves distinguishing different kinds of entities (often called types). So despite
the fact that everything is fundamentally a number, some kinds of symbols will
be used to refer to instructions, some other method will be used for referencing
addresses, and some other way to indicate an actual number. Higher level pro-
gramming languages will have different kinds of objects: strings, floating point
numbers, signed integers, unsigned integers, lists. . . These are all, at base, numbers
in memory, but it’s useful to have different shortcut methods for manipulating
them, since they need to be treated differently. If two numbers are representing
particular strings of letters, then it doesn’t make sense to add them together. You
can do it, but the result doesn’t have any meaningful interpretation.
Or not even: everything is just a particular configuration of particular parts of physical computer
memory. Certain configurations of open/closed transistors, or high/low current are understood
as representing certain binary digits 1 or 0 which are interpreted as numbers.
Charles Petzold does an excellent job of explaining computer architecture in his book Code
(Petzold ).
Annoyingly, the “`” operator is often overloaded to do string concatenation, instead of adding
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I think the same sort of thing is going on in the relationship between the decision
theory frameworks. Everything can be thought of, at base, as a proposition.
But some kinds of propositions we want to think of as events, and their logical
structure and interrelationships are important. For other propositions, it is the
preference structure which is important to us.
Often, the abstraction of treating different kinds of propositions as different
is a legitimate move: things are conceptually simpler. Savage sets things up in
this simple way. But it is a “leaky abstraction” as all abstractions are. What
this means is that in the edge cases, in the unusual circumstances, the abstraction
breaks down. And when this happens, all sorts of strange behaviour can emerge.
As long as you are aware of the problems and do your best to avoid them, then
you can safely use the abstracted theory. Thus I adopt Savage’s strict distinctions
between acts, states and outcomes.
Bradley () explains exactly what needs to be done to a “Jeffrey-like” frame-
work to make it look “Savage-like”. This amounts to treating acts as conjunc-
tions of particular kinds of conditionals in an enriched space. These are not
truth-functional conditionals, but there is some disagreement about what sort of
conditionals they are. Joyce () offers one approach, Bradley () another.
So, acts will now be thought of as functions from states to outcomes. But we
should keep in mind that they are “really” conjunctions of conditionals of a certain
kind.
.. Conclusion
We have now set up the formalism that will see us through the rest of the disser-
tation. It is abstract, and idealised in many ways, as we have seen. However, the
hope is that some insight can be drawn from this system nevertheless.
the underlying numbers together.
The term is from Spolsky ()
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The long run is a misleading
guide to current affairs. In
the long run we are all dead.
Economists set themselves
too easy, too useless a task if
in tempestuous seasons they
can only tell us that when the
storm is past the ocean is flat
again.
(John Maynard Keynes)
There were quite a few preliminary details to set out in the previous chapter,
so it may be useful to take a moment to explain how this chapter fits into the
overall project. The ultimate aim is to develop a better account of belief and
decision under severe uncertainty. Before I do this, it will be helpful to see what
the standard approach to these issues is. I take probabilism to be the standard
approach and so this chapter is devoted to discussing and criticising the arguments
for probabilism. The next chapter will contain further discussion of probabilism,
and will present some further problems for the standard view.
In section . I discuss one of the most influential arguments for probabilism:
the Dutch book theorem. Next, in section . I tackle the other main type of
argument: representation theorems. Having dealt with these two well discussed
strands of justification for probabilism, I move on to some less well known views.
A recent kind of argument that relies on measuring inaccuracy of belief is sum-
marised in section .. Finally, in section . I discuss some other attempts to
justify probabilism.
There are a couple of things to explain here. First “coherent” often means
conforming to the rules of probability. So incoherent credences are those that
Recall that probabilism is the view that takes probability theory to be the best model of belief
under uncertainty.
. Arguments for probabilism 
contravene one or other of the axioms of probability. I don’t like using “coherent”
to mean “conforming to probability theory”, since the suggestion is then that non-
probabilists are incoherent. This is a value judgement I do not endorse. So perhaps
I should call probabilists “probabilistically coherent” or just “p-coherent”. One
could then talk of other kinds of coherence: “DS-coherent”, meaning conforming
to the axioms for Dempster-Shafer beliefs.
Sometimes probabilism is taken to include the various alternative approaches I
outlined above. My use of the term “probabilism” is somewhat more restricted: I
use it to mean coherence with probability theory as outlined in Definition ... I
do however endorse the more general claim that degrees of belief can and should
be modelled formally. In fact, I even endorse the claim that probability theory has
a privileged role to play in our understanding of degrees of belief. I return to this
point at the end of the chapter.
.. Dutch book argument
An awful lot of ink has been spilled over the Dutch book argument (DBA). People
have criticised its prudential character, that it relies on pragmatic concerns about
preferring higher utility outcomes. People have suggested that betting behaviour
is not a good proxy for belief (e.g. Bradley and Leitgeb ). Any number of
other issues have been raised with it. See Hájek () for an overview. I am
sidestepping much of the current and past debate over the status of the Dutch
book argument. I want to explore in detail what one needs to assume in order to
prove the theorem, and ask when are those assumptions justified.
Degrees of belief have a role in decision making, and betting is a paradigm
case of that. So there should be some connection between betting behaviour and
belief. The connection may not be as tight as proponents of the DBA would have
us believe, but there is still something to be learned about belief by studying the
constraints on reasonable betting.
Standardly the theorem is traced back to the work of Bruno De Finetti and
F.P. Ramsey in the s and s. My aim here is not historical, so I do not want to
go back to those original authors and see whether modern treatments are faithful
to those pioneers’ works. What I will do is take one specific modern treatment
Much of this section draws on Bradley ()
 I am here making a claim about where the argument is generally traced to: not one about who
it should be traced to.
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of the theorem and go through it in detail. I will also mention another different
approach to the theorem.
As a first approximation the Dutch book argument says that if your credences
are “non-probabilistic” then you are open to a Dutch book. Non-probabilistic
means just that your credences don’t conform to the axioms of probability. A
Dutch book is a set of bets that guarantee a sure loss to whoever takes them. But
strictly speaking the Dutch book argument does not say this: it talks in terms of
betting behaviour and implicitly assumes that betting behaviour lines up with
belief. So, let’s restate the DBA in terms of betting behaviour. It says if your betting
odds are non-probabilistic then you are open to a Dutch book and you will lose
money. So, if your degrees of belief are the sole determinant of your betting odds,
then your degrees of belief had better be probabilistic.
But this can’t be the whole story, since actual bookmakers do offer odds that
are not probabilistic! If this naïve Dutch book argument were true, then bookies
offering nonprobabilistic odds would have been exploited to bankruptcy long ago.
So there must be more to the story than that. To give a fairer appraisal of DBA, I
need to explore in detail the theorem that gives the argument its strength.
This will be a rather long and involved discussion of what is, ultimately, a rather
simple theorem. The aim is to carefully assess exactly what restrictions on betting
behaviour are required to secure the theorem. Along the way, we will see which
parts of the theorem can be proven with restricted sets of constraints. Since I
will find only some of the conditions to be rationally compelling, it is worthwhile
seeing what can be done without the contentious axioms.
... A formal framework for gambling
The Dutch book argument talks in terms of betting behaviour, so we need a formal
method for talking about bets. I borrow much of this formalism from Halpern
(). Frank Döring () has a slightly more general framework for describing
bets, but when he moves to discussions of Dutch books, he places restrictions on
the allowable bets so as to make the two frameworks much the same.
For our purposes, a bet is an ordered pair of an event in SL and a “betting
quotient”. For a bet of stake s and potential winnings w, the betting quotient is
α “ s
w
. The higher the α the more likely you think the event in question is. The
greater the proportion of the winnings you are willing to risk on a bet, the more
likely you think the event is. So bets will be ordered pairs of the form pX,αq where
X P SL and α P R. What is relevant about a betting scenario is the betting quotient
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and the event in question.
The argument can be made that the absolute size of the stake and the potential
winnings relative to your current wealth are also relevant in gambling. For
example, in poker, a good player will act differently depending on whether she
is chip-leader or short-stacked. The way Joyce () sets up his decision theory
builds this element in. Joyce makes you sensitive to overall levels of wealth, rather
than changes in level of wealth. While this is better in actual cases, in this rarefied
setting we are assuming that utility is linear with money and that the punter is risk
neutral. This is for the sake of simplicity, rather than for any principled reason.
Concerns about the diminishing marginal utility of money, and your attitude to
risk are orthogonal to the concerns of the current project. Severe uncertainty is
hard enough on its own, so I will help myself to these sorts of simplifications
throughout. I am not making any claims that these simplifications are always
permissible, simply that the complications they lead to are orthogonal to the
concerns of the current project.
A bet pX,αq pays out vpXq. That is, if X is true the bet pays out 1, and it pays
out 0 if X is false. The bet costs α, that is to say the stake is α because we have set
the winnings w “ 1. The bet p X,1´αq is called the complementary bet to pX,αq.
Think of the complementary bet p X,1´αq as “selling” the bet pX,αq. Whenever
you take a bet pX,αq, the bookie is effectively taking on the complementary bet
p X,1´αq. Table . illustrates the “mirror image” quality that the payoffs of
complementary bets have.
vpXq “ 1 vpXq “ 0
pX,αq 1´α ´α
p X,1´αq ´p1´αq α
Table ..: Payoffs for a bet and its complement
What I am interested in here is how betting behaviour might serve to force
degrees of belief to be probabilistic. In this respect, the important parts of the bet
are the event bet on and something that is supposed to correlate with the agent’s
strength of the belief in that event. The betting quotient serves this purpose.
Think of the bets like this: when you buy a bet pX,αq you pay α and get a ticket
that says X. If it turns out that X is indeed the case – that is it turns out that
vpXq “ 1 – then you return to the bookie and redeem your ticket. That is, you
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hand in your ticket to the bookie and he gives you £1. So your net gain is 1´α. If
X fails to be the case – if vpXq “ 0 – then the ticket is worthless and you have lost
your α.
There are two possibilities for the “neutral bet”: pJ,1q or pK,0q. That is, the
bet that costs 1 and guarantees a payoff of 1 or the free bet with no prospect of
winning anything. Preferring a bet to one of these suggests that you would accept
that bet: the bet is “better than nothing”. I return to the issue of preference versus
acceptance later. These neutral bets bets are complementary to each other.
A set of bets B “ {pX1,α1q, . . .pXk ,αkq} costs κpBq “
∑
αi and pays out pivpBq “∑
vpXiq. That is, you get 1 for every event that you bet on that is true. So the value
of a set of bets B is τvpBq “ pivpBq´κpBq. The value of the bet is how much it pays
out, minus what the bet cost. The complementary set of bets BC is just the set of
bets complementary to those in B: {p X1,1´α1q . . .p Xk ,1´αkq}
Theorem .. For all v PV and B we have τvpBCq “ ´τvpBq
Proof Assume that B consists of n bets: {pX1,α1q,pX2,α2q, . . . ,pXn,αnq}. The cost
of the complementary bet is:





As for the payout: for every bet that B wins, BC does not, and for every bet that B
does not win, BC does. There is a total of n up for grabs and exactly one of B or
BC wins on each of the n events. More concisely, from the properties of v PV, we











Putting these two results together it follows that a set of bets wins exactly as
This is an abuse of notation. BC is not the set-theoretic complement of B at all, but something
rather more subtle.
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much as the complementary set of bets loses:
τvpBCq “ pn´pivpBqq´ pn´κpBqq
“ ´pivpBq`κpBq
“ ´τvpBq 
This shows that the neat complementarity of the payouts of complementary
bets illustrated in Table . holds for sets of complementary bets as well.
pX,αq is the same as a bet with odds of “1´ α : α”. This is for English-style
odds. That is, “odds-to” rather than “odds-for”. Apparently in the U.S. odds look
different and the corresponding bet would have odds of “1 : α”.
Odds can be defined directly in terms of bets; as a ratio of the profit to the
stake. Profit is the win minus the stake. So for the bet pX,αq, a stake of α gives
a profit of 1´ α if X obtains. To tie this in with the above discussion of α as a
betting quotient, recall that our potential winnings are fixed at 1. So α plays the




. There is no loss of
generality here, since if you wanted to play a “high stakes” gamble with large
potential winnings, say 100, you can simply buy one hundred copies of the bet.
You could just buy 100 copies of pX,αq. One could make the size of the stake an
extra parameter (as Paris (,  []) does) and then add a constraint to
the effect that preferences among bets are insensitive to the size of the stakes. That
is, a bet would be a triple pX,α,sq that costs sα and pays out αvpXq. The constraint
would then be that if pX,α,sq  pX 1,α1, sq then the same preference holds for all s1.
A more formal rendering of this sort of “stake independence” appears as Savage’s
P in a later section.
Recall the standard caveats from section ... We want any preference among
bets to indicate a difference in the punter’s degrees of belief in those events. That
is, we want to say that if a punter prefers bet A to bet B when A and B pay out the
same, then that reflects the punter’s belief that the event in A is more likely than
the event in B.
... Rationality constraints on betting preference
I am now ready to set out the proof of the Dutch book theorem. This section
lays out the preliminaries, the constraints on betting preference. The next section
contains the proof proper. First I will make clear exactly what conditions have
The odds-to of a fair coin landing heads should be “ to ”. Odds-for would be “ for ”.
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to hold for the argument to follow. That is, I show what conditions have to be
satisfied in order for you to be constrained by the DBA. These conditions come
from Halpern (). This treatment is nonstandard. I chose Halpern’s treatment
because it is the one that makes clearest the assumptions one makes in proving
the theorem. They are also interestingly weaker than might be expected. I will
later discuss how it relates to other more classical outlines.
The preference relation we are characterising is one that holds between sets
of bets, but this straightforwardly determines a relation between the bets them-
selves by its action on singleton sets, so I use the “” symbol for relations among
individual bets as well.
Halpern’s first constraint is the following:
Bet Dominance For sets of bets B1 and B2: If τvpB1q ě τvpB2q for all v P V
then B1  B2. And if τvpB1q ą τvpB2q for some v then B1  B2.
This is a dominance principle. I call it Bet Dominance to distinguish it from a
principle called Dominance that comes up in the gradational accuracy argument
(section .). What this says is that if B1 is guaranteed to give at least as much
money as B2 in every situation, then you should (weakly) prefer B1 to B2. And
if B1 sometimes gets you strictly more money, you should strictly prefer it. This
condition relates preference among bets to payoffs of bets. It is this condition
that gives the theorem its pragmatic character. Important steps in the proof work
by showing that if you are in violation of one of the axioms of probability, then
it can be shown that you prefer a sure loss to a sure gain, thus contradicting
Bet Dominance. Note that this condition does not entail that you are rationally
obliged to prefer a bet with higher expected value: you are only obliged to prefer a
bet with higher guaranteed value. This is one way Halpern’s conditions are weaker
than might be expected. Indeed, it would be strange if Halpern’s argument relied
on expectation: this is supposed to be a behaviourist argument, so it should not
appeal to the inner mental life of the agents and what they expect.
Halpern’s second condition is simply that betting preferences should be transi-
tive.
Transitivity For sets of bets B1,B2,B3: if B1  B2 and B2  B3 then B1  B3
This second condition gives some structure to the set of bets. Transitivity and the
fact that the weak preference relation is reflexive means that the relation gives
the set of bets the structure of a partial preorder.
Reflexivity follows from Bet Dominance.
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The third condition is that complementary bets are comparable.
Complementarity For all X either pX,αq  p X,1´ αq or p X,1´ αq 
pX,αq
This condition relates complementary events. In other words it relates betting
behaviour regarding an event to behaviour regarding the complementary event.
Or it connects your attitude to buying bets to your attitude to selling bets. This
gives further structure to the betting preferences. Since we are using betting
behaviour as a way of discussing uncertainty, this condition relates uncertainty
in an event to uncertainty in its complement. Note this is an inclusive “or”: both
disjuncts of (Complementarity) can hold.
Note that this condition is much weaker than demanding that the preference re-
lation be complete, or total. It is only between complementary bets that the relation
must hold one way or the other. In other words, it can still be acceptable, rational,
that neither B1  B2 nor B2  B1, as long as the bets are not complementary. This
is the condition I will end up rejecting. I shall defer my criticisms of it until the
end of this section.
The final condition states that if you prefer some bets individually, you prefer
them as a set. Or, as Halpern puts it “preferences are determined point-wise”.
(Halpern , p. )
Package If pXi ,αiq  pYi ,βiq for each i then:
{pX1,α1q, . . .pXk ,αkq}  {pY1,β1q, . . .pYk ,βkq}
This relates single bets to sets of bets. It is sometimes called the “package prin-
ciple” and has been criticised (see e.g. Schick ). I think it’s fairly acceptable:
I don’t feel the force of the objections against it. I will however show what it is
possible to prove in the absence of this condition.
This constraint is fairly weak. Note the things it does not say: it does not say
that if B1  B2 then for each pX1,α1q P B1,pX2,α2q P B2 that pX1,α1q  pX2,α2q. Nor
does it guarantee in general that if B1  B2 and B3  B4 then B1YB3  B2YB4.
These constraints impose a certain structure on an agent’s preference among bets.
This concludes the discussion of the constraints on rational betting preference. It
However, it can be shown that both disjuncts of (Complementarity) are true for at most one
value of α for any X.
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is claimed that failing to have preferences structured in this way is irrational. The
intuitive appeal of most of the conditions should be apparent.
Real bookies violate (Complementarity). They do not offer “symmetric” odds
on and against an event. But of course, real bookies’ odds do not reflect their
beliefs in the way agent’s preferences in Dutch book situations should. Bookies
are out to make money. The move away from symmetry allows bookies to make
money whichever way the outcome goes. They are, in effect, collectively Dutch
booking their punters. This assumption of Dutch book arguments is not often
made explicit, but it is important: agents in the DBA are not out to make money,
nor are they trying to lose money; they simply bet according to their beliefs in
order to break even. That is, these agents are setting their betting quotients in such
a way as to reflect what they consider fair prices. The agents are like a cooperative
insurance agency: they want to set their premiums in such a way as to cover the
losses they expect, but they also want to set their premiums as low as possible.
That’s why their betting behaviour is supposed to tell us about their beliefs. That’s
why (Complementarity) is supposed to be justified. I shall have more to say on
this point later.
... Consequences of betting preference conditions
The following two definitions will be absolutely vital to the proof.
Definition .. Your limiting betting quotients are defined:
• αX “ sup {α : pX,αq  p X,1´αq}
• βX “ inf {β : p X,1´ βq  pX,βq}
That is, αX is the largest value you’re willing to buy the bet at, and βX is the
smallest value at which you’ll sell the bet. The Dutch book theorem, in its usual
form amounts to arguing that prpXq “ αX is a probability measure. That is, we
need to show that αJ “ 1; αX ě 0 for every X; and that αX_Y “ αX ` αY for
incompatible X,Y .
I don’t do this directly. I try to do as much of the proof as possible with as
few of the conditions as possible. It turns out that you can do a lot without
Betting quotients that satisfy this condition are symmetric in the sense that if the odds on X are
1´α : α then the odds against X are α : 1´α.
This is an analogy that is due to Lenny Smith.
This is using the “incompatible propositions” definition of probability.
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(Complementarity), and then use it just at the end to show αX “ βX . And then
the last details fall into place.
I set out the proof as follows. First I show that only the first two conditions
– (Bet Dominance) and (Transitivity) – are required to give prpXq “ αX and
prpXq “ βX the structure of a Choquet capacity. Then I show that with (Package)
as well I can demonstrate that prpXq “ αX is a Dempster-Shafer belief function and
that prpXq “ βX is a Dempster-Shafer plausibility function. Finally, I introduce
(Complementarity) and demonstrate that the full Dutch book theorem now holds.
The proof is not “efficient” in that the theorem can be proved much quicker if all
the conditions are available from the start. However, I think that the intermediate
results that I derive on the way are interesting in their own rights. And since I
don’t endorse all the constraints on betting preference, those intermediate results
will be all that will be required for rationality, in my view.
What the Dutch book theorem actually proves
The Dutch book theorem shows us that limiting betting quotients must have a cer-
tain structure if your betting preferences satisfy the above restrictions. Typically
the Dutch book theorem is taken to tell us something about belief, not just about
betting quotients. To make this move, we need one further assumption. We need
something that makes the link between betting quotients and belief tight enough
that structure imposed on betting quotients allows us to infer the same structure
imposed on belief. One way to do this is to interpret degrees of beliefs as your
limiting willingness to bet. This is the line that Williamson () takes. I think
this is too strong a connection between belief and betting behaviour. Obviously
revealed betting preferences have some strong connection to belief, but I don’t
think that betting preference exhausts the functional role that belief plays. I
discuss in more detail what I understand belief to be when I discuss my preferred
model in the next chapter (section .).
Despite this, it does seem that there should be a strong link between belief and
betting behaviour. So we shall assume that you are willing to bet in line with your
beliefs. To secure the conclusions we want, we need to be able to assume that
betting behaviour reveals the structure of your beliefs.
One might think that there are distinctions in belief state that can’t be elicited
by differences in betting behaviour. Even so, the Dutch book theorem tells us
something about your betting quotients. This tells us something about your beliefs,
but we mustn’t make the mistake of thinking that betting quotients are beliefs:
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they are consequences of beliefs, only. So the following sections are going to put
the Dutch book theorem in terms of betting quotients. It will then be up to us to
decide what the consequences of this are for belief. How we do this depends on
what we think the relationship is.
Betting quotients are Choquet capacities
To show that betting quotients are Choquet capacities we need to show that they
are normalised, bounded and monotonic. Normalisation first.
Lemma .. αK “ 0 αJ “ 1 βK “ 0 βJ “ 1
Proof Note that τvpK,αq “ ´α for all v. Likewise τvpJ,1´αq “ α for all v. For
α ă 0, this means that pK,αq  pJ,1´αq by Bet Dominance. Thus αK ě 0. For
α ă 0, we have pJ,1´αq  pK,αq. So pK,αq pJ,1´αq. So αK ď 0. Thus αK “ 0.
Proofs of the other three results follow in exactly the same way. 
So our betting quotients are normalised.
We move on to monotonicity now. First we have a couple of quick lemmas
regarding preference for smaller bets and for bigger events. Note that many of
these lemmas also have a “strict” version, but I leave that implicit, since I never
actually need to use the strict versions.
Lemma .. For all events, X:
• If α ď α1 then pX,αq  pX,α1q
• If β ě β1 then p X,1´ βq  p X,1´ β1q
Proof This follows immediately from (Bet Dominance). 
That is, you prefer the bet that costs you less if the bets win/lose in the same
circumstances. And similarly, if you’re selling the bet, you prefer to sell it for
more money.
Lemma .. If X ( Y then for all α:
• pY ,αq  pX,αq
• p X,1´αq  p Y ,1´αq
Choquet capacities were defined above in Definition .., p. .
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Proof The first half follows directly from (Bet Dominance). The second half
follows from the first half and the observation that if X ( Y then  Y ( X. 
This too should be intuitive. If you keep the stake fixed, you would prefer a bet
that wins in more circumstances. And if you are selling the bet it is the other way
around: you prefer to sell a bet on a smaller event.
Lemma .. For all events, X, the following two biconditionals hold:
• pX,αq  p X,1´αq if and only if α ď αX
• p X,1´ βq  pX,βq if and only if β ě βX
Proof We shall do the “if” part first; we assume α ď αX .
pX,αq  pX,αXq by Lemma ..
pX,αXq  p X,1´αXq by definition
p X,1´αXq  p X,1´αq by Lemma ..
So: pX,αq  p X,1´αq by (Transitivity)
Now the “only if” part. pX,αq is preferred to its complement. It follows that
α ď αX because αX is defined as the largest value for which that bet is preferred to
its complement. The proof of the second result is similar. 
The above lemmas together allow us to prove the following:
Theorem .. If X ( Y then:
αX ď αY and βX ď βY
Proof Assume X ( Y . Then:
pY ,αXq  pX,αXq by Lemma ..
pX,αXq  p X,1´αXq by definition
p X,1´αXq  p Y ,1´αXq by Lemma ..
pY ,αXq  p Y ,1´αXq by Transitivity
So: αX ď αY by Lemma ..
The proof of the other result proceeds in the same way. 
Since K ( X and X ( J for all X, monotonicity entails boundedness. We
have proved that prpXq “ αX has the structure of a Choquet capacity, as does
prpXq “ βX .
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We can in fact prove more than just that prpXq “ αX and prpXq “ βX are
capacities. We can show that they are capacities intimately related to each other.
It is hardly surprising that values at which you buy a bet and values at which you
sell those bets are connected.
Theorem .. For all X; αX “ 1´ β X
Proof Note that   X “ X and 1´p1´ β Xq “ β X , and thus that pX,1´ β Xq 
p X,β Xq. So by Lemma .. we know that 1´ β X ď αX .
1´ p1´αXq “ αX . So from the definition of αX it follows that p  X,1´ p1´
αXqq  p X,1´αXq. Therefore, by Lemma .., 1´αX ě β X . Thus, 1´β X ě αX .
Therefore αX “ 1´ β X 
In fact, if we allowed our “αs” to range over some only partially ordered set of
goods with unique maximal and minimal elements, rather than real numbers, then
one can prove that (Bet Dominance) and (Transitivity) are enough to show that
the belief function so defined is Halpern’s “plausibility measure”. See Halpern
(, p. –) or Chu and Halpern () for details.
Betting quotients are Dempster-Shafer belief measures
All of the above results rely only on (Bet Dominance) and (Transitivity). From
now on, the results will also require (Package).
Theorem .. For all X; αX ď βX
Proof The set of bets {pX,αXq,p X,1´ βXq} is preferred to its complement by
definition of αX and βX and (Package). The payout of this set of bets is always
1. The cost of the bets together is αX ` 1´ βX . So the value of this set of bets is
always βX ´αX . If it were the case that αX ą βX , this net gain would be negative,
and the complementary set of bets would have positive net gain, by Theorem ...
This contradicts (Bet Dominance), so the conclusion is that αX ď βX 
This is a proof strategy that we shall use a lot: we make some assumptions about
some betting quotients. We find some set of bets (often a set of bets with one bet
on each element of a partition of SL) and we show that this set is preferred to its
complement but that it has a negative payout in every world (that is, for every v).
The definitions of τv and friends need tweaking, but all the modifications are straightforward.
 In fact, the next few results require only (Bet Dominance) and (Package). Until we get to
Theorem .., which also requires (Transitivity), no interesting structure is imposed.
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So its complement has a positive payout in every world by Theorem ... This
violates (Bet Dominance), so whatever assumption we made about the αs must
be wrong. Often I will show that the set has a negative payout and jump straight
to the conclusion that the assumption is wrong.
Our next aim is to show that αX is superadditive and that βX is subadditive. That
is, we want to demonstrate that the following two inequalities hold for disjoint
X and Y : αX_Y ě αX `αY and βX_Y ď βX ` βY . Before we do that, we will need
some more lemmas.
Lemma .. If exactly one of the Xi are true then:∑
αXi ď 1 and
∑
βXi ě 1
Proof Each pXi ,αXi q is preferred to its complement by definition. So by (Package)
they are preferred as a set. This set of bets always wins 1, no matter what v is used,
since exactly one Xi is true. If
∑
αXi ą 1 then the net gain would be negative,
contradicting (Bet Dominance). The proof of the second half is similar. 
Note that with (Complementarity) and Lemma .. it is already possible to prove
that prpXq “ αX conforms to the partition definition of probability.
Note that exactly one of {X _ Y , pX _ Y q} is true and therefore, by the above
lemma, that 1ě αX_Y `α pX_Y q.
Two final inequalities will allow us to prove the result we want.
Lemma ..
αX_Y `αX^Y ď βX ` βY and βX_Y ` βX^Y ě αX `αY
Proof The following set of bets is preferred to its complement by definition (plus
(Package)): {pX _ Y ,αX_Y q,pX ^ Y ,αX^Y q,p X,1´ βXq,p Y ,1´ βY q}. This set of
bets wins 2 everywhere. Its cost is p1´ βXq ` p1´ βY q `αX^Y `αX_Y . Thus the
set of bets wins βX ` βY ´ pαX_Y `αX^Y q everywhere. So in order to avoid this
being negative, αX_Y `αX^Y ď βX ` βY . The other half of the proof is similar. 
We now have everything we need to prove the following theorem:
Theorem .. For all incompatible X,Y :
• αX_Y ě αX `αY
• βX_Y ď βX ` βY
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Proof Consider the bet B“ pX_Y ,αX`αY q. This has exactly the same payout as
C “ {pX,αXq,pY ,αY q}. Because X and Y are incompatible, C never wins 2. So by
(Bet Dominance), B  C (and indeed, C  B). C  CC by definition and (Package).
Now by (Bet Dominance) again, CC  BC . So by (Transitivity) B  BC . αX_Y
is defined as the maximum value for which a bet on X _ Y is preferred to its
complement. This value is at least αX `αY , since B  BC . So αX_Y ě αX `αY .
Much the same proof works for the corresponding result involving βX_Y . 
Lemma .. and Theorem .. don’t quite get us what we’d really like to prove.
To prove a more general result directly – namely that αX_Y `αX^Y ě αX `αY –
we need another constraint on preference among sets of bets. I have proved these
slightly unsatisfactory theorems because they, together with Complementarity,
are sufficient to prove what we want without recourse to the extra principle. The
required principle is the following:
Distribution Invariance For set of bets B“ {pX1,α1q,pX2,α2q, . . . ,pXn,αnq},
if B  BC then κpBq ď∑αXi .
This principle requires that preference among sets of bets is determined only by
the total cost of the set and not how that cost is distributed among the individual
bets. The converse of this principle is a consequence of Bet Dominance.
Lemma .. For all X,Y
αX `αY ď αX_Y `αX^Y
Proof Let B “ {pX _ Y ,αXq,pX ^ Y ,αY } and let C “ {pX,αXq,pY ,αY q}. τvpBq “
τvpCq for all v. So by Bet Dominance B „ C. Also, τvpBCq “ τvpCCq so BC „ CC .
C  CC by definition and Package. Putting these facts together with Transitivity
we have that B  BC . So by Distribution Invariance we have that αX ` αY ď
αX_Y `αX^Y . 
The same proof can be used to show that the αs are n-monotonic for any n. If we
define belpXq “ αX and plauspXq “ βX these functions are Dempster-Shafer belief
and plausibility measures, respectively.
When we introduced Dempster-Shafer belief functions, we also introduced
the connected notion of a mass function. We can construct the mass function out
In section .. on p. ...
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of our betting quotients. First, let’s define mpXq as follows:




By “Y +( X” I mean Y entails X but X does not entail Y . That is, rY s Ĺ rXs.
Strictly speaking this should be an inductive definition on the size of X, but it’s
fairly clear how it works. This will turn out to be a mass function as defined in
Definition .. on p. . Note that this sum is “ranging over proper subsets of
rXs”. mpXq picks up all the mass not already attributed to subsets of X. So for
example, the mass of an atom is just equal to its maximal betting quotient. That
is mptq “ αt. From this assumption and Lemma .. it follows that mpXq ě 0 for
all X; because K ( X, for all X. It just remains for us to show that the sum of
the masses of all events is equal to 1. This follows from the fact that the atoms
partition the event space, and thus
∑
αti ď 1 by Lemma ...
We now show that the DS belief function defined by this mass function does
indeed have the right relationship to all all the betting quotients.


















We can also prove, in a similar way, that plauspXq “ βX is a D-S plausibility
function, though I won’t go through that here. So bel defined this way is infinite
monotone. We have proved as much as we can without (Complementarity).
Betting quotients are probabilities
Finally, we add (Complementarity) to our arsenal of rationality constraints and
now we can prove the full Dutch book theorem.
Lemma .. For all X, αX “ βX .
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Proof For all β ą αX , it is not the case that pX,βq  p X,1´βq. So by (Complementarity),
p X,1´βq  pX,βq. So αX “ inf {β : p X,1´ βq  pX,βq}“ βX by Definition ...
So our superadditive αX and our subadditive βX are forced to be the same. This
is enough to derive the final result.
Theorem .. prpXq “ αX is a probability measure.
Proof By Lemma .., and the above result, we know that αX_Y “ αX `αY for
incompatible X,Y . So prpXq “ αX is additive. We have already shown that this
function is bounded and normalised. 
Note that the above argument doesn’t make use of Lemma .. and hence it
doesn’t require Distribution Invariance.
... Paris’ Dutch book argument
As I said, the above proof is non-standard. It is quite different from most other
treatments of the DBA, so I shall spend some time comparing it to another proof.
I shall discuss J.B. Paris’ approach to the Dutch book theorem. This part is based
on Paris (,  []).
Paris considers the following scenario.
[S]uppose that 0 ď p ď 1 and that the expert is required to make a
choice, for stake S ą 0 between:
• gaining Sp1´ pq if vpXq “ 1 whilst losing Sp if vpXq “ 0
• losing Sp1´ pq if vpXq “ 1 whilst gaining Sp if vpXq “ 0
Paris (, p. )
This is clearly a choice between a bet on X and a bet against X. In my above
discussion of Halpern I just set the stake to be S “ 1. If we do the same here, then
we can see that Paris’ framework relies on choosing between complementary bets.
Paris defines a number which is supposed to be the maximum value at which you
prefer the first of these to the second. This is exactly the definition of αX we had
above. The conclusion is, of course, that if the belief function defined by these
maximum values is not a probability function, then you are open to a Dutch book:
a set of bets that guarantees that you lose money.
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where taking the first kind of bet for Xi means setting Si positive, and taking the
second means setting Si negative. Paris’ definition of a Dutch book is a set of
Si and Xi such that the value of (.) is negative. He proves that there exists no
Dutch book if and only if the pis are convex combinations of v PV.
It is implicit in his argument that one should always have a preference between
complementary bets, which is exactly the content of (Complementarity). Paris
simply does not worry about the possibility that the expert has no preference
between the two bets. Paris makes this commitment explicit in his later paper.
Paris says that throughout the paper he is making the assumption that “for any
θ P SL, stake S ą 0 and η P r0,1s either one is willing to accept [the first bet] or one
is willing to reverse roles and [accept the second bet].”
However, Paris is interested in a different kind of modification to the scenario.
He is interested in valuation functions v that don’t obey the classical rules. And
one of the situations he explains in his  [] leads to the conclusion that
belief functions should be Dempster-Shafer belief functions.
To reiterate: the valuation function v serves to decide which bets win, and which
lose. So if you bet on an event X and it turns out that vpXq “ 1, you win. In the
original Dutch book theorem, the v functions of interest are those whose outputs
are classical truth values, ones that obey the classical truth conditions which we
saw earlier in Definition ...
Paris extends the Dutch book argument to cases where the v function need not
obey the classical definition. Instead of learning the truth value of all atoms, you
learn some (possibly non-atomic) proposition X. The v rule of interest now is vX
which operates like this: vXpY q “ 1 iff X ( Y . In the context of these alternative v
functions, the “Dutch book method” then produces the result that to avoid Dutch
books, your belief function should be a Dempster-Shafer belief function. In fact,
Paris’ result is quite general. For any set of valuation functions W, Paris’ theorem
shows that to avoid a Dutch book you have to have a belief in the convex hull of
W. Paris shows that for a particular choice of W, then using a result from Jaffray
(), W` is exactly the DS belief functions. So it is important how the “truth”
of events is determined.
This is an interesting convergence of results. Above I showed that by modifying
the restrictions on the agent’s betting preference, you can derive a “Dutch book-
like” result for DS theory. Paris shows that a similar result obtains if one instead
 Paris ( [], fn , p. )
Classical truth valuations were defined in Definition .. on p. .
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keeps the betting preference restrictions in place, but modifies the conditions
under which bets win. I think these two results are pulling in the same direction
and it is the aim of section .. to draw out these conclusions. This result is
worth mentioning both because it gives an alternative route to nonprobabilism,
but also because Robbie Williams has recently used a similar technique to subvert
a different argument for probabilism (Williams a,b).
... Loose ends
There are some minor issues I would like to discuss in this short section. First, I
want to address the difference between a fair bet and a favourable bet. And second,
I wish to point out the difference between preference among bets and acceptance
of a bet. Finally, I discuss the “converse theorem challenge”.
Fair or favourable
Hájek () rightly argues that the Dutch book argument is often set out in terms
of “fair” bets: bets at odds that are fair according to your beliefs. This is to be
contrasted with “fair-or-favourable” odds, which are bets at fair odds or better, by
the lights of your beliefs. For example, say you were betting on a fair coin’s landing
heads. Your belief in this event is bpHq “ 12 . The odds of -for- on this event are
fair by the lights of your belief. Longer odds are not fair, but favourable. If you’re
willing to accept -for- on heads, then of course it makes sense to take -for- or
-for- on the same event (although you might get suspicious of someone offering
-for- on a fair coin’s landing heads). These bets are favourable. It is worth
noting that Halpern’s framework always talks in terms of fair-or-favourable bets
and the norms govern both. αX represents your fair betting quotient, anything
less than that counts as favourable. Lemma .. guarantees that favourable bets
are preferred to their complements; Lemma .. and Lemma .. guarantee that
more favourable bets are more preferred.
Preference or acceptance
Note that Paris’ argument is in terms of bets you would accept, given your beliefs.
Halpern’s argument is only in terms of your preference among bets. To illustrate
the difference between preference and acceptance, consider the fact that you can
have a preference among bets without being willing to accept either. It seems
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rational to have the following preference: pK,0.1q  pK,0.3q, although you would
certainly not want to buy either bet. That is, you can a preference for paying less
for a bet, even if you don’t want to buy any bet on an impossible event.
So how do we bridge the divide between preference among bets and acceptance
of bets? We could characterise acceptance as follows: you accept a bet pX,αq just
in case pX,αq  p X,1´αq. Or perhaps instead we could say that you prefer a bet
just in case you prefer it to the neutral bet pJ,1q. Or we could do this by appeal to
b. You would accept the bet pX,αq when bpXq ě α. It should be obvious that bpXq
will coincide with αX by definition. These characterisations amount to the same
thing.
Converse theorems
What is still missing from the above argument is the oft-neglected “converse
theorem” (Hájek ). That is, we have not proved that if your betting quotients
are probabilistic, then there does not exist a Dutch book against you. The above
argument (in section ..) shows only that it is irrational to be nonprobabilistic.
It does not show that being probabilistic protects you from this irrationality. In
the present set up, proving the converse theorem would mean showing that if
b P V` then if you set your betting quotients in accordance with you b, you
satisfy Halpern’s conditions. In fact, it would require you to have your preferences
among bets determined only through the expectation associated with b, in order
to have you satisfy Halpern’s conditions. This is possible, but I won’t go through it
here. Paris ( []) is also immune to Hájek’s “converse theorem” challenge.
Paris explicitly makes his Dutch book argument an “if and only if” claim: so he
effectively shows the converse theorem to be true as well.
... What’s wrong with the DBA?
This section mainly deals with why one might want to “get off the bus” before
we add (Complementarity). That is, we are concerned with whether it might
be reasonable to finish with just Dempster-Shafer betting quotients: under
what circumstances it might be reasonable to deny that one’s betting preference
should be constrained by (Complementarity). Reasons for this idea have to do
Indeed, it follows from (Bet Dominance).
I don’t think DS theory is all that much better as a model of belief, but I do think it is a more
reasonable restriction on rational betting quotients.
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with concerns about vagueness or ambiguity undermining the rationale for the
symmetry condition.
Consider an analogy to discussions of vagueness. Imagine we are trying to
determine the boundary between two regions. The boundary is vague. On one
side, we are unequivocally in one region, call it X. On the other side we are
certainly in  X. The boundary between them is indistinct. We can say that “up to
at least this point we are definitely in X” without committing ourselves to saying
“after this point we are certainly in  X.” Now consider throwing a dart at this
region (imagine that the dart has a uniform probability over the whole region).
You are offered a bet on whether the dart will land in the X region. The nature of
the game forces us to assign some numerical betting quotient to X, call it bpXq.
But because of the uncertainty, the vagueness, we are not thereby committing
ourselves to saying that all the remaining probability belongs to  X, that is we
are not saying that 1´bpXq “ bp Xq. So you can recognise some bets on whether
X will occur as being good, and some as being bad. But there is a third category:
bets you aren’t sure about.
Given that (Complementarity) seems to be relating belief in an event to belief
in its complement, it seems like this would be the constraint to relax if one were
worried about vagueness. I think the analogous move makes sense for cases of
severe uncertainty or ambiguity. Paris’ discussion of “the Dutch book method”
for non-classical valuation functions (Paris  []) is also revealing. Here
we seem to be saying that if the criteria for a successful bet are somehow “non-
classical” then we need not restrict ourselves to probability measures. Vagueness
might induce this kind of non-classical criteria for success.
The Paris approach seems to invite questions about the interpretation of the
valuation function. Is this supposed to have some metaphysical import? What
does it mean to say that the valuation function is non-classical? Does this mean
that the world is somehow non-classical? It may be possible to give this valuation
function an epistemic reading. However, the “deny (Complementarity)” approach
I took in section .. is, I feel, safer, since the rationality conditions on betting
preference clearly have no metaphysical import. They are more clearly about the
agent’s attitude to vagueness. So my approach works even when we know that bet
winnings are determined classically. Since my interest is in how to formally deal
 Fuzzy logic, one approach to dealing with vagueness, can also be modified to offer a theory
of upper and lower probabilities: see Halpern (, pp. –). So this analogy is not so
far-fetched
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with uncertainty and ambiguity, situating the problem in the agent’s epistemic
state is preferable to situating it in the logic of which bets win. Nevertheless, that
Paris’ approach leads to similar conclusions only strengthens the argument.
So nonprobabilistic betting behaviour can demonstrate, not your irrationality,
but the weakness of your epistemic state. For example, Ellsberg style choices do
not show that you are behaving irrationally, but that you are in the possession of
an incomplete, vague, ambiguous picture of the gambling scenario.
.. Representation theorems
The Dutch book argument is one big strand of argument for probabilism. The other
such strand is the representation theorem argument. Representation theorems in
slogan form say “If you conform to some reasonable restrictions on preference, and
assumptions about the structure of the world; then there is a probability function
that agrees with your choices.” This is a very rough characterisation, there are
myriad different representation theorems that are importantly and interestingly
different. I look at some of these in turn, I will not discuss proofs in detail.
... Representation in general
Before going on to talk about the representation theorems of specific interest in
this context, I want to take some time to discuss the concept of representation in
general. There is a mathematical field known as “measurement theory” which
deals with these sorts of questions. We are ultimately interested in when one
particular formal structure can be represented by another. In particular, we are
interested in when certain kinds of order structures can be represented by a
function.
I will briefly outline the simplest such case: length. Certain kinds of rigid bodies
– sticks, pencils, book spines, arm spans – can be ordered by how long they are. For
my purposes I take those things that can be so ordered to be called “sticks”. Sticks
needn’t be stick-like, one can compare the diagonal size of a computer screen to
the long edge of a piece of paper. The important thing is that there is an obvious
way to compare these lengths. I briefly set out the basic idea of a representation
theorem here.
I discuss these games in the next chapter.
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. Length is a quantity – a property that admits of degrees – that attaches itself
to some kinds of things.
. Call “sticks” things that have a length. For my purposes, pencils, arms, book
spines, the imaginary line between your outstretched fingers: these are all
sticks.
. Some sticks are longer than others. Say “X len Y ” means “X is at least as
long as Y ”.
. There is an operation you can perform on sticks: composition. You can lay
sticks end to end and parallel. Call the compound of X and Y , X ‘Y . It is
also a stick.
. The set of sticks (S) has some structure. For all X,Z we have X‘Z len X. If
X len Y then X ‘Z len Y ‘Z.
. There is a privileged stick: the null stick. No stick is shorter than the null
stick.
. Given some technical conditions, there is an additive function len : SÑ R
that assigns to each stick, a real numbered value: its length. len represents
len and is unique up to affine transformation.
. By “len represents len” we mean that X len Y if and only if lenpXq ě
lenpY q.
. By “len is additive” we mean lenpXq` lenpY q “ lenpX ‘Y q.
Measurement theory studies this idea of representing a quantity. You get theorems
that look like this: “If S, ‘ and len have the right sort of properties, then the
function len will have certain other properties.” The properties of the function
that represents the quantity tell us things about that quantity itself. For example,
contrast length and temperature. Length has an additive representation. However,
not so for temperature. There’s no interesting physical composition procedure such
that temperature is additive with respect to that procedure. Put two thermal
bodies in contact and the temperature of the composite body will be some sort of
average of the two temperatures of the composite bodies before composition, not
their sum. So this tells us that length and temperature are interestingly different
as quantities, not just as regards their representations.
Ellis calls length an extensive quantity, and temperature intensive.
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There is a mathematical theorem that backs up point  on this list. For the
technical details, the classic work is Krantz et al. (). See also Ellis () and
Kyburg () for more philosophical treatment.
I want to take a moment here to emphasise that only some aspects of the
representation function can be understood to be telling us things about the world.
For example, there exists a particular representation function that measures the
particular stick X as having a length lenpXq “ 42. This is a fact about the function
that we don’t take seriously as a fact about the world. The X stick has no intrinsic
property of “forty-two-ness”. The point is that there will be other functions that
don’t give X that value of length that will represent the quantity just as well. So a
stick that is, say 42 centimetres will be some other number (16.5) of inches long.
But it is the same length. So it is only properties invariant under an appropriate
class of transformations that we take to tell us something about the world (Stevens
).
That, in brief, is what a representation theorem looks like. We will be interested
in representation theorems that say something, not about length or temperature,
but about your beliefs and values. The general case is taken up in Krantz et al.
(, Chapter ).
... Eliciting beliefs
In the case of representations of subjective probability and utility, it is trickier
than for length, because we are trying to represent two things – your beliefs and
your values – but we only have the one yardstick: your choice behaviour. We take
choice behaviour to reflect preference.
To get at the intuition behind representation theorems, I consider first ways you
might try to elicit someone’s degrees of belief in various events. Ramsey, De Finetti
and Savage all thought about how one might go about finding out what an agent’s
actual degrees of belief might be through finding out what preferences they held.
These theorems, being behaviourist in character, don’t want to assume anything
about your mental life. They look only at the overt, observable consequences of
whatever goes on in your head. That is, they look only at your observed choices,
which reveal your preferences among the options.
What we effectively do in the Dutch book argument is use a given linear scale
See Krantz et al. (, Chapter ).
I think this behaviourist character of the theorems has misled some people to think that only
what can be elicited in this way can be real.
. Arguments for probabilism 
(money) to calibrate beliefs by preferences on bets. That is, we calibrate “strength
of preference” on a previously given linear scale. This is like using a ruler to
determine what our len function should return for a given stick. Or imagine
learning that a column of mercury in a tube of constant diameter has a height
proportional to the air temperature. We can then use our understanding of length
(or height) to calibrate the temperature scale. Calibrating belief scales works in
the same way. We can imagine offering you a series of bets where the event is
fixed but the stake changes. There will be some “tipping point” value at which
you no longer prefer the bet to its complement. We write this value down and
repeat, thereby building up a record of your betting quotients (and therefore, it is
assumed, your beliefs). We need a monetary scale – a ruler, if you like – to get this
strategy off the ground. We are calibrating our belief scale (temperature) to the
previously given linear scale of money (length).
The von Neumann–Morgenstern approach uses objective chances to calibrate
utility (von Neumann and Morgenstern [] ). Instead of keeping the
event fixed and shifting around the stake to elicit your beliefs, these authors use
a different trick. They shift around the objective chances with which various
consequences arise and calibrate their value function that way. Anscombe and
Aumann () use a similar trick to von Neumann and Morgenstern, but they
use some objective chances to elicit subjective probabilities for other events as
well.
Ramsey uses a neat trick to elicit strength of belief without recourse to such an
explicit yardstick (Ramsey ). He assumes that there exist some propositions
about whose truth value you have no preference either way. He calls these ethically
neutral propositions. His idea is to pinpoint the “probability one half” point by
finding an ethically neutral proposition X0.5 with the following property: for
outcomes o1  o0, you are indifferent between gaining o1 if X0.5, o0 if  X0.5 and
gaining o0 if X0.5, o1 if  X0.5. That is, despite preferring to get o1, you have
no preference about which of X0.5 or  X0.5 would be the better way to get it.
Ramsey can then use these ethically neutral probability one half propositions to
calibrate a utility scale. Choose o0, o1 such that o1  o0. Now fix the utility of
these outcomes as follows: upo0q “ 0,upo1q “ 1. There is an outcome, o0.5 such
that you are indifferent between it and o1 if X0.5, o0 if  X0.5. Fix upo0.5q “ 0.5.
Using a similar procedure you can find further outcomes that have utility 0.25
and 0.75, and so on. To extend it to things preferred to o1, we look for that
We obviously need quite strong richness assumptions to guarantee that there are outcomes with
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o2 such that you are indifferent between o2 if X, o0 if  X and o1. Likewise for
things dispreferred to o0. Once Ramsey has built up this utility scale, it can be
used to calibrate degrees of belief in a similar way to how we used bets above to
calibrate belief. See Bradley () for more details on Ramsey’s method. What’s
impressive about Ramsey’s approach is that no previously existing linear scale
is needed to get the whole thing to work. As Bradley points out, however, there
are some strong assumptions in the background. Ramsey’s assumptions make his
method a good way of eliciting beliefs, but the axioms don’t make so much sense
as constraints on rational preference.
Savage’s method, like Ramsey’s, doesn’t need a previously existing scale to
calibrate measures of belief against. Unlike Ramsey, Savage tries to make his
axioms, as much as possible, reasonable constraints on rational preference. The
order is also reversed: Savage derives a measure of belief first and uses that to fix
the utilities.
... Savage’s Foundations of Statistics
Savage’s representation theorem for personal probability is spread through chap-
ters , and  of his classic Foundations of Statistics (Savage  []). Much like
the Dutch book theorem as I presented it, the basic idea is to look at your choices
or preferences under uncertainty and then to impute beliefs to you. Savage’s
approach is interesting, because he starts without making any assumptions about
your utility scale. All he needs to assume is that you have preferences over a
remarkably rich collection of acts. The trick is to help himself to particular kinds
of acts, that can be used to elicit your beliefs about events. He builds a “qualitative
probability” ordering out of the preferences over these sorts of acts, and then
uses essentially the same proof as Krantz et al. () to arrive at a probabilistic
representation. Once he has defined probability, he then goes on to show that
the preferences determine a utility scale up to linear transformation.
Savage’s world
Savage considers a set of possible worlds – the states – and defines events as sets of
such worlds much as Halpern () does. We can go the other way and define
the events as the sentences of a language SL, and define the states as the atoms
of this language. Alternatively, since there is a bijection between the atoms and
the right properties for all the values we want to specify.
This is anachronistic. Krantz et al. acknowledge that their proof owes much to Savage’s work.
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members of V, we could have the states be described by the valuation functions.
Some of Savage’s conditions will require that there be uncountably many states.
Savage then defines consequences as those things that might matter to a person
and that might be brought about by some act. The set of consequences O – what
we earlier called outcomes – is effectively an unstructured set of things you might
care about. It derives its structure from other features of the system. An act is
then a function from atoms in SL to consequences O. I will denote the set of acts
A as before.
An act determines, for each way the world could be, the consequences that
would befall you were you to perform that action when the world were in that
state. Finally, it is shown that given certain assumptions about the structure of
preference among acts, there is one and only one probability measure that accords
with preference in a certain way.
The restrictions on preference
In this section, I list the assumptions Savage makes about preference among acts.
Reading “a1  a2” as “a1 is at least as good as a2”, the first condition says that the
relation is a total order.
P For all a1, a2, a3 PA:
• a1  a2 or a2  a1
• If a1  a2 and a2  a3 then a1  a3
In other words,  satisfies transitivity and completeness. Note this is stronger than
(Complementarity) from section .., and similar worries apply here. Savage
contemplates the possibility of allowing “” to be a partial order, but dismisses
the project since doing so would be “losing much in power and advancing little,
if at all, in realism” (Savage  [], p. ). In his presentation, Joyce makes
the two parts of this definition distinct axioms. This is because the second part is
arguably a principle of rationality while the first part is not (Joyce , p. ).
Savage defines various relations out of this preference relation. He needs the
notion of “preference among acts, given a certain condition is known to obtain”. That
is, he needs preference conditioned on an event: “a1  a2 given X”. For example,
you may on balance decide you prefer to not carry an umbrella. However, your
preference given that it is raining is to carry the umbrella. This is done by saying
that if a1 and a2 lead to the same consequences outside of X, then a1  a2 given X
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if and only if a1  a2. The second condition – known in the literature as the “Sure
Thing Principle” – is then:
P For every event X, the relation  given X is total.
Calling this the STP is perhaps a little misleading: a lot of the work is being done
by the definition of the relation “a  b given X”. We will meet the STP again a
number of times, and when we do meet it again, it will be more obvious what the
content of the principle is. For now, I pass over it without further comment.
A constant act is one that gives the same consequence for all states. For all
practical purposes, a constant act can be identified with its constant consequence.
Savage relies on these constant acts to impose a preference ordering on the conse-
quences through the ordering among acts. P says that for acts that are constant on
X, whichever constant consequence is preferred determines which act is preferred
given X.
P If a1pxq “ o1 and a2pxq “ o2 for every x P rXs, then a1  a2 given X, if and
only if o1  o2
Note that “o1  o2” is a preference between outcomes rather than acts. Savage
determines preference between outcomes by the proxy of constant acts. Imagine
there’s an act that always gives outcome o1. And another that always gives o2.
It’s reasonable to understand preference between the outcomes as meaning a
preference between the constant acts that give those outcomes.
An important assumption is being introduced here that is worth making more
apparent. What this requires is that how much oi is valued does not depend
on which event obtains. We mentioned this kind of assumption earlier: how
much you value the lottery that wins an umbrella depends on whether or not
it rains. P rules out these sorts of possibilities. In many cases, the outcomes
are not state independent in this way. For example imagine taking bets on future
catastrophic climate change. The money you stand to gain if the climate system
does go catastrophically wrong will likely be worth a lot less than the money is
worth if things carry on as before. In this case, I’d recommend taking gambles
that involve payouts in canned food, drinking water and solar panels. Or imagine
making a big bet on the proposition “there will be hyperinflation in the UK by
”. Of course, if you win, there will have been hyperinflation, and thus the
money has become near-worthless. These examples illustrate state-dependent
utilities. Having your values depend on the states like this is ruled out by P.
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The Savage-style response to these problems is to refine the outcomes. He
suggests that – to return to the simple umbrella case – the outcomes have been
mis-specified. The outcome is not in fact the same whether it’s raining or not:
the outcomes are “umbrella when raining” and “umbrella when sunny”. With
outcomes specified at that level of detail, the Rectangular Field Assumption (RFA)
looks less convincing. The RFA says that all possible functions from states to
outcomes define acts. The more fine-grained you make these sorts of outcomes,
the less reasonable it seems that you can find constant acts. For instance, what
sort of act could possibly win you “umbrella when raining” when the event “it is
sunny” obtains?
Savage then moves on to constructing a relation among events. Consider the
choice between two acts: aX , aY such that aX wins you a prize when X obtains, and
aY wins you the same prize when Y obtains. That is, aXpxq “ o1 for all x P rXs and
aXpxq “ o2 for all x R rXs, and o1  o2 and similarly for aY .














Table ..: Table of consequences for acts relating to P
Whatever the prize is (assuming it is actually preferable to not receiving any
prize) it seems reasonable that given the choice, you will pick the act that cor-
responds to the event you consider more likely (compare Lemma ..). In this
way I could elicit your “qualitative probability” by asking you to pick between
acts. Savage’s P effectively says that for any two pairs of “prize functions” like
this, you always pick the same way. Basically, this guarantees that the actual prize
offered isn’t relevant to which of the acts you pick.
P For o1, o2, o11, o12 PO with o1  o2 and o11  o12, and aX , aY ,bX ,bY P A with
X,Y P SL: If the consequences for the acts are as in Table ., then: if aX  aY
then bX  bY
To rule out a particularly uninteresting pathological case, we assume that
there are two consequences, such that one is strictly preferred to the other. This
guarantees that there will be some nontrivial prize function.
The term is due to Broome (, p. –,–).
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P There are at least two constant acts, o1, o2 such that o2  o1
Next, P claims that you can cut up the states of the world small enough such
that changing the action of two acts on some small part of the space makes no
difference to the preference order among those acts. This is basically a demand
that the set of states be rich enough to be infinitely subdivided.
P If a1  a2 then, for every o PO there is a partition of SL such that a11  a12
and a1i is identical to ai on all but one partition element, and a
1
i takes the value o
on that one element.
What P demands is that no matter how fantastic some consequence o is, you
can always cut the event space up small enough so that an act modified to give
you o on some tiny part of the space doesn’t affect you preference among the acts.
No matter how brilliant a prize, one can contemplate a situation so implausible
that getting that prize in that implausible situation makes no difference to your
preferences.
Finally, Savage’s last constraint demands that if a is preferred to every conse-
quence that b can produce on X, then a  b given X. It is, in short, a dominance
condition.
P If a  bpxq given X for every x P rXs, then a  b given X.
Note that “a  bpxq” is actually a preference for an act over an outcome. As above,
we understand this as shorthand for a preference for a over the constant act that
always returns bpxq for a fixed x. P has the flavour of what Bradley () calls
“The Averaging Slogan”:
No prospect is better (or worse) than its best (worse) realisation in a
set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive prospects. (p. )
Savage proves that you can extract a “qualitative probability” from preference
among acts. Savage shows that, given a rich enough space of states, acts and con-
sequences, only one probability measure “agrees with” the qualitative probability
thus determined. In the next section I will discuss qualitative probability, but first
I shall mention some problems with Savage’s approach.
Problems with Savage’s approach
Here I outline a number of problems with Savage’s approach.
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Preference among acts is taken as the basic preference relation, and preference
among consequences is derived from this. Psychologically, this seems backwards:
it is because of a particular preference among the possible consequences — along
with my judgements of the likelihoods of various possible states of the world —
that I prefer some act to another. That is, it feels to me as if it is my beliefs and
values that determine my choices, not the other way around. One might respond
that yes, there is something psychologically backwards about this approach, but
that’s not necessarily a point against in as regards its adequacy as a model of
belief. In the same way we can measure temperature by its effect on the height
of a column of mercury, even though it is the temperature that determines the
height, not vice versa. That is, the representation, the elicitation is focusing on the
effect rather than the cause of the behaviour, but it is a meaningful representation
nevertheless.
State independence – the outcomes’ being independent of the states – seems
to be a rather strong assumption. In some circumstances it seems reasonable:
betting under normal circumstances where the economic conditions are assumed
to be stable, for example. But in many real-world decision examples, the state of
the world does impact the value of many of the outcomes we are trying to bring
about. This is at least an assumption that can be dropped. There is a lot of work
on “state-dependent utilities” and representation theorems for them (Schervish,
Seidenfeld, and Kadane ). Given that many decisions based on scientific
evidence, especially climate decisions, seem to have state-dependent utilities, it
seems like this should be an assumption I should avoid. However, I think the
question of state independence is orthogonal to my interest, which is in severe
uncertainty. Given that this issue is difficult enough, I feel I am warranted in
making the state independence assumption when I discuss decision making.
There is another kind of independence built into Savage’s framework. This one
is harder to get rid of, since it is not just an assumption that can be dropped. This
is act independence. Act independence means that which act is performed does not
affect the chances of the various states obtaining. For example, choosing to bet on
Categorical Imperative does not make it more or less likely that that horse should
win. This is built into the setup of Savage’s system by having acts be functions
from states to outcomes. Jeffrey’s system, by doing away with this way of framing
acts, doesn’t build in act independence.
Act independence is interestingly and radically violated in some decision prob-
lems we face in a climate change decision context. Indeed, many of the options on
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the table are specifically designed to lower the chance of catastrophic warming. Any
kind of mitigation action is a deliberate attempt to change the chances with which
various climate states will obtain.
Act independence is a much more problematic assumption, I feel, than is state
independence, in this context. However, for the most part I will be making the
assumption. Again, this is not because I think it is a warranted assumption,
but because I feel that the problems it raises are somewhat orthogonal to the
problems of severe uncertainty. Even if the set of decision problems to which
my conclusions are relevant is restricted to adaptation decisions (as opposed to
mitigation decisions), I think a thorough understanding of severe uncertainty will
be useful. It would certainly be interesting to drop this assumption, but I will
have to leave this for future work. One approach would be to understand the
states as being conjunctions of dependency hypotheses that tell you what would
happen were a certain act to be performed. This seems to go against the colloquial
understanding of what it is we have beliefs about: I have a belief about whether it
will rain, not whether a certain bundle of dependency hypotheses (“If I were not
take an umbrella I would get wet”. . . ) holds. Even given this, it seems that such
bundles of dependency hypotheses make the RFA less plausible in much the same
way the “reconceptualise the outcomes” response to state independence does.
The richness of Savage’s world – with its infinitely divisible state space – may
seem troubling. For all practical purposes, only a finite number of elicitations can
be done. So one can never in practice narrow down the representation of a real
subject’s mental state to unique probability and utility functions. But the more
preferences are elicited, the more I can know about your beliefs and utilities. The
richness is only really required for the uniqueness of the result, and can be seen as
a kind of “limiting ideal” rather than as any requirement of rationality. I return to
this point later.
Meacham and Weisberg () object to the use of representation theorems as
a basis for decision theory. Their argument is that representation theorems can’t
accurately characterise real agents’ beliefs, nor can they provide a normatively
compelling grounding. The failure of what they call Characterisational Represen-
tationalism relates to things I have already discussed: failures of real agents to
satisfy the axioms (STP or completeness for example). The failure of Normative
Representationalism is connected to an argument due to Zynda () that any
agent whose belief can be represented by a probability function can also be repre-
sented by a nonprobabilistic function, as long as a commensurate modification to
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the choice rule is also made. The upshot, for both Meacham and Weisberg and
for Zynda is that we can’t use representation theorems to get beyond qualitative
belief orderings in terms of normative assessment of belief.
A stronger problem, perhaps, and one that I think Zynda’s argument suggests is
that “being representable some way or other is cheap. . . ; it’s more demanding to
actually be that way.” (Hájek , p. ). Hájek goes on to give the example of
Voodooism as a rival to probabilism. You prefer A to B just in case there are more
A-favouring spirits than there are B-favouring spirits. The claim is that agents can
be represented as having such warring voodoo spirits, but that does not make it the
case that there are such spirits.
... Representing qualitative belief
Whether you get your qualitative belief ordering from Savage’s elicitation pro-
cedure, or just try to justify the axioms on b directly, you end up at the same
point.
Savage’s theorem works by using your preferences to determine a qualitative
belief ranking. Fine () just starts with the qualitative belief order and shows
it is representable by a probability function if it satisfies certain axioms. These
axioms are similar to the ones that Savage imputes to you on the basis of your
preferences over acts. Krantz et al. () give a similar result. There is much
work in this area on minimal necessary and sufficient conditions for a probabilistic
representation.
Ultimately, all the arguments require that the ordering be complete. They also
all require that the domain of objects of belief be uncountably rich. These are
necessary conditions on the probabilistic representation’s being unique. If the
ordering is only partial, or if the space of beliefs is only finite, then there will be
many probability functions that represent the ordering. The idea is that either of
these weakenings introduces “wiggle room” that allows one to shift the probability
mass around between propositions and maintain the same ordering among the
elements. When the ordering is dense, this wiggle room is severely constrained.
Joyce (, pp. –) sets out the axioms more or less as follows:
• Normalisation: J b K
I have suppressed those details that only matter for the case of countable additivity. Happily this
also means that the alternative axiomatisations of Krantz et al. () or Fine () coincide
perfectly for this part.
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• Boundedness: J b X b K for all X
• Ranking: b is a partial order
• Completeness: X b Y or Y b X for all X,Y
• Quasi-additivity: If X ^Z ” K” Y ^Z then
– X b Y iff X _Z b Y _Z
– X b Y iff X _Z b Y _Z
• Richness: If X b Y then there exists a partition of SL: {Zi} such that X b
Y _Zi for all i
The first couple of these look very similar to conditions we saw imposed on
belief functions in section ... Some of the conditions should also remind us of
conditions from Savage’s axioms for preference. Qualitative belief that satisfies
the above axioms can be represented by a unique probability function. Proofs of
this result can be found in Fine (); Krantz et al. (); Villegas ().
Note agents with DS beliefs can violate Quasi-additivity. Let belpY q “ 0 “
belpZq and let belpXq ą 0. Let Z “  Y . Note that belpX _ Zq ě belpXq but
otherwise it is unconstrained; so set belpX _ Zq ă 1. However, belpY _ Zq “ 1
because DS belief is normalised. This violates quasi-additivity. The trick is that
a lot of “belief mass” can accrue to disjunctions, while leaving very little mass
on the individual disjuncts. So if one thought that Quasi-Additivity captured
something distinctive about the structure of qualtiative belief, and thus of degree
of belief more generally, then DS belief would not be a good representation of it.
... Other representation theorems
Savage’s wasn’t the first representation theorem, nor was it the last. I don’t aim to
be exhaustive in my survey of representation theorems, but I do want to mention
some other important theorems.
The first is Richard Jeffrey’s representation theorem, building on mathematical
work by Ethan Bolker. This is an interestingly different theorem, because it does
away with some of the constraints imposed by Savage’s framework. This comes at
the cost of the representation not being unique.
The second representation theorem I discuss is due to Luce and Raiffa. This is
important because they use choice sets rather than preference relations as the basic
entity. I will make use of this way of speaking when I discuss imprecise decision.
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Jeffrey’s system
I won’t go into much detail about Jeffrey’s system. As I mentioned in chapter ,
Jeffrey makes states, outcomes and acts all into propositions. So he doesn’t build
in the act-independence of the states as Savage does. Nor does he make the same
strong state-independence of the outcomes assumption that Savage does.
These differences make his representation theorem much harder. In fact, the
representation he achieves is not unique in the way Savage’s is. One can get a
unique representation only by extending Jeffrey’s framework. There are two ways
to do this. One way, due to Joyce (), is to augment the set up with a second
relation: a relation of qualitative belief. That is, you have a preference relation
and a qualitative belief relation, and these – under certain assumptions – give you
a unique representation. The other way of achieving uniqueness, due to Bradley
(), is to turn the algebra into a conditional algebra by adding a particular kind
of (non-truth-functional) conditional binary operator to the language.
Despite being Savage-like in taking acts to be functions, my approach is influ-
enced by Jeffrey and by Joyce’s discussion of Jeffrey because I am aware of the
importance of the assumptions I am making about what acts are. Indeed, one of
the important lessons learned from studying imprecise decision is that the details
of how acts bring about outcomes is important. This idea is even more important
in causal decision theory, where you explicitly model ideas about how your actions
influence the outcomes.
Luce and Raiffa’s choice set approach
There is an interestingly different approach to representation of belief in Luce and
Raiffa (). Instead of representing a preference relation, Luce and Raiffa model
an agent as having a choice set. That is, they model an agent as choosing some
subset of the options available as “the good ones”. The conclusion that is drawn
from their discussion is that if you satisfy the conditions on your choice set, then
there is a probability function such that your choice maximises expectation with
respect to it.
I mention this because later (in section .) I will use the related idea of a “choice
function” as my primary representational tool when discussing imprecise decision.
A choice function, C , is a function from a set of acts into a subset of that set: C pAq
picks out the best options from A.
But see Jeffrey () and chapter  of Joyce ().
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Luce and Raiffa impose rationality constraints on the choice set such that there
is a preference relation that can be closely associated with it. By this I mean that
the conditions on the choice set are such that something is in the choice set if and
only if it is maximal with respect to the associated ordering.
Informally, their important axioms are as follows (see Luce and Raiffa ,
pp. –):
• C pAq is never empty
• If f P C pAq and g dominates f (in the sense that gpXq  f pXq for all X) then
g is in C pAq
• If some g in A dominates f , then f is not in C pAq
• Adding a new act to the set of options can’t make an old non-choiceworthy
act choiceworthy, and can only make a previously choiceworthy act non-
choiceworthy if the new act is itself choiceworthy
• The Sure Thing Principle
• Probability mixtures of choiceworthy acts are choiceworthy (i.e. the choice
set is convex)
They state a theorem (p. ) to the effect that if your choice rule satisfies these
properties, then there is some probability function such that you can be repre-
sented as maximising expected utility with respect to it. Luce and Raiffa note
that it is not the case that every act that maximises with respect to that proba-
bility need be such that your choice rule deems it choiceworthy. Satisfying Luce
and Raiffa’s conditions makes maximising expectation a necessary condition on
choiceworthiness, but not necessarily a sufficient condition.
... Richness, Completeness and Extendability
Common to all the above arguments is an assumption that whatever relation you
are dealing with – a preference relation or a qualitative belief relation – it should
be complete, and it should be defined on a suitably rich algebra of events.
The richness and completeness assumptions are not required to demonstrate
the existence of a probability representation, but only to prove its uniqueness. In
the next chapter I will argue that sets of probabilities are a better representation
The results are due to Amartya Sen (Sen , ).
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of uncertainty, so I am happy with non-unique representation. Indeed, I will later
argue that non-unique probabilistic representation is one way to justify imprecise
probabilism (section ..).
Let’s think how we might defend these assumptions. Let’s take the richness
first. One might argue that instead of being a requirement on actual beliefs, the
richness assumption could be an assumption about extending your beliefs. The
idea being that it should be possible for you to continue adding more propositions
to your event algebra indefinitely. Arguably, this understanding of the richness
assumption as one of extendability is the understanding Savage himself had of it.
He says:
Suppose, for example, that you yourself consider B ≺b C, that is, you
would definitely rather stake a gain in your fortune on C than on B.
Consider the partition of your own world into 2n events each of which
corresponds to a particular sequence of n heads and tails, thrown by
yourself, with a coin of your own choosing. It seems to me that you
could easily choose such a coin and choose n sufficiently large so that
you would continue to prefer to stake your gain on C, rather than on
the union of B and any particular sequence of n heads and tails.
Savage ( [], pp. –, with some notational change)
So Savage thought that arbitrarily fine distinctions of probability judgement could
be made by extending the algebra to include a suitably rich collection of otherwise
uninteresting and independent events.
Some have suggested that completeness is also like this (Hawthorne ; Jeffrey
; Joyce ). Hawthorne for example says that incomplete belief orderings
are perfectly reasonable. However, it would be unreasonable for an agent to
have a preference that could not be extended into a complete one. He says that
there being no complete extension of your belief ordering points to an implicit
incoherence. That is, if X and Y are incomparable, and there is no complete
extension of the relation, then neither of X  Y ,Y  X is even possible for you.
This seems to be incoherent. So Hawthorne requires only that the relation be
completeable. He does the same sort of thing for richness.
You might fail to have a preference for several different reasons. For example,
you might fail to have a preference simply by never having considered the possi-
bility of having to make the choice between the options. This is incompleteness
I will talk about preference, but I feel that much the same argument can be made for the
qualitative belief ordering.
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through failure of introspection. Or perhaps you fail to have a preference simply
because the evidence you have about the choices is so weak that no preference is
sanctioned. This is a stronger kind of failure of completeness. Some might want
to argue that only the first kind of incompleteness is permissible: only through
failure of introspection can your preferences be incomplete. I would argue that
the second kind of incompleteness is also permissible. There can be cases where
even when you turn your attention to the choices, you remain unable to determine
a preference either way.
... Against behaviourism
In both the Dutch book argument and the representation theorem sections, I have
suggested that I find completeness of preference to be an unreasonable axiom.
There is, however, one school of thought that would take issue with this claim:
behaviourism.
The behaviourist might argue against incomplete preferences as follows: having
no preference should be modelled as being indifferent. There’s no way to elicit the
difference between the two states, so there is no real difference between them. The
claim is that there is no behavioural difference between the two attitudes. That is
to say that no (reasonable, robust) method of preference elicitation can distinguish
these two kinds of attitude. So, the argument goes, we should not represent
differences we cannot elicit. My response to this is just to say that there is more to
belief than dispositions to choose. So possibility of elicitation isn’t an appropriate
necessary criterion for the reality of some aspect of belief. Mark Kaplan argues as
follows:
Both when you are indifferent between A and B and when you are
undecided between A and B you can be said not to prefer either state
of affairs to the other. Nonetheless, indifference and indecision are
distinct. When you are indifferent between A and B, your failure to
prefer one to the other is born of a determination that they are equally
preferable. When you are undecided, your failure to prefer one to the
other is born of no such determination. Kaplan (, p. )
If pressed to choose, you will plump for one or other of the incommensurable
options. A behaviourist could take this fact to point to some sort of disposition
to act. This disposition to act in this way when faced with that choice is exactly
Ittay Nissan has helpfully pressed me on this point.
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what the preference relation is supposed to be capturing. The behaviourist would
argue that this suggests there really is no difference. I would respond to this by
arguing that there is an important distinction in the character of the dispositions
in the incommensurability case as opposed to the preference case: a distinction
worth representing.
On a purely instrumentalist level, we can still show that there is some difference
in character between indifference and incommensurability. If you are indifferent
between a and b, then you will prefer a` ε to b for any small positive gain ε. You
cannot induce a preference between incommensurable goods by this procedure of
“sweetening” one of the options. So the behaviourist is wrong to suggest that there
is no difference to elicit between indifference and incommensurability.
The more general point to make as regards my disagreement with the be-
haviourist position is the following. Behaviourists take probability and utility to
be merely a summary of a consistent agent’s preferences. The summary can then
form a useful tool to predicting further action: one could always work out what
your preferences are given the preferences you have already demonstrated, but
using the summary functions makes things easier. I don’t find behaviourism at all
compelling as an explication of belief. Or rather, I take your elicited behaviour
to be only part of what characterises your belief state. I however take probability
and utility to be independently meaningful psychological quantities of some form
or another. Instead of summarising preference, I take probability and utility (or
rather, belief and value) to be the inputs to a decision problem. It is the job of
decision theory to help you manipulate those inputs in such a way as to arrive at
the best outcome. If we took the behaviourist’s view on probability and utility, the
action guiding aspect wouldn’t involve decision theory at all: the action guiding
advice from a behaviourist amounts to “introspect on your preferences and choose
the most preferred option”. To me this is backwards: we are using what we know
about how you value things and how likely you think things are to determine
what the preferences should be. The preference determining procedure should
determine preferences that are consistent, that is, that are in line with the ratio-
nality axioms of decision theory. So there is some feedback between preference
determining decision procedures and preference constraining axioms of rational-
ity. And the representation theorem would tell us that any decision procedure
that determines preferences that satisfy these axioms is effectively a maximising
expected utility procedure. Would, that is, if all the axioms of the representation
theorem had independent intuitive force as constraints on preference. I have
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argued that they don’t and that the behaviourists’ response to my criticism misses
the point, since I am coming at decision theory from a different angle.
Bermúdez () distinguishes several different projects that use decision the-
ory as a tool. These are decision theory used to guide action; to normatively assess
action; and to explain and predict action. He also outlines two understandings
of utility: the substantive and the operational. The substantive understanding of
utility takes utility to be a measure of some sort of “goodness”: some aspect of the
outcomes that feeds into the motivations for choice. The operational understand-
ing of utility takes utility to be part of the behaviourist preference-summarising
machinery I discussed above. I situate myself as being primarily interested in
the action-guiding and normative dimensions of decision theory, and endorsing
a substantive understanding of utility. The behaviourist takes the operational
understanding of utility and is more interested in the explanation or prediction di-
mension of decision theory. Given these differences of outlook, it is not surprising
that we should disagree.
Joyce goes further and argues that not only are the two outlooks distinct, but
also that the behaviourist outlook is deficient.
There are just too many things worth saying that cannot be said within
the confines of strict behaviourism. . . The basic difficulty here is that
it is impossible to distinguish contexts in which an agent’s behaviour
really does reveal what she wants from contexts in which it does not
without appealing to additional facts about her mental state. . . An even
more serious shortcoming is behaviourism’s inability to make any sense
of rationalizing explanations of choice behaviour. Joyce (, p. )
Ultimately, the behaviourist’s “explanation” of your choice is that you were satis-
fying your preferences. This is unhelpfully circular.
.. Epistemic utility
Dutch book arguments and representation theorems have been criticised for
relying on agents’ actual or hypothetical choices. The pragmatic nature of these
arguments has been questioned (Christensen , ). It has been suggested
that preference among acts is not the sort of thing that should constrain epistemic
rationality. These pragmatic considerations, it is claimed, should not influence
the structure of your beliefs. To counter this criticism, some authors have offered
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arguments for probabilism that rely on purely epistemic premises. Pettigrew
() outlines three types of epistemic utility argument. I will outline the general
approach and introduce the several types of epistemic utility argument. I will
then outline the premises of one specific argument, that of Joyce (). The proof
will be relegated to Appendix A.
... Scoring rules in general
The idea common to all these types of argument is to score a belief function, and
the aim is to have beliefs that score well. For example, one sort of score you might
use is the “distance from the truth”. If you had some appropriate sort of measure
of distance from truth, then you could use this to score various kinds of beliefs.
This is the kind of approach that Joyce takes. He gives a characterisation of what
properties an inaccuracy measure should have and then proves a theorem: “If your
credences are incoherent (nonprobabilistic), then there is a coherent (probabilistic)
belief function that is more accurate in every possible world”. This is a domination
argument. Another argument that builds on inaccuracy measures is that of, for
example Leitgeb and Pettigrew (a,b). Instead of being accuracy dominated,
in this argument it is shown that nonprobabilistic beliefs have higher expected
inaccuracy. A slightly different argument is motivated by the idea that it is not
closeness to the truth but calibration that is the important thing about beliefs.
The proofs behind these types of arguments then show that probabilistic beliefs
are better calibrated. Finally, there are arguments that start from the idea that
whatever else is true of a good belief function, it should expect itself to be the best.
That is, it is a flaw in a belief function if by its own lights, some other function
does better. Scoring rules that reward this property of belief functions are known
as proper scoring rules. These sorts of arguments (like Predd et al. ()) are called
propriety arguments.
All the arguments have a similar structure. They all purport to show that
probabilistic credences are better because they do better at some putative epistemic
good-making feature.
Domination arguments are not one of Pettigrew’s categories. The remaining three types – from
Pettigrew () – are all kinds of expected utility arguments.
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... Admissible scoring rules
For now, I focus my attention on Joyce (). What is important about your
beliefs is that they are accurate. If it were the case that your degrees of belief
could be more accurate than they actually are, I would consider that a failure of
rationality. Scoring rules arguments start from the axiom that it is desirable to
minimise the inaccuracy of your credences. More specifically, they argue that
it is a defect to be accuracy dominated. Call your current credences b. If there
is some other belief function, b1 that is more accurate in every possible world,
then your rationality is impugned. That is, if your beliefs are such that there is
a way you could always have more accurate beliefs, it’s irrational to stick with
the defective b. The conclusion of scoring rules arguments is typically that you
should be probabilistically coherent. That is, you should have degrees of belief
that satisfy the axioms of probability.
Much hangs on exactly how one formalises the idea of inaccuracy, and Joyce
criticises several earlier attempts at doing this for begging the question: by having
the idea of probability somehow built in to what inaccuracy measure to use.
Joyce’s own approach is to impose some conditions on what counts as a legitimate
scoring rule. The argument then goes “Whatever scoring rule is picked from
this class, your beliefs are accuracy dominated unless you are probabilistically
coherent”. This result is rather surprising. It says that if your degrees of belief are
not probabilistic, then there’s a probability measure which does better however the
world turns out.
This section explores Joyce’s discussion of accuracy measures. This mainly
draws on Joyce (). I will also mention criticism of Joyce’s paper in for example
Hájek () and Maher () and Joyce’s response to these (Joyce ).
In his  paper, Joyce seems to allow the event space SL to be finite or
countable, though Maher () and Joyce () restrict themselves to the finite
case. I shall stick to the finite case throughout.
Now we are ready to start characterising inaccuracy measures.
Definition .. An inaccuracy measure is a function I : BˆVÑ R.
Ipb,vq is a measure of how far from the “truth” (designated by v) the belief function
b is. So, Joyce’s claim becomes the following: whatever I you are using, if your
Actually, it says you always do at least as well and sometimes strictly better. In the interest of
rhetorical force, I’ve swept aside some of the subtlety.
. Arguments for probabilism 
b is probabilistically incoherent (i.e. if b P BzV`) then there is c P V` such that
Ipc,vq ď Ipb,vq for all v.
A final point before we come to the conditions themselves is that Joyce makes
extensive use of the idea of “mixtures” of belief functions. If b,b1 P B, then there
is a “line” between them. This geometrical structure is what Joyce exploits in the
proof.
Definition .. bb1 is the “line segment” between b and b1. c P bb1 if and only if
c“ λb`p1´λqb1, for some λ P r0,1s. That is: cpXq “ λbpXq` p1´λqb1pXq for all
X.
With these preliminaries in place it is time to look at the conditions that Joyce
imposes on inaccuracy measures.
Structure For each v PV, Ipb,vq is a non-negative, continuous function of b
that goes to infinity in the limit as bpXq goes to infinity for any X P SL.
Inaccuracy Ipb,vq clearly attains a minimum of 0 when b “ v. So I is non-
negative. This minimum being zero is partly conventional. But it would seem
unusual to say that a belief function has some non-zero inaccuracy with respect
to itself. . . That is, if you fully believe all the truths and fully disbelieve all the
falsehoods, it would be strange to insist that your beliefs had any inaccuracy other
than zero. By tending to infinity in the limit, Joyce is merely trying to capture the
idea that, since v is bounded, so should b be. Patrick Maher offers an alternative
description of this last part of the Structure condition.
Structure (Maher) For all X P SL and ε ą 0 there exists δ ą 0 such that, for
all b P B, if |bpXq| ą δ then Ipb,vq ą ε (Maher , p. )
Since the biggest a truth value can get is 1, as your belief function assigns bigger
and bigger numbers to X, the more inaccurate it must get. Note this is due to
the convention that valuation functions assign the value 1 to the truth. But this
isn’t doing much work. We only need that truth and falsity are assigned bounded
values. You could replace 0 and 1 throughout with vpKq and vpJq and nothing
drastic would happen to the argument.
Extensionality At each possible world v, Ipb,vq is a function of nothing
other than the truth values that v assigns to propositions in SL and the degrees of
confidence that b assigns to these propositions.
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With this condition, Joyce simply wants to rule out anything other than the
truth and the belief affecting inaccuracy. For example, simplicity, verisimilitude,
pragmatic usefulness of beliefs are all barred from directly affecting the “goodness”
of a belief. This differentiates his project from, for example that of Maher (),
who is interested in a broader notion of epistemic utility.
Joyce argues that the norm of accuracy is by far the most important norm when
one is concerned with epistemology. One could also argue that by having accurate
beliefs, you also help yourself conform to some lesser norms. For example, having
accurate beliefs will normally be pragmatically advantageous. Of course one can
construct cases where believing the truth would be pragmatically bad, but in
general, the two aims will line up.
Joyce also argues that having a false but “almost true” belief (a verisimilar belief)
will lead one to have other true beliefs. So while both Copernicus and Kepler
had false beliefs about the orbit of the Earth, Kepler’s beliefs would be overall
better. Copernicus believed the orbit of the Earth around the Sun was circular.
Kepler believed the orbit was elliptic. The actual orbit is almost elliptic, but
perturbed by the influence of the Moon and other celestial bodies. So both Kepler
and Copernicus held a false belief to a high degree, but one would like to be able
to say that Kepler’s beliefs were somehow better, in virtue of being closer to the
truth. Joyce’s response to this objection is to say that despite being false, Kepler’s
belief in an elliptic orbit around the Sun would lead him to have other, strictly
true beliefs that Copernicus didn’t have. Joyce gives the example of “that the
average distance of the Earth to the Sun is different in different seasons”. So “the
overall effect of Kepler’s inaccurate belief was to improve the extensional accuracy
of his system of beliefs as a whole.” (p.  Joyce , Joyce’s emphasis). Strictly
speaking if one’s beliefs differed only in what one believed about the shape of
Earth’s orbit, then they would be equally inaccurate. Joyce’s point is that believing
the more verisimilar proposition will cause changes in other beliefs which will
be strictly true. These differences cannot be captured within the gradational
accuracy framework. But then, these differences rely on the semantic content of
the propositions about which we have beliefs, so the inability of the framework to
fully capture these things is unsurprising and should not be seen as a defect. In
short, the claim is that verisimilar beliefs have more true consequences than less
verisimilar beliefs. A proper argument for this claim would involve developing a
method for counting the consequences of sentences. In any case, Joyce ()
Discussions with Foad Dizadji-Bahmani helped clarify this point.
This might be tricky. If V is the more verisimilar belief and V 1 the less verisimilar one, then
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doesn’t rely on extensionality.
And now, onto the next condition.
Dominance If bpY q “ b1pY q for every Y P SL other than X then Ipb,vq ą
Ipb1,vq if and only if |vpXq´bpXq| ą |vpXq´b1pXq|
What Joyce is getting at with this condition is that inaccuracy of a belief function
somehow supervenes on the inaccuracies of the individual beliefs that make it
up. Those individual inaccuracies are straightforwardly measured by the distance
from the truth (designated by vpXq).
Normality If |vpXq´bpXq| “ |v1pXq´b1pXq| for all X P SL, then Ipb,vq “
Ipb1,v1q
Again, this condition is saying that if some belief function is always exactly as
far from the truth as another, then they are just as inaccurate as each other. It is
quite a strong condition. It says not only that if b and b1 are always equally far
from v, they are equally inaccurate, but further that even if they are the same
distance from different valuations – v,v1 – they are equally inaccurate.
The final two conditions are the most controversial. They are the two that Maher
() criticises, and they are crucial to Joyce’s result. They relate to the idea of
mixtures of belief functions.
Weak Convexity Let m“ p1{2b`1{2b1q be the midpoint of the line segment
between b and b1. If Ipb,vq “ Ipb1,vq, then it will always be the case that Ipb,vq ě
Ipm,vq with equality only if b“ b1.
Think of b and b1 as two epistemic agents. What this condition says is that if the
two of them are equally inaccurate, they can’t do better than effecting some sort of
epistemic compromise. This condition says roughly that if two epistemic peers
disagree on something, they should “split the difference”. That is, if b is just as
inaccurate as b1 then an equal mixture of the two, m will be no more inaccurate.
The final condition says that equally biased mixtures will always be equally
inaccurate:
Symmetry If Ipb,vq “ Ipb1,vq, then for any λ P r0,1s one has:
Ipλb`p1´λqb1,vq “ Ipp1´λqb`λb1,vq
whenever X is a consequence of V , V 1_X is a consequence of V 1.
There has been much recent discussion on the correct response to disagreement among peers.
Joyce’s paper predates much of it. See Christensen () for an overview.
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Consider the case where λ is large. The left hand side of this equation is a mix-
ture that is biased towards b and against b1. The right hand side is biased towards
b1. What the condition says is that these two biased “compromises” between b and
b1 will be equally inaccurate. These two conditions impose constraints on how
inaccuracy of mixtures is related to inaccuracy of the things they are mixtures of.
Joyce’s main theorem, then, in its final form is as follows:
(Main Theorem) If gradational inaccuracy is measured by a function
I that satisfies Structure, Extensionality, Dominance, Normality,
Weak Convexity and Symmetry, then for each c P BzV` there is a
c1 PV` such that Ipc,vq ą Ipc1,vq for every v PV.
Joyce (, pp. –)
... Comments on epistemic utility
There are a number of problems that have been raised with this argument. I think
the same sort of problems crop up against the other types of epistemic utility
argument, so while the following discussion will be largely in terms of Joyce’s
argument, things should carry over straightforwardly to the other arguments I
mentioned earlier.
The underdetermination of the inaccuracy measure
The argument deliberately says as little as possible about which inaccuracy mea-
sure you should use: this makes the argument as general as possible. But it does
lead to a problem: I is underdetermined. Which inaccuracy measure you use will
affect which probability function accuracy dominates your nonprobabilistic belief.
So without knowledge of which inaccuracy measure is “the right one” you don’t
know how to change your credences so as to avoid being accuracy dominated. In
fact, there are two problems here. First, just knowing that your beliefs are accuracy
dominated doesn’t tell you how to change your beliefs. Knowing your beliefs are
dominated tells you that they are bad, but it doesn’t show that the dominating
beliefs are good. Of course, the dominating beliefs are better in that they don’t have
the defect of being dominated, but there might be an even better belief to move
to which doesn’t dominate your current beliefs. So, even if you knew the right
inaccuracy measure, the advice you would get from this domination argument
would be fairly weak. And if we don’t even know which inaccuracy measure we
should use, we can’t even make use of that weak advice.
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Does it even make sense to talk about there being some correct measure of
inaccuracy? And if not, what exactly is the normative upshot of Joyce’s argument?
Hájek () worries about this. In short, his worry is that the theorem does not
guarantee that moving to any probability function will make you less inaccurate.
Here’s an analogy (adapted from Aaron Bronfman and Jim Joyce, per-
sonal communication). Suppose that you want to live in the best city
that you can, and you currently live in an American city. I tell you that
for each American city, there is a better Australian city. (I happen to
believe this.) It does not follow that you should move to Australia. If
you do not know which Australian city or cities are better than yours,
moving to Australia might be a backward step. You might choose
Coober Pedy. Hájek (, p. , fn. )
Hájek then mitigates the worry as follows:
That said, the calibration argument may still be probative, still diag-
nostic of a defect in an incoherent agent’s credences. To be sure, she
is left only with the general admonition to become coherent, without
any advice on how specifically to do so. Nevertheless, the admonition
is non-trivial. Compare: when an agent has inconsistent beliefs, logic
may still be probative, still diagnostic of a defect in them. To be sure,
she is left only with the general admonition to become [consistent],
without any advice on how specifically to do so. Nevertheless, the
admonition is non-trivial. (ibid)
Perhaps you could take the set of all probability functions that accuracy dominate
your nonprobabilistic belief relative to some set of reasonable inaccuracy measures.
This set of probabilities would then be the right belief to have. I will return to this
in the next chapter.
Nonclassical logic and accuracy domination
Williams (a,b) points out that Joyce’s argument is sensitive to the underlying
logic in exactly the same way that Paris ( []) showed Dutch book theorems
are. That is, Joyce’s result rests on proving something about the convex hull of the
truth valuations. So in the same way the Dutch book theorem ends up sanctioning
Dempster-Shafer betting quotients if the underlying logic is a kind of non-classical
one, Joyce’s argument leads to the same conclusions.
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Not all epistemic utility arguments have this feature, however. For example,
the theorem of Joyce () is sufficiently different that the same trick doesn’t
obviously work. The assumption of classical logic comes in, in that paper when the
set of “world vectors” is defined as the set of vectors with a 1 in one position and 0
everywhere else: this framework is built up from a partition of the event space. A
nonclassical world vector might allow more than one atom to get a nonzero value.
In any case, it isn’t clear what the upshot of Williams’ argument is when applied
to these newer gradational accuracy arguments.
The size of belief space
It is worth noting that in setting up his framework, Joyce is thinking of B as a
vector space. Maher picks up on this point and adds that Joyce is considering B to
be a subset of Rn where n is the number of atoms. So vector ÝÑb represents a belief
function b, for some ordering of the atoms in the following way: the length of the
projection of
ÝÑ
b onto the ith coordinate gives the value of b for the ith atom. What
value does the vector representation give to compound sentences, for example
ti _ tj? There is a whole class of belief functions that agree on values for the atoms
but disagree on compound sentences. Leitgeb and Pettigrew (a,b) explicitly
restrict themselves to this way of thinking. This focus on the atoms is a subtle way
to beg the question. It shifts the goalposts in favour of those functions that are
determined by their actions on the atoms only, that is, in favour of V`. Note that
functions that are superadditive but not additive aren’t determined by the action
on the atoms, since superadditivity involves an inequality, rather than an equality.
For this reason one might prefer to think of the vector space in question being
of dimension of the cardinality of SL. That is, there is an axis for every proposition,
not just the atoms. There is then some non-trivial structure on the “world vectors”.
For example, if a particular “world vector” has 0 in the ith proposition, and jth
proposition, then, if k is the proposition corresponding to the disjunction of the
ith and jth, the kth coordinate must be 0 too. But what determines this structure?
Perhaps the structure of the v functions determines the structure of the world
vectors. Now there should be some connection between a coordinate representing
a disjunction and coordinates representing its disjuncts, but what should that
relationship be? I don’t claim to have an answer to this question, but I do want to
stress that assuming that a belief function is determined by its action on the atoms
is a substantive assumption. The same argument works for those arguments that
Take for example, any Dempster-Shafer belief function that assigns 0 to all the atoms.
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take the belief function to be defined over some partition of the space (Joyce ;
Predd et al. ).
Real valued belief, real valued inaccuracy
There is a further point: Joyce takes his belief functions to be real valued functions.
No other types of functions are even considered to be candidates for representing
belief. As I will argue in the next chapter, there is a better representation in terms
of sets of probability functions. Joyce also takes his inaccuracy measures to be real
valued functions.
I think uncertainty is not a single-dimensional thing. There are importantly
different ways to be uncertain about something. These differences cannot be
represented by mapping propositions onto a linear, one-dimensional scale like the
real line. What gradational accuracy arguments secure is the conditional claim
that if belief and inaccuracy are to be modelled by real valued functions, then
probability theory is privileged. I deny the antecedent of this claim. All the other
gradational accuracy arguments I am aware of make the same assumptions and
are thus open to the same criticism.
In chapter , I will discuss a case study of scientific uncertainty. The uncertainty
we encounter there is certainly not single-dimensional.
The structure of belief space
As well as the size of belief space, there is another issue to do with its structure.
Joyce’s Structure condition included the claim that Ipb,vq is a continuous function
for each v. Continuity of a function is defined relative to a topology on its domain.
The topology doesn’t necessarily have to be specified directly: sometimes there
will be some obvious metric on the space, and the metric induces a topology
(Sutherland ). Joyce can’t really be appealing to some implicit metric on the
space, since his whole proof relies on constructing a measure of distance on the
space of belief functions. Joyce is perhaps appealing to the standard topology on
the vector space representation of the belief function. But the standard topology
on a vector space is one induced by a standard metric.
The intuition behind demanding that I be continuous is this: “a tiny change in
one of my beliefs, bpXq say, shouldn’t cause a huge difference in the inaccuracy
of my beliefs”. The topology (or the metric) is what gives content to the idea of a
“tiny change” in belief. So maybe what Joyce needs is some kind of proposition-
wise continuity of inaccuracy relying just on differences between |bpXq ´ vpXq|.
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This is in fact what Pettigrew () has, instead of continuity. But, even this
use of absolute difference could be criticised for implicitly relying on the notion
of Euclidean distance. Why should the proposition-wise distance of my belief
from the truth be measured by the Euclidean distance between them? Why not
|bpXq´ vpXq|2 or log |bpXq´ vpXq|?
It seems that I might be labouring this point, but the history of analysis is
rife with examples of how the intuitive concept of “continuity” is a tricky beast
to pin down formally. Appendix  of Lakatos () gives a lively account of
one such episode. Given that Joyce’s “Lemma-” (Theorem A.. in the current
setting) relies on a result from topology, it is important to understand what this
continuity assumption means. It seems the implicit topological/metrical notions
are doing some work for Joyce, so I think it is worthwhile voicing these worries
about that framework. Leitgeb and Pettigrew (a) and its followup are much
more explicit in the presuppositions they rely on, but the privileged role given to
Euclidean notions of distance could still be questioned in their proof.
Quite a bit of what Joyce wants to do with this idea of continuity can be achieved
just by thinking about “continuity along mixtures”. For example, in the proof
of Theorem A.., we only need continuity along the lines of mixtures. But
Theorem A.. relies on V` being a closed, bounded region. These topological
properties can’t be captured as easily by just focusing our attention to lines. The
theorem of Joyce () also relies on the inaccuracy functions being continuous:
the theorem involves the use of Brouwer’s fixed point theorem. It would be
interesting to see exactly what conditions need to be imposed on the space of
belief functions. Assuming the standard topology on the reals and assuming
Euclidean distance on the axes (on the propositions) is certainly sufficient. But
are there weaker conditions for which the theorem holds? Or can an elementary
justification for why the standard topology and Euclidean distance gives the right
notion of “a tiny change in belief”?
There isn’t time to discuss in detail other importantly different and interesting
theorems in this area. There are a few niggling technical worries with the original
theorem, only some of which are addressed in the literature since Joyce ().
I think ultimately justifying probabilism through gradational accuracy is ham-
strung by the insistence on real-valued belief and real-valued inaccuracy, and by
 Pettigrew’s other conditions are slightly different from Joyce’s, so it’s simplifying things some-
what to say that his “Proposition-wise continuity” does all the work of Joyce’s continuity
assumption.
 Leitgeb and Pettigrew make this very point themselves
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underdetermination of the inaccuracy measure.
.. Other arguments
... Cox’s theorem
A strangely neglected argument for probabilism can be found in a paper by
physicist R.T. Cox from . The main thrust of the argument is that we want our
degrees of belief to match up with classical logic in the limit, and codifying this
desideratum in a particular way forces us to conclude that degrees of belief must be
represented by something isomorphic to a probability measure. Cox takes his cue
here from Keynes’ “logical theory” of probability (Keynes ). Probability is here
taken to be a “logic of plausible inference” or “logic of reasonable expectation”.
The basic entity in Cox’s proof is “pA|Xq” which is the degree of plausibility
of proposition A given state of information X. And pA|B,Xq is interpreted as the
degree of plausibility of A given the state of information X plus the truth of B. This
is not quite how Cox himself expressed it, this is the reformulation of Van Horn
(). Cox had the “X” also being a true proposition and read pA|Bq. as “the
degree of plausibility of A given the truth of B”. The difference is subtle and
I won’t dwell on it here. For now, it suffices to say that a state of information
can include true propositions, but can also contain “soft information that says
nothing with certainty but still affects one’s assignments of plausibilities” (Van
Horn ). One might imagine that X could contain statistical information: this
says nothing with certainty, but can still give you strong reason to believe certain
generalisations.
So these things, pA|Xq and so on, are by definition, real numbers. They measure
the degree to which some proposition is plausible given certain evidence. These
numbers aren’t completely unconstrained. For example, pA|A,Xq seems like it
should have some maximal value: the degree of A’s plausibility given A’s truth
should be fixed. True things are maximally plausible, or rather, things known to
be true are maximally plausible. The plausibility of A^B is somehow related to
the plausibility of its components and so on.
These kind of concerns are what drives Cox’s argument. Cox’s proof proceeds
by giving some plausible constraints on how p A|Xq should relate to pA|Xq, for
example. And how pA^B|Xq should relate to pA|Xq,pB|Xq,pB|A,Xq . . . and so on.
Given the functional relationships between these numbers, Cox proves that the
only functions that will do the job are isomorphic to probabilities.
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I follow the presentation of Van Horn () in this section. Other treatments
of the theorem, outside of Cox’s  paper, can be found in: Halpern (a,b);
Jaynes (); Paris ().
Van Horn calls the requirements “R,R. . . ”; I will replace these with more
semantically transparent labels. So let’s get on to the first requirement.
Basic pA|Xq, the plausibility of proposition A given state of information X is a
single real number.
This condition just tells you what kind of thing we are taking plausibilities to be.
It is a substantive claim to say that plausibilities can be represented by a single real
number: it implies that all plausibilities can be compared. I have already discussed
my scepticism of this sort of demand for complete comparability. It rules out it
ever being the case that there are two propositions such that you can’t tell which
is more plausible. I have already discussed my views on the reasonableness of
incommensurability.
Maximality There exists a real number T, such that for every X and A,
pA|Xq ď T
This condition says that there is some maximal value that plausibility can take.
Nothing can be strictly more plausible than something known to be true. Van
Horn uses “J” for this value, rather than “T”, but I want to keep “J” reserved for
the proposition that gets the plausibility value “T”. At this stage I’d be happy to
just set T“ 1 by fiat, as this convention fits with what I’ve done in earlier sections.
However I refrain from doing this, because Cox actually proves that this must be
the case.
Both the above two requirements are contained in Van Horn’s R, but I have
separated them, because I think each deserves comment on its own.
Next, a bit of terminology. A state of information, X, is consistent if there is no
proposition A for which both pA|Xq “ T and p A|Xq “ T. This is the “plausibility
analogue” of a set of sentence’s being consistent if there is no sentence such that it
and its negation can be derived from the set.
Our next condition is in the same vein: it says that these plausibility values
behave in the obvious way as regards logic.
Compatibility Plausibility assignments are compatible with the propositional
calculus:
• If A and A1 are tautologically equivalent, then pA|Xq “ pA1|Xq
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• If A is a tautology, then pA|Xq “ T
• pA|B,C,Xq “ pA|B^C,Xq
• If X is consistent and p A|Xq ă T then A,X is also consistent.
This just says that plausibility behaves as we would expect vis-à-vis logic. So
tautologically equivalent propositions are equally plausible, tautologies are max-
imally plausible. This is motivated by the desire that our logic of plausible
inference be continuous with classical logic in the limit.
These have been fairly straightforward conditions so far. Now the requirements
get more interesting.
Negation There exists a non-increasing function S0 such that p A|Xq “
S0pA|Xq for all A and X
This is effectively saying that the plausibility of the negation of a proposition
stands in some functional relationship to the plausibility of the proposition itself.
The function is non-increasing because as A gets more plausible (as pA|Xq gets
bigger)  A shouldn’t get more plausible as well. Some of what I said against
Complementarity will also apply here. I don’t think that, in general, this tight
link between an event and its negation should hold.
Note that ( A Ø   A so by Compatibility, pA|Xq “ p  A|Xq. From this it
follows that pA|Xq “ S0pS0pA|Xqq. If we define F “ S0pTq then we know that
F ď pA|Xq ď T. This is so since pA|Xq “ S0p A|Xq ě S0pTq by Maximality and
the fact that S0 is non-increasing. Van Horn says that this holds for consistent X,
although I’m not sure the qualification is necessary.
So far, so uncontroversial. The next requirement is not so obviously reasonable,
and much of the debate around Cox’s theorem has been on whether or not this
requirement is justifiable.
Universality There exists a nonempty set of real numbers P0 with the follow-
ing two properties:
• P0 is a dense subset of pF,Tq. That is, for every pair of real numbers a,b P P0
such that Fď aă b ď T there is some c P P0 such that aă c ă b.
• For every y1, y2, y3 P P0 there exists some consistent X with a basis of at
least three elementary letters – call them A1,A2,A3 – such that pA1|Xq “
y1,pA2|A1,Xq “ y2 and pA3|A1,A2,Xq “ y3.
The domain of S0 is the subset of the real numbers that are plausibility values.
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A basis for X is the set of elementary letters that X tells us about. That is, X is a
state of information that is informative about the set of elementary letters in its
basis.
This requirement feels pretty strong: it requires that the space of plausibilities
be quite rich. There are no finite dense sets, so this requirement forces there
to be infinitely many values that plausibility can take, and thus infinitely many
propositions. Van Horn’s name for this condition “Universality” hints at the reason
why he thinks it isn’t as problematic as it seems. The idea is that if this is supposed
to be a logic of plausible inference – something that extends classical logic – then
it should be similarly context neutral. It should apply in all situations. The idea is
that whatever else our logic should do, it should “be capable of handling a case
where we have three completely unrelated atomic propositions with arbitrary
plausibilities.” (Van Horn , p. ) It is this assumption that Halpern (a)
criticises. Similar worries arise with Savage’s assumptions about the richness of
the state space (P).
It is reasonable to expect that the plausibility of the conjunction of propositions
is somehow related to the plausibility of the propositions individually. In fact
it turns out that pA^B|Xq is related to certain conditional plausibilities as well.
Van Horn () discusses why this should be. It should not be wholly unintuitive
that the following functional dependence should hold.
Conjunction pA^B|Xq “ FppA|B,Xq,pB|Xqq where F is a strictly increasing
function in both arguments.
This should perhaps remind you of the discussion of conditional probability and
in particular of the (Conditional) condition (p. ).
Jaynes () gives the following reasoning for the above requirement:
In order for A^ B to be a true proposition, it is necessary that B is
true. Thus the plausibility pB|Xq should be involved. In addition, if B
is true, it is further necessary that A should be true; so that plausibility
of pA|B,Xq is also needed. . . [If a] robot has pB|Xq and pA|B,Xq it will
not need pA|Xq. That would tell it nothing about A^B that it did not
have already.
Jaynes (, Following Van Horn in adapting the notation)
But see Arnborg and Sjödin () for a possible way out. The trick is to replace “infinitely
rich algebra” with “algebra that could be extended so as to be infinitely rich”. We have already
encountered the idea of “richness as extendability” so I won’t say any more here.
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The idea is that pA^B|Xq can’t be worked out from just pA|Xq and pB|Xq, since we
don’t know the correlation between them. But with pA|B,Xq and pB|Xq, we know
everything there is to know.
These requirements allow us to prove a variety of facts about our plausibilities
which will ultimately force them to be isomorphic to probabilities. For example,
the function F in our final condition is such that, for all x,y,z:
Fpx,Fpy,zqq “ FpFpx,yq, zq (.)
This follows from the associativity of logical conjunction. A result from func-
tional analysis shows that any function with this form is such that there is a
continuous, strictly increasing function g with gpFpx,yqq “ gpxq` gpyq. Defining
wpxq “ exppgpxqq allows us to say that:
wpA^B|Xq “ wpA|B,XqwpB|Xq (.)
These things are now starting to look a lot like probabilities. In fact, one can prove
that wpTq “ 1 and wpFq “ 0, which is strange, since these values are typically
taken to be conventional.
Van Horn then defines α as the fixed point of S1, a function that extends S0 to
all of rF,Ts. That is, S1pαq “ α. Where S1 is a function on rF,Ts such that for all A
and consistent X, S1pA|Xq “ S0pA|Xq. This α is unique since S1 is non-increasing.
Then r is defined as follows: r “ ´ log2{ logwpαq. Finally, define prpxq “ wpxqr .
This pr is then shown to be a probability measure. pr´1 is shown to be well
defined, so there is a tight relationship between x and prpxq, so much so that
whether we talk about the plausibilities x or their associated transformation into
probabilities prpxq makes no difference.
All this manoeuvring allows us to show that prp A|Xq “ 1´prpA|Xq, which,
together with the above results, shows that our plausibilities pA|Xq are isomorphic
to probabilities through the mapping pr.
This has been a fairly cursory look at Cox’s theorem, but I imagine I am al-
ready trying my reader’s patience by belabouring these points. The argument is
mathematically sophisticated but philosophically unilluminating.
I will not spend long commenting on Cox’s theorem, since my criticisms of it
have already come up elsewhere. Having plausibility measured on a real valued
scale is too strong as it rules out incommensurability. I have discussed this when
talking about preference relations, and again when talking about Joyce’s assump-
tion that belief is measured with real valued functions. Second, the negation
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assumption builds in a strong complementarity between an event and its negation;
a complementarity that I feel is unwarranted. I discussed much the same thing
in regard to Complementarity in section ... Jon Williamson offers several
criticisms of this argument for probabilism. Among them, he suggests that the
continuity of F – the conjunction function – “seems to be less a rational constraint
than a technical convenience” and that the basic assumptions make too strong an
assumption about an agent’s logical omniscience (Williamson , p. ).
... Structure via calibration
One might think that reflection on the objects of belief might suggest something
about the structure of belief. We’re happy with the idea of using the logical
structure of the objects of belief to justify (weak) norms of belief. Consider the
earlier discussion of logical omniscience: if two sentences stand in a particular
logical relationship, then you are committed to treating them the same way.
Perhaps other aspects of the structure of the objects of belief can ground norms of
belief. Can probabilism be grounded by investigating this structure?
Think about flipping coins or drawing cards: it seems like beliefs about these
things are constrained in various ways. Our beliefs about coin flips should match
up with the chances, or with the observed frequencies. This offers another way
of arguing for probabilism. Paris (, pp. –) shows that observed relative
frequencies are probabilities. This suggests that if you want to apportion your
belief to the evidence, you should at least have your beliefs be probabilistic. All
the ways the evidence might be share this structural feature, so your belief should
also have this feature.
We can see the argument that frequencies must be probabilistic as an instance
of the theorem that probabilities are convex combinations of truth values (The-
orem ..). It is thus open to the same trick as Paris ( []) applies to
the Dutch book argument and Williams (a,b) does to gradational accuracy
arguments. Namely, changing the underlying logic affects the outcome. One way
we might rationalise this move in the current context is as follows: Perhaps the
statistics you have gathered are deficient in some way. Perhaps when counting
people by hair colour, the light wasn’t always so good, so you weren’t sure whether
someone’s hair was brown or black. What do you do? Perhaps you guess: you say
This section draws on my paper “Nonprobabilistic chance?” Thanks to audiences at the LSE PhD.
student seminar and at the British Society for the Philosophy of Science annual conference –
July , University of Stirling.
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“it might have been brown or black, let’s say black”. Or perhaps you’d reason as
follows: “I can’t tell whether Bob’s hair was brown or black, so let’s put him in
the disjunctive ‘brown or black’ category, without putting him in either of the
disjuncts.” The statistics you build up in this way will determine a non-classical
valuation function, and your statistics will be superadditive, but not additive. This
is what Walley and Fine () do, and what Walley () does in much more
detail. Or you might just argue that there is genuine indeterminacy or vagueness
in the world. So what to conclude about what norms of belief are sanctioned by the
structure of events is at the very least dependent on some substantive assumptions
about the nature of events.
This argument also has the flaw that it only works for cases where there is
statistical evidence of the right sort. We might cast our net further and argue that
beliefs should match the objective chances or rather, your beliefs should at least
have the structure common to all possible chances. And if the objective chances
must be probabilistic, so too should the beliefs be. More carefully, there are various
principles – like Lewis’ Principal Principle for example – that suggest that beliefs
are somehow constrained by chances. According to the PP, credences should be
expectation values of chance functions. If chance functions are probabilities, then
so should the credences be.
I have yet to see convincing arguments that chances must have the structure
of probabilities. One would need such an argument to have the above line of
reasoning hold any water. In fact, there are some reasons to think that they needn’t
be. For example, if objective chances are some kind of quantity – a property
that admits of degrees – then there is some sort of thing to which the quantity
attaches to. When we were discussing length earlier I called the things that the
quantity “length” attaches to “sticks”. Let’s call the things chance attaches to
“events”. For chances to be probabilistic, events must have a certain structure:
they must form an algebra. One thing to note is that we need X ^ Y “ Y ^X,
since we must have chpX ^Y q “ chpY ^Xq. Typically in formal representations
of quantum events, like in quantum logic, you don’t have this commutativity.
It is true that in all observable bases, you do have commutativity, and indeed
the mod-squared amplitudes are additive, but this isn’t generally true (Rédei
; Rédei and Summers ). Krantz et al. () discuss “QM-qualitative
probabilities”, where these differ by not always having conjunctions. That is, it
can be that X and Y are in your event structure, but X ^ Y isn’t. Note this is
For instance, if X says something very specific about a particle’s position and Y something
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a different point from “Humphreys’ paradox” (Humphreys ; Suárez ,
forthcoming). The issue there is what the link is between conditional chances and
conditional probabilities.
There is also a well-known tension between the demands of probability theory
and infinite spaces. Consider throwing a dart at the real unit interval. What
is the chance that the dart hits a rational number? The intuitive answer is that
Q ch K: that is, hitting a rational number is more likely than the impossible event.
This is a long-winded way of saying that hitting a rational number is possible.
But probability theory forces upon us the conclusion that chpQq “ 0. So it seems
that probabilistic chance isn’t making some distinctions we might want to make
between these sorts of events. There has been some back-and-forth on hyperreal
probability theory recently that I don’t want to get into, but it is another thing to
bear in mind (Hájek ms.).
In any case, it seems like intuitions or folk conceptions of the “event concept”
aren’t strong enough to support the claim that chances are probabilities.
.. The interaction between the arguments
I have outlined several arguments for probabilism. How are we to assess these
arguments? What criteria are appropriate to an assessment of arguments for
probabilism?
... Criteria for assessing the arguments
A first possible way of distinguishing between the arguments is in terms of the
size and structure of the domains the argument requires. For example, does it only
work for finite spaces of events? Perhaps you are a finitist, and find arguments that
require infinite spaces unappealing. Perhaps you think that given the richness of
the structure of the actual world, arguments that only hold for finite domains are
worthless. In either case, this is a relevant variable for assessment.
Another yardstick against which to measure different arguments for probabilism
is how well they deal with conditional probabilities. We have independent reasons
specific about its momentum, then while chpXq and chpY q might have values, chpX ^ Y q
doesn’t make sense, since it would violate the uncertainty principle. See p.  of Krantz et al.
().
That is, there is a tension if you buy into the idea that chpXq ą 0 is a necessary condition for X
being possible. Hájek and Schaffer () both endorse this idea.
. Arguments for probabilism 
for thinking that conditional probability should be taken as the basic notion and
standard unconditional probabilities defined in terms of them (see, for example
Hájek ). So it seems that it would be a point in its favour if one of these
arguments could be straightforwardly applied to conditional probabilities as
well as to unconditional ones. I am talking here about synchronic conditional
probabilities as the basic notion: this should not be confused with discussions
of updating one’s probabilities on learning new evidence via conditionalisation.
These two ideas are obviously related, but they are not the same thing.
On the topic of conditionalisation, we could ask about other norms that are
closely associated with probabilism. For example, can there be an analogous
argument for the norm that you should update your beliefs by conditionalising?
Or can you justify a norm of calibration this way? It seems like a good epistemology
should have its norms justified in harmonious ways.
You might also have a particular view on the nature of belief, and thus find
certain arguments appealing or unappealing depending on whether they fit with
your views. For example, many people think that belief is an epistemic thing, and
thus a prudential argument like the Dutch book argument is getting at the wrong
thing.
Finally, it seems like a flaw in an argument if it is easy to modify to give different
conclusions. That is, if “nearby” arguments suggest different norms of belief,
then this undermines the correctness of the original argument. For example, as
mentioned earlier, J.B. Paris gives a Dutch book argument for DS belief functions
by modifying the valuation functions. So a probabilist who wants to use Dutch
book arguments must really be committed to the valuations’ being classical to
secure her conclusion. Then the argument is only as good as her argument for the
claim that “ideal” bets are settled by classical logic.
... Assessing the arguments
Now I wish to assess each of these on each of the criteria I mentioned above.
The first of these was the nature of the objects of belief. More specifically, I am
interested in the structure and the size of the space of propositions. Probabil-
ity measures are defined over an algebra of events or propositions. What’s at
stake here is what sort of assumptions are made about this algebra in the above
arguments. Gradational accuracy arguments typically assume that the algebra in
question is finite. Joyce () doesn’t make clear whether he restricts himself to
finite domains, but Maher () takes him to be doing so, and Joyce () is
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explicit about it. Dutch book arguments normally tend to assume finiteness as
well. There are results for infinite cases though they are significantly harder. It
also seems like any pragmatic argument that requires you to take infinitely many
bets is significantly weaker. The jury is still out on whether countable additivity is
reasonable. Howson () argues that it is not, while Williamson () takes it
to be so.
Representation theorems, on the other hand, tend to assume that the space
of acts over which one is choosing is really quite rich and this makes the space
of beliefs very rich as well. That is, it is not only infinite, but structured in a
particular way. Fishburn () says that typically one assumes that the set of
states is non-denumerably infinite. Finiteness does not preclude there being a
probabilistic representation, but it does preclude its uniqueness. Cox’s theorem
also requires that the algebra of propositions be structured in a way that can only
be satisfied by infinite spaces. Halpern (a,b); Paris () make these claims
but see Snow () for a dissenting opinion.
Which of these (finite or rich) you find more appealing depends on your taste.
On the one hand it seems that your boundedness, your finitude means that it is
reasonable to assume you have only a finite number of opinions. On the other
hand, it certainly feels as if the world is rich enough that the things about which
you could have opinions is unbounded, potentially infinite.
Now, which arguments work with conditional probabilities? Cox’s theorem
is already couched in terms of conditional probabilities, so that’s a point in its
favour. Fishburn () offers a representation theorem that grounds conditional
probabilities in terms of conditional acts.
There are arguments to the effect that Dutch book arguments cannot be used
to justify conditional probability. Döring () argues this point. As for
gradational accuracy, it is an open question, as far as I know. That is, there are no
results I am familiar with in this vein.
Now, which arguments can be used to offer other important norms for belief
like conditionalisation, calibration, equivocation? Dutch book theorems do well
here: there are arguments of a similar character for all of the above norms. For
example, Paris (, pp. –) or Halpern (, pp. –). For the latter two –
calibration and equivocation – see, for example, Williamson (). Leitgeb and
Pettigrew (a,b) offer a gradational accuracy argument for conditionalisation,
 For example, Fine’s axioms C and C (Fine )
Döring seems to suggest that Jeffrey conditionalisation is immune to his criticism, but that
would mean building a whole new foundation of Jeffrey conditional probabilities
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but as Pettigrew () says, there are many open questions in this area still. Rep-
resentation theorems for updating look very much like representation theorems
for conditional probabilities, but with the extra axioms being understood in a
different way.
Which arguments fit with which conceptions of what beliefs are? If you are
inclined to think that beliefs are the sort of things that are action guiding, then it
seems that you will be convinced by Dutch book-type arguments. If, on the other
hand, beliefs are something you ascribe to others in order to understand their
actions, then representation theorems seem like the right way to go. If beliefs are
somehow internal but not necessarily action guiding – if belief is an attitude we
take towards propositions – then gradational accuracy arguments, or qualitative
belief representation look like the most reasonable kinds of argument. Cox’s
theorem looks like it is motivated by a similar conception of beliefs to gradational
accuracy arguments, but rather than looking at the relationship between proposi-
tions and the world, it looks at the relationships of partial entailment among the
propositions themselves.
Related to this last criterion is the question of whether utility is important.
Dutch books and representation theorems seem to be tied up in practical rational-
ity and questions of action, reward, punishment and so on. Gradational accuracy
or Cox’s theorem, on the other hand, seem to be oblivious to questions of utility.
If you think your belief shouldn’t be tied to your conception of what is practically
good, then the first two kinds of arguments are not going to be convincing. Having
said that, one might take the Dutch book to be merely dramatising an inconsis-
tency in a nonprobabilistic agent’s credences. This would suggest that the focus
on utility is misleading and that Dutch book arguments aren’t so grounded in
pragmatic concerns. Gibbard () goes further in arguing that this is something
of a false dichotomy. He argues that a pure concern for truth can only be a con-
cern for the guidance value of the beliefs. So even purely epistemic values are
somewhat instrumental.
One might ask: are there arguments similar to the ones above but whose conclu-
sion is something other than probability? That is, is there a Dutch book theorem
that justifies, not probability, but Dempster-Shafer belief theory, for example? My
discussion of the Dutch book theorem highlights exactly these sorts of results.
The relevance of this is as follows: say you need four assumptions about betting
behaviour in order to prove the Dutch book theorem. Now, imagine that in the
The phrase is from Hájek ().
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absence of one of those conditions, you can prove instead that degrees of belief
ought to be Dempster-Shafer functions. This makes you wonder whether that
fourth condition is reasonable, and whether it’s better to stick with DS theory. In
a way, these other theorems “in the neighbourhood” of the Dutch book theorem,
weaken it, or at least make you scrutinise the assumptions. The theorem would
come as a package, each of its presuppositions integral to the argument.
Williams (b) has an argument based on the method in Paris ( [])
that shows that you can modify the argument of Joyce () to give the conclusion
that degrees of belief ought to be Dempster-Shafer functions. Economics literature
is rife with representation theorems for a vast array of different kinds of models
of belief and utility. There are a number of weaker results in the mould of Fine’s
qualitative probability approach, for example Koopman (); Seidenfeld ();
Seidenfeld, Schervish, and Kadane (). Whether Cox’s theorem is modifiable in
this way is, I think, an open question but I would guess that it is not so amenable
to modification.
... Are the arguments for probabilism mutually reinforcing?
Given the different motivations the various arguments rely on, and given that
the arguments are successful to varying degrees on a number of points, it seems
that there isn’t much common ground where these arguments might be mutually
reinforcing. If you are the kind of person who thinks that it’s reasonable to restrict
ourselves to finitely many propositions, then it looks like representation theorems
and Cox’s theorem are going to be unsatisfying. Then depending on whether
you thought belief was tied more strongly to practicality or to epistemology, only
one of the remaining two arguments would be appealing. If, on the other hand,
you thought it was better that beliefs cover a rich algebra of propositions, then
at least gradational accuracy would be ruled out. Say you thought it important
that probabilism relate to conditional probability measures. This might rule out
Dutch book arguments. If you thought degrees of belief were about your attitude
to propositions, then representation theorems wouldn’t seem to be doing the right
thing at all. So wherever you stand, only one theorem is really convincing. In brief,
given a particular attitude to what beliefs are, most arguments for probabilism
are unconvincing.
One might criticise this line of thought by saying “but I care about practical
rationality and epistemic rationality!” You might continue: “I think epistemic
rationality suggests (via gradational accuracy) that beliefs ought to be probabilities,
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and practical rationality (via Dutch books) secures the same conclusion.” The two
arguments seem reinforcing despite their different starting points. But this misses
the point. Dutch books secure the claim that degrees of belief as action-guiding
mental states – as determinants of betting quotients – should be probabilities.
Gradational accuracy says that degrees of belief as estimates of truth values should
be probabilities. The burden of proof is on whoever claims these two ways of
thinking of belief are the same. At the very least one needs to claim that estimates
of truth values are a good guide to action. I’m not suggesting that such an
argument can’t be made, indeed, I think true beliefs will often be practically
useful. But I do want to stress that the link between the two kinds of degrees
of belief needs to be quite strong for the arguments to be mutually reinforcing.
Arguably, Gibbard () offers exactly the needed connection between practical
rationality and epistemic rationality.
I think it is perfectly reasonable to say that my beliefs fail to satisfy the axioms
of qualitative probability (for example, maybe my b ordering is only partial),
but I nevertheless consider the constraints on betting imposed by the Dutch book
argument to be rational. So while it is the case that I should act “as if” I had
some probability function, subjectively, my beliefs don’t have the structure of
probabilities. The probabilist might respond that my phenomenological “beliefs”
aren’t doing any work, they aren’t guiding action, so they aren’t what’s at stake. But
that’s just to deny that probability plays the role that the proponent of qualitative
belief claims it does.
To make the claim that these arguments for probabilism are mutually reinforc-
ing, one needs an argument to the effect that the different kinds of beliefs under
discussion are tightly linked. That’s not to say I don’t think such an argument can
be made, but just to point out that arguments for probabilism do not reinforce
each other without such an argument. Let’s say you wanted Joyce’s nonpragmatic
argument and a Dutch book type argument to be mutually reinforcing. You
would need to argue that the sort of epistemic beliefs that Joyce is interested
in and the practical action guiding beliefs under consideration in Dutch book
arguments should have the same structure. And how would you go about arguing
this, without being able to appeal to arguments for probabilism? Gibbard ()
argues that a concern for accurate beliefs can only come from a desire for beliefs
Something like this sort of idea is motivating the “Transferable Belief Model” which allows
nonprobabilistic beliefs, but forces them to collapse into some probability function when you
have to make a decision (Smets and Kennes ).
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with high guidance value. And guidance value is the sort of practical thing that
action-guiding beliefs should do well at.
Consider the following – admittedly rather odd – scenario. A crazy neuroscien-
tist induces you to undergo an advanced brain scan that can ascertain whether or
not you believe certain propositions. The neuroscientist tells you that if you have
a certain false belief, he will reward you handsomely. Here it seems that value
for the truth and pragmatic value have come apart: epistemic value is maximised
by disbelieving the falsehood, while practical value is maximised by believing
the falsehood. The reason is because of the strange way that the reward is tied
directly to your beliefs rather than to your actions as informed by your beliefs.
Proponents of Gibbard’s view needn’t be moved much by such outlandish ex-
amples, but they do, I think, show that there is at least a conceptual wedge to
be driven between practical and epistemic utility. What I take the above “crazy
neuroscientist” example to show is that there’s some implicit assumption about
how beliefs influence value in Gibbard’s argument.
It is certainly true that it is often practically valuable to have high credence
in the truth, but that’s a far cry from claiming that structurally, these disparate
types of belief are similar. What about the claim that there is just one kind of
thing – belief – and it fulfils all these roles. But that is just stating, by fiat, that
the question under discussion has been decided. Belief is a slippery concept and
I can’t see any a priori reason to rule out pluralism. Another argument that you
might offer for the claim that epistemic beliefs and action-guiding beliefs ought to
be structurally similar is that there are independent arguments that each of these
ought to have this particular structure and that therefore, they ought to have the
same structure. But that is just putting the cart before the horse. An appeal could
be made to theoretical unity at this point. We don’t have strong reasons to believe
that these disparate things we call “belief” have a common structure, nevertheless,
there is some value in having a unified framework for modelling all of them, and
probabilism provides that. This argument shouldn’t, however, be taken to be an
argument against exploring alternative frameworks for modelling belief when
probabilism is found to be inadequate.
It does, however, suggest a different line of argument. Perhaps the very indepen-
dence of the different arguments is a way in which they are mutually reinforcing.
“See:” says the probabilist, “no matter what you think about the structure of
This paragraph was in part inspired by a talk Hilary Greaves gave at a “Philosophy of Probability”
conference in Oxford on “Cognitive Decision Theory”.
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the algebra of events, the conclusion is the same: probabilism. Whatever you
think about the nature of belief, I have an argument that says you should be a
probabilist.” I don’t think this is all that convincing. If I think beliefs should be
action guiding in the way Dutch books assume they are, then why should Joyce’s
argument convince me at all? Given some position on the various considerations
discussed above, it seems that some arguments are going to be irrelevant and
therefore not convincing.
Maybe you could say “I have no firm position on what beliefs are, but whatever
they are, there’s an argument that says they’re probabilities.” This is a sort of
“supervaluation” move. On all precisifications of the idea of belief, it is true that
there is an argument for probabilism. So probabilism is “super-true”. But this
is only as strong as the weakest argument for probabilism. While this may give
you a weak sort of “robustness” argument for probabilism, it doesn’t mean that
gradational accuracy arguments make Dutch book arguments more convincing,
for example.
.. Probabilism as a regulative ideal
I have offered a range of arguments for probabilism, and I hope I have shown how
each is flawed. However, I don’t want to just completely ignore these arguments,
and I don’t want probabilism to have no role in my theory of uncertain belief. The
criticisms I made of the various arguments’ premises have been motivated in part
by worries about severe uncertainty. So, if there is no severe uncertainty then
probabilism should be warranted. Probabilism is serving as an ideal case, like the
frictionless plane in physics. We are interested, in Henry Kyburg’s nice phrase, in
the “laws of frictionless thought” (Kyburg , p. ). Just as in the case of the
frictionless plane, an idealisation can be an important part of getting to the heart
of some particular phenomenon.
When you are certain of everything, your probability function reduces to a
valuation function. In the same way, when you are sufficiently sure of things that
there is no severe uncertainty, then your belief representor should reduce to a
probability function. In a way, I think the move from probability to imprecise
probability mirrors the move from valuation function to probability: the previous
framework proves to be inadequate given the nature of the evidence (or lack
thereof) that you have.
. Imprecise probabilism
On two occasions I have been
asked, “Pray, Mr. Babbage, if
you put into the machine
wrong figures, will the right
answers come out?” I am not
able rightly to apprehend the
kind of confusion of ideas
that could provoke such a
question.
(Charles Babbage)
The previous chapter argued that the orthodox method for representing graded
belief has some flaws. The main aim of this chapter is to outline my preferred al-
ternative representation of belief. I motivate and defend the imprecise probabilities
approach. More generally, this chapter further develops the kind of limited view
of rationality that I subscribe to.
This choice, of course, encapsulates some particular value judgements about
what a representation of belief is supposed to do. Not least, my view that only a
weak standard of rationality is in play in cases of severe uncertainty. So I shall
discuss that as well. As we saw in section ., there are many reasons to think
about formal representations of belief.
The plan is to first give some details of my preferred outlook on imprecise
probabilism. Then I discuss how the theory should be understood. I then discuss a
variety of ways to motivate the theory. After this, I briefly survey a couple of similar
systems. Finally, I discuss learning and updating with imprecise probabilities.
.. What is imprecise probabilism?
The basic insight of the imprecise probabilities approach is to represent belief by
a set of probabilities instead of a single probability. So instead of having some
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pr represent your belief, you have P , a set of such functions. Call this set your
representor. I will discuss various ways you might interpret the representor later
(in section .) but for now we can think of it as follows. Your representor is a
credal committee: each probability function in it represents the opinions of one
member of a committee that, collectively, represents your beliefs.
Often, it is assumed that your degree of belief in a proposition, X, is given by
P pXq “ {prpXq : pr P P }. I will adopt this notational convention, with the proviso
that I don’t take P pXq to be an adequate representation of your degree of belief in
X. I return to this point later. From this we can derive an “imprecise expectation”.
If Eprpf q is the expected value of act f with respect to probability pr, then EP pf q
is:
Definition .. EP pf q “ {Eprpf q : pr P P }
The same proviso holds of EP pf q as held of P pXq. I will often drop the subscript
“P” when no ambiguity arises from doing so.
From these concepts we can define some “summary statistics” that are often
used in discussions of imprecise probabilities. Your “lower envelope” of X is:
P pXq “ infP pXq. Likewise, your “upper envelope” is P pXq “ supP pXq. In the
same way we can talk about the bounds of the spread of your expectation. Your
“lower prevision” is defined as Epf q “ infEpf q and your upper prevision (E )
defined in the obvious way.
One might want to call “lower prevision” “lower expectation”, but we must
be careful: Walley () and Cozman (n.d.) use “lower expectation” to mean
something slightly different. The difference won’t be relevant here, so I stick
with the more intuitive terminology of “expectation”. Note however, that this
is a (minor) deviation from what is standard in the literature. One might also
prefer to term P pXq a “lower probability” rather than a “lower envelope”. I will
allow myself to do this, but I should note that this is again slightly non-standard.
Remember also that these summary statistics are not properly representative of
your belief. Information is missing from the picture. I will have more to say about
this later.
One might wonder whether taking representors to be sets of conditional prob-
abilities as the basic item might not be a better way to do things. Hájek ()
argues that conditional probabilities should be taken to be the basic entity, and
This term is due to van Fraassen ().
It hardly needs spelling out that if I am sceptical of P pXq as a representation of belief, I am
doubly so of P pXq.
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unconditional probabilities should be defined out of them. I agree with Hájek but
in what follows, this point won’t really make any difference, so I will continue to
talk mostly of unconditional probabilities. Bear in mind that these are “really”
conditional probabilities conditioned on J.
.. Interpreting the framework
How are we to understand claims like P pXq “ 0.3? More generally, what interpre-
tation should be given to the set of probabilities? Before we can ask this question,
we need to ask an even more basic question.
... What is a model of belief a model of?
Imprecise probabilities aren’t a radically new theory. I see them as merely a slight
modification of existing decision theory for situations of ambiguity. Often your
credences will be precise enough, and your available actions will be such that
you act more or less as if you were a strict Bayesian. I see imprecise probabilities
as the “Theory of Relativity” to the strict Bayesian “Newtonian Mechanics”: all
but indistinguishable in all but the most extreme situations. Howson ()
makes a similar analogy between modelling belief and models in science. Both
involve some requirement to be somewhat faithful to the target system, but in
each case faithfulness must be weighed up against various theoretical virtues like
simplicity, computational tractability and so on. Likewise Hosni (ms.) argues that
what model of belief is appropriate is somewhat dependent on context. There
is of course an important disanalogy in that models of belief are supposed to be
normative as well as descriptive, whereas models in science typically only have to
play a descriptive role.
One standard interpretation of the probability calculus is that probabilities
represent “degrees of belief” or “credences”. This is more or less the concept that I
have been considering so far. But what is a degree of belief? There are a number of
ways of cashing out what it is that a representation of degree of belief is actually
representing. It is important to get these concepts clear before we continue. I am
Recall the discussion of section ...
This analogy goes deeper: in both cases, the theories are “empirically indistinguishable” in nor-
mal circumstances, but they both differ radically in some conceptual respects. Namely, the role
of absolute space in Newtonian mechanics/GR; how to model ignorance in the strict/imprecise
probabilist case.
“Descriptive” is here being used in a fairly broad sense to include activities like prediction.
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going to adopt the convention of using degree of belief to refer to the thing being
modelled, and credence as the thing doing the modelling. I will try to keep to a
similar convention as regards value (the thing modelled) and utility (the thing
modelling).
One of the most straightforward understandings of degree of belief is that
credences are interpreted in terms of an agent’s limiting willingness to bet.
Williamson () takes this line. The idea is that your credence in X is q just
in case q is the value at which you are indifferent between the bets pX,qq and
p X,1´ qq. This is the “betting interpretation”. This is the interpretation behind
Dutch book arguments: this interpretation of belief makes the link between bet-
ting quotients and belief strong enough to sanction the Dutch book theorem’s
claim that beliefs must be probabilistic.
A related interpretation of credence is to understand credence as being just a
representation of an agent’s dispositions to act. This interpretation sees credence
as that function such that your elicited preferences and actions can be represented
as those of an expected utility maximiser with respect to that function. Your
credences just are that function that represents you as a rational agent. A slightly
more sophisticated version of this sort of idea is to understand credence to be
exactly that component of the preference structure that the probability function
represents in the representation theorem.
One might take the view that credence is modelling some kind of mental or psy-
chological quantity in the head. Strength of belief is a real psychological quantity
and it is this that credence should measure. Unlike the above views, this interpre-
tation of credence isn’t easy to operationalise. It also seems like this understanding
of strength of belief distances credence from its role in understanding decision
making. The above behaviourist views take belief’s role in decision making to be
central to or even definitional of what belief is. This psychological interpretation
seems to divorce belief from decision. Whether there are such stable neurological
structures is also a matter of some controversy.
A compromise between the behaviourist views and the psychological views is to
say that belief is characterised in part by its role in decision making. This leaves
room for belief to play an important role in other things, like assertion or reasoning
and inference. So the answer to the question “What is belief?” is: “Belief is
whatever psychological factors play the role imputed to belief in decision making
For precise probabilism, “rational agent” means “expected utility maximiser”. For imprecise
probabilism, rational agent must mean something slightly different.
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contexts, assertion behaviour, reasoning and inference”. There is room in this
characterisation to understand credence as measuring some sort of psychological
quantity that causally relates to action, assertion and so on. This is a sort of
functionalist reading of what belief is. Eriksson and Hájek () argue that
“degree of belief” should just be taken as a primitive concept in epistemology. The
above attempts to characterise degree of belief then fill in the picture of the role
degree of belief plays.
I want to be a little non-standard in my understanding of belief. I don’t want to
focus solely on human-sized agents and their personal beliefs. I’d also like to use
the same formal framework to theorise about the explicit decision weights used in
real cost-benefit analyses. These don’t necessarily match any particular human
agent’s personal beliefs: they are what might be called “institutional credences”.
These are the sort of credences of interest in scientific decision making, which will
be the topic of a later chapter.
In any model of uncertain belief and uncertain inference, there are some things
about which you are uncertain. But in every case there are some things that are
taken for granted. Imagine a toy example of drawing marbles from an urn. The
observed frequencies of colours is used as evidence to infer something about the
frequencies of colours in the urn. In this model, you take for granted that you are
accurately recognising the colours and are not being deceived by an evil demon or
anything like that. That’s not to say that we couldn’t model a situation where there
was some doubt about the observations: the point is that in the simple case, that
sort of funny business is just ruled out. There are certain aspects of the situation
that are taken for granted: that are outside the modelling process. This is the same
in science: when we model the load stress of a particular design of bridge, we
take for granted the basic physics of rigid bodies and the facts about the materials
involved. This point relates to what I was saying earlier about models of belief
being like models in science. It also relates to the discussion of Lo and Mueller
() and the idea of level of uncertainty being relative to what you take for
granted (section .).
Of course, in this case I am moving away from having belief be tied to psychological quantities.
But belief is still somehow tied up with whatever structural features of the institutional set up
and the beliefs of the individuals involved that are involved in decision making.
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... What makes belief rational?
Once we’ve decided what sort of thing belief is, we need to decide what we will
mean by rational belief. There are levels of normativity here. The most basic
constraints on rational belief, those that almost everyone will assent to, are basic
structural constraints: it is unreasonable, irrational to believe contradictory things.
For precise probabilists these structural constraints will include adherence to the
axioms of probability theory. Imprecise probabilists will not accept this structural
constraint in the same form, although probability theory still maintains some
of its normative force for them. Some might maintain that the basic structural
constraints are all that is required for rationality. I call these people radical
subjectivists.
One might also demand that rational beliefs should be responsive to the evi-
dence, in a certain sense. Williamson () calls this “empirically-based Bayesian-
ism”. Note here we are talking about a synchronic norm: your current evidence
should inform your current credences. There’s a separate issue of how new ev-
idence should change your credences, but I don’t want to discuss that yet. If
you thought that obeying the structural constraints and being in accord with the
current evidence was all there was to rationality, and that as long as you did that,
you could believe what you like, I would term you an empirical voluntarist.
W.K. Clifford argued that
. . . it is wrong always, everywhere and for anyone to believe anything
on insufficient evidence Clifford (, p. )
This suggests that there needs to be a procedure for determining what the correct
belief should be when the evidence underdetermines belief. Clifford seems to be
thinking in terms of outright (full) belief and so the correct attitude would be
suspension of judgement. If you are a Bayesian, you need to do a little work to find
out what the appropriate level of belief is. The Objective Bayesian has one such
method of determining the correct belief when the evidence is weak. I find myself
sympathetic to objectivists but, as I discuss later, I am sceptical of the details of
Objective Bayesianism.
William James criticised Clifford’s objectivism and argued for a kind of volun-
tarism that I mentioned above (James ). James starts by agreeing with the
intuition motivating Clifford’s remarks:
Indeed, radical subjectivists will argue that adherence to a diachronic evidential norm is enough
to guarantee that credences are suitably responsive to evidence.
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All this strikes one as healthy, even when expressed by Clifford with
somewhat too much robustious pathos in the voice. Free-will and
simple wishing do seem, in the matter of our credences, to be only fifth
wheels to the coach. (p. )
He goes on to point out that there seem to be competing epistemological pressures.
Believe truth! Shun Error! — These, we see, are two materially different
laws; and by choosing between them we may end by coloring differently
our whole intellectual life. (p. )
James worries that Clifford is too focused on shunning error and that any such
commitment will lead to an impractical level of scepticism. The widespread sus-
pension of belief that James thinks Clifford’s view leads to is, he claims, impossible.
When the evidence doesn’t decide what to believe for us, we must believe some-
thing, and nothing but free choice is left to decide what that belief should be. I take
it to be important to any sort of objectivist project in the imprecise probabilities
mould to respond to this worry about the danger of a looming scepticism.
So there are three levels of normativity for rational belief. One might consider
only structural constraints. One might think that empirical constraints limit your
choice of belief. Or one might think that empirical constraints determine your
choice of belief.
In the kinds of scientific decision making contexts that I will eventually return
to, these are the kind of probabilities of interest. In this context, I feel, objec-
tivism certainly has the upper hand over any form of permissivism or voluntarism.
Whatever might be the case of real individual agents’ freedom over their beliefs,
institutional credences shouldn’t be based on hunches, gut feeling or what have
you: only the evidence should count. Given that we are understanding these
institutional credences as explicit decision weights used in decision making, there
must be a “paper trail”. At some stage, the use of these rather than those weights
might have to be justified: reasons given for why the cost benefit analysis sanc-
tioned this rather than that course of action. Jamesian relativism precludes having
the reasons for belief that are necessary in this context.
Even at the level of desiring that your evidence determine your beliefs, I think
there is a certain level of subjectivity or arbitrariness that is unavoidable. First,
there is choice of a formal language to describe the objects of belief. This choice
could have an impact. It certainly has an impact for Objective Bayesianism, as
Williamson () points out in chapter . It is perhaps a little less clear whether
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this language-relativity is as big a problem for the imprecise case. Whether or not
it is, there are other elements of subjectivity that enter the process. When setting
up the model of belief, I have to decide what things to take for granted – what
facts to take as part of the background information. There is also the question
of ascertaining exactly what import various kinds of evidence you might receive
should have. To take a simple example, what should the import be of observing
 heads out of  tosses of a coin? One would like to say, at the very least, that
this rules out the possibility of the coin’s being heavily biased toward tails. But
it is logically possible that a tails-biased coin could come up heads  out of 
tosses. The question is “What standard of evidence do we need to assent to
some claim?” The standard of logical proof is obviously too strong. Indeed, it
seems like logic alone cannot determine what standard of evidence we require.
There is some subjectivity in fixing the standards for evidence: but once this is
done, the evidence determines your belief. In different ways, Kyburg’s evidential
probabilities model (Kyburg ; Kyburg and Teng ) and the unreliable
probabilities model of Gärdenfors and Sahlin () both build in this kind of
subjectivity. Kyburg by the thresholds for acceptance, Gärdenfors and Sahlin with
their reliability threshold ρ0. Both of these models will be discussed a little later.
I will return to this point later, but for now I want to point out that the ideal
of a purely objective model of belief isn’t going to work. What I mean by this is
that it seems like principles of rationality alone don’t seem to determine what
language you should frame your beliefs in, nor do they determine what standard
of evidence is appropriate. That’s not to say that these things are subjective – they
may just be inescapable aspects of your psychology – but just that they are not
determined by the principles of rationality alone. We can and should mitigate and
constrain how the elements of subjectivity enter the process.
... What represents belief?
So now we have a better idea of what it is that a model of belief should do. But
which part of our model of belief is representing which part of the belief state?
The first thing to say is that P pXq is not an adequate representation of the belief
in X. That is, one of the values of the sets of probabilities approach is to capture
certain kinds of non-logical relationships between propositions that are lost when
focusing on, say the associated lower probability. For example, consider tossing
The extreme finite frequentist might disagree: that it comes up heads more often tails makes it
the case that it isn’t tails-biased, so what I described is impossible.
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a coin of unknown bias. P pHq “ P pT q “ r0,1s, but this fails to represent the
important fact that prpHq “ 1´prpT q for all pr P P . This complementarity can
play an important role in reasoning and decision. This is a point I will return to
several times. I mentioned it when I introduced “P pXq”, I am mentioning it again
now, and I will return to this theme when I discuss updating later (section .).
P pXq might be a good enough representation of belief for some purposes. For
example in the Ellsberg game which we shall meet later (section ..), these sets
of probability values (and their associated sets of expectations) are enough to
rationalise the paradoxical preferences. How good the representation needs to be
depends on what it will be used for. Representing the sun as a point mass is a good
enough representation for basic orbital calculations, but obviously inadequate
if you are studying coronal mass ejections, solar flares or other phenomena that
depend on details of the internal dynamics of the sun.
... Imprecise and indeterminate
Sometimes a distinction is made between imprecise credences and indeterminate
credences. The idea is that there are two distinct kinds of belief state that might be
modelled by sets of probabilities. An imprecise belief is one where there is some
probability function that reflects your preferences, but you don’t know what it is,
so you use a set. An indeterminate belief is a belief state where there is genuine
indeterminacy in your beliefs. Steele () argues that it is the indeterminate
beliefs that are interesting.
I am following Walley () in using the term “imprecise probability” to
cover cases of indeterminate probability. This is an unfortunate aspect of a
somewhat standard terminology. It has been suggested to me that “indeterminate
probabilities” is a better name for the items I am interested in. I am somewhat
inclined to agree, but this advice came far too late in the day for me to effect
such a terminological upheaval in the current project. In any event, “imprecise
probability” is still infinitely better than the term “mushy credence”.
... Interpretations of the representor
There are a number of ways to understand what P is supposed to represent. I
mention a couple here, although a better handle on the interpretation is probably
gained from looking at the arguments in favour of the position, which I shall turn
to in a moment.
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One way one might want to interpret P is as a set of plausible chance func-
tions, for a given confidence interval. One could interpret Kyburg’s Evidential
Probabilities in this way (see section ..).
The worry with viewing P as a set of possible chance functions is that it doesn’t
seem to be properly responsive to evidence. Imagine tossing a biased coin, with
chance of heads either 13 or
2
3 . So if this were the right interpretation of the







. Since coin tosses are independent, evidence of previous
coin tosses would not change anything about the representor. Intuitively however,
seeing  out of  tosses land heads is good evidence that the true chance is 23 .
See Halpern (, Example .., pp. –).
The above worry – that sets of chances aren’t responsive to new evidence sug-
gests another interpretation. This interpretation of the representor that is due to
Joyce () is to consider each probability in the representor as a member of a
credal committee. This committee represents all the possible prior probabilities you
could have that are consistent with the evidence. Each credal committee member
is a fully opinionated Jamesian voluntarist. The committee as a whole, collectively,
is a Cliffordian objectivist.
The idea is that the elements of your representor are ways that sufficiently better
evidence might have determined your credence. There is something somewhat
“supervaluationist” about this understanding of the representor. Indeed, connec-
tions between imprecision and vagueness are deep and interesting. I shall discuss
them again later. One can think of the committee as containing members whose
beliefs encode all the possible situations that need to be taken into account. Col-
lectively, the committee must reason and decide. The overall committee opinion
somehow supervenes on the opinions of the members of the committee. Each
committee member, whatever the prior belief, is sensitive to the evidence. Thus,
representors so interpreted should respond to evidence appropriately. Later we
will see that this is not quite right.
Finally, one might take imprecise probabilities to just be a representation of
“fuzzy” or “incomplete” attitudes. This would motivate having credal states
represented by intervals or sets of numbers rather than precise values. The sets of
probabilities approach might then be seen as a solid formal foundation for that
sort of representation.
Though this isn’t the only interpretation of Evidential Probabilities.
Joyce attributes it Adam Elga. Weatherson (ms.) discusses something similar.
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.. Conceptual arguments for imprecise
probabilism
In the last chapter I spent a long time discussing various arguments for precise
probabilism that have been put forward. I ultimately find the arguments want-
ing. Not because they are deeply flawed, but because they impose too strong
constraints on your belief. Given the kinds of severe uncertainty I am concerned
with, probabilism seems like an unattainable ideal. In this section I want to offer
some positive arguments why the imprecise framework is better than its precise
cousin.
I offer some epistemological, conceptual arguments; and, in the next section,
some arguments of a more formal character.
Most of the following epistemological or conceptual arguments in favour of im-
precise probabilism can be seen as different attempted articulations of a common
idea. When modelling belief, it is almost universally agreed that it is important to
reflect the evidence you have in the belief you hold. Especially in the case where
you are modelling belief for the purpose of decision making, evidence should be
represented. I claim that there is an important corollary of this principle: you
ought to represent your ignorance. That is, it is important to have your representa-
tion of belief reflect your evidence, but it should also reflect where your evidence
is lacking. In a number of ways, precise probabilism glosses over this important
point.
... Incomparability and indifference
In chapter  I discussed some arguments that made use of preference relations,
or qualitative belief relations. In all these cases, the relation was assumed to be
complete. In cases of severe uncertainty, I don’t consider completeness to be
reasonable. That is – to take the preference example – I think it reasonable to have
no preference in either direction. This is, I feel, an importantly different attitude
to being indifferent between the options (see section ..).
Is it really reasonable to say that an agent has a preference between any two
possible acts? In the context of eliciting an agent’s preference, it might be a
In section . the preference was only assumed to have a strictly weaker property, but what I
have to say here holds of this case too.
Indeed, given the Rectangular Field Assumption and the Richness axiom, the space of acts over
which you are expected to have a preference is unreasonably vast.
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reasonable thing to assume, since “having neither preference” is more or less
behaviourally indistinguishable from “being indifferent” (i.e. having both pref-
erences). But I think there is an important difference between positively holding
both weak preferences and having neither preference. In the context of the kinds
of uncertainty I am interested in, I think this difference will be important, so
lumping “no preference” together with “indifference” is not justified. As I have
said above, I am coming from a quite different direction from those motivated
by behaviourist concerns. My concern is to represent your epistemic/doxastic
state so as to facilitate good decision making in cases of severe uncertainty. A
representation theorem is besides the point.
The question I am asking is “given the current state of evidence, what is the
right belief state to have in order to best make the right decisions?” I take it that
it is possible for evidence to not decide which of two hypotheses is more likely,
which of two possible actions will do better. I think it is important that our model
of belief should accommodate these facts.
Various of the arguments for probabilism required unreasonable things of you.
Representation theorems required you to have preferences over astonishingly
rich spaces of acts; Dutch book theorems required you to be able to determine
preference between arbitrary bets: would you rather bet on getting at least one
1 on four rolls of a die or on getting at least one pair of 1s on  rolls of two
dice? In either case it seems like there are discriminations of preference that are
required of you that you simply cannot make. From this and the contrapositive
of an “ought-implies-can” principle, we conclude that the conjunction of the
axioms cannot be normative. More specifically, at least some of the axioms are
not normative constraints. Arguably completeness and richness are among those
axioms that shouldn’t be considered normative; Joyce () agrees. We can now
ask what can be proved in the absence of the purely structural axioms? This
surely gives us a handle on what is really required of the structure of belief. The
specific answer to this question will be left until the section on formal arguments
(section .).
This is apparently the problem that bankrupted the Chevalier de Méré and caused him to turn
to Blaise Pascal for an explanation. This in turn led to the birth of probability theory.
Perhaps this example won’t convince if you take on board the idea that our agents are logically
omniscient. But just imagine bets on propositions where you know nothing about the nature of
the propositions. Surely here is a case where indifference is not warranted. That is, replace the
lack mathematical ability with some evidential failing in the example.
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... Weight of evidence, balance of evidence
Joyce () suggest that there is an important difference between the weight
of evidence and the balance of evidence. This is a distinction that collapses in
precise probabilism. Joyce argues – and I agree – that the distinction is worth
representing. This idea has been hinted at by a great many thinkers including J.M.
Keynes, Rudolf Carnap, C.S. Pierce and Karl Popper (See references in Gärdenfors
and Sahlin ; Joyce ). Imprecise probabilism allows you to represent this
difference.
Consider tossing a coin known to be fair. Let’s say you have seen the outcome
of a hundred tosses and roughly half have come up heads. Your degree of belief
that the coin will land heads should be around a half. This is a case where there is
weight of evidence behind the belief.
Now consider another case: a coin of unknown bias is to be tossed. That is,
you have not seen any data on previous tosses. In the absence of any relevant
information about the bias, symmetry concerns might suggest you take the chance
of heads to be around a half. This opinion is different from the above one. There
is no weight of evidence, but there is nothing to suggest that your attitudes to H
and T should be different. So, on balance, you should have the same belief in both.
However, when offered the choice between betting on the fair coin’s landing heads
as opposed to the unknown-bias coin’s landing heads, it doesn’t seem unreasonable
to prefer the former. But if both coins have the same subjective probabilities
attached, what rationalises this preference? So these two different cases get
represented as having the same probabilistic belief. Joyce argues that there is a
difference between these beliefs that is worth representing. Imprecise probabilism
does represent the difference. The first case is represented by P pHq “ {0.5}, while
the second is captured by P pHq “ r0,1s. Another way to understand what is wrong
with the precise probabilist’s response to this coin example is due to Karl Popper
(quoted in Gärdenfors and Sahlin (, p. )). If the precise probabilist must
have prpHq “ 0.5 before any evidence has arrived, and if the evidence (E) that
arrives is that the coin lands heads about half of the time, then the posterior belief
will be prpH |Eq “ 0.5. The evidence, therefore is irrelevant: it has had no impact
The phrase “coin of unknown bias” is a little awkward, since there’s no sense in which what is
unknown is a bias. Bias with respect to what? The coin could only said to be biased if we had a
pre-existing idea that the coin should land tails as often as heads. We should perhaps speak of a
“coin with unknown chance of heads”. Or if chance-talk is not allowed, “coin with disposition
to generate unknown statistics”. Hykel Hosni was helpful in pressing me on this point.
This is related to the Ellsberg cases I mention in a moment (section ..).
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on the belief.
Kaplan (, ) makes the same point. He suggests that to conflate the two
cases discussed above is to commit the “sin of false precision” (Kaplan , p –
). He notes that it is not the case that it is always unreasonable or impossible for
you to have precise beliefs: in that case precision could serve as a regulative ideal.
Kaplan’s argument is that to expect to always have precise beliefs is to fail to give
evidence its due (p. ). I think precise probabilism does still serve as something
of a regulative ideal, but it is the belief of an ideal agent in an idealised evidential
state. Idealised evidential states will include things like tossing a coin known to
be fair.
Scott Sturgeon perhaps puts the point best when he says:
[E]vidence and attitude aptly based on it must match in character. When
evidence is essentially sharp, it warrants sharp or exact attitude; when
evidence is essentially fuzzy – as it is most of the time – it warrants at
best a fuzzy attitude. In a phrase: evidential precision begets attitudi-
nal precision; and evidential imprecision begets attitudinal impreci-
sion. Sturgeon (, p. , Sturgeon’s emphasis)
Hawthorne () argues that Bayesians need both degree-of-belief and also
degree-of-support measures. I think this is pushing in the same direction as Joyce’s
argument. Hawthorne’s motivation and his solution are different, but ultimately,
both his project and the current argument are trading on the idea of degree of
belief and degree of support coming apart, and both being important aspects of
belief. The basic idea in both cases is that it’s not just what the evidence says, but
also how much evidence there is.
It might be objected that the difference between weight and balance of evidence
can be captured within a single probability measure by attending to the extent to
which updating on various kinds of evidence would change the posterior belief.
In the case where there has already been some evidence, extra evidence won’t
do much to shift the belief in Heads. However, in the case of no evidence, the
belief will be more prone to shifts due to new evidence. Brian Skyrms identifies a
property that plays something of this role, but in the context of propensities and
lawlikeness. He calls it “Resiliency” (Skyrms ).
If all we wanted was something that corresponded to the distinction between
weight and balance of evidence, then this would be fine. However, if we want the
Or, more properly, a coin taken to be fair.
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distinction to be of relevance in decision making, then it needs to be represented in
such a way that it can impact on decisions. The imprecise probabilities approach
can do this because the difference in belief is relevant to decision. Arguably, the
single measure approach cannot. Or rather, the standard decision theory is not
sensitive to this difference in the possible future updated beliefs. We could of
course come up with some sort of “resiliency-weighted expected utility” which
would nullify this objection. And presumably at least some of the other objections
to standard probability theory can be dealt with the same way. But the more we do
this, the epicycles on epicycles we add to our precise probabilist framework, the
less clear it becomes that this has any advantage in simplicity over the imprecise
framework.
Strictly speaking, what I have argued here is only half the story. I have shown
that there is a difference between the representations of belief as regards weight
and balance. But that still leaves open the question of exactly what is representing
the weight of evidence? We could, of course, just measure the amount of evidence
in each case. The fair coin case is like the unknown-bias case, but you have
some extra information. In this sense, the beliefs in the former are based on
stronger weight of evidence. But what aspect of the belief reflects this? It seems
unsatisfactory to simply use P pHq´P pHq as a measure of the weight of evidence
for H . This would get wrong cases of conflicting evidence. (Imagine two equally
reliable witnesses: one tells you the coin is biased towards heads, the other says
the bias is towards tails.) We can, I think, sidestep this problem. The advantage
of imprecise probabilities in these cases is not that they represent the weight of
evidence per se, but that they allow a representation of the difference between weight
and balance such that we can rationalise differences in behaviour that we think are
due to this distinction.
Sadly, it is not always true that imprecise probabilities represent this difference.
In cases of dilation (see section ..) more evidence can cause the upper and lower
probabilities to get further apart. I defer an analysis of this awkward fact until I
have presented the phenomenon of dilation in detail.
... Ellsberg problems
There are a number of examples of decision problems where we are intuitively
drawn to violate precise probabilism. And indeed, experimental subjects do seem
to express preferences that violate the axioms. Imprecise probabilities offers a way
of representing these intuitively plausible and experimentally observed choices as
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rational. One classic example of this is the Ellsberg paradox. Here I adapt a version
of the problem from Halpern ().
Example  I have an urn that contains a hundred marbles. Thirty marbles
are red. The remainder are blue or yellow in some unknown proportion.
What are we to think about this example? The standard precise probabilist
beliefs would have prpRq “ 0.3, and then, using some symmetry reasoning, we get
prpBq “ prpY q “ 0.7{2“ 0.35.
These probabilities suggest that you should prefer a bet on yellow to a bet (for
the same stakes) on red. In the betting formalism from section ., you should have
the following preference: pB,0.3q  pR,0.3q. However, experimental evidence – for
example Camerer and Weber () – suggests that real agents often prefer bets
on red to bets on yellow and also prefer red to blue. These revealed preferences
are difficult to square with the standard precise probabilist story. That is, no
probability function determines an agent who has the following preferences:
• pB,0q „ pY ,0q
• pR,0q  pB,0q
• pR,0q  pY ,0q
• pR,0.3q „ pB_Y ,0.7q
The first three of these reflect the experimentally observed (and intuitively reason-
able) preferences, the fourth reflects the intuition that red should have a betting
quotient of 0.3 reflecting its known probability.
The imprecise probabilist can model the situation as follows: P pRq “ 0.3,P pBq “
P pY q “ r0,0.7s. Modelling the ambiguity allows us to rationalise real agents’
preferences for bets on red. To flesh this story out would require a lot more to
be said about decision making. I defer this task until the next chapter, but the
intuition is that aversion to ambiguity explains the preference for red over blue or
over yellow.
As Steele () points out, the above analysis rationalises the Ellsberg choices
only if we are dealing with genuinely indeterminate beliefs. If we were dealing
with a case of “unknown precise belief” then there would exist some pr in the
Note that this expression of the belief state misses out some important details. For example,
for all pr P P , we have prpBq “ 0.7´prpY q. For the point I am making here, this detail is not
important.
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representor such that rational choices maximise Epr. For the Ellsberg choices,
there is no such pr.
Let me be clear here that I take the current project to be a normative one. So what
is important here is the ability of the imprecise probability model to rationalise
the intuitively compelling response to this decision problem. Even a normative
theory should, perhaps, have one eye on its descriptive adequacy so that the
intuitively reasonable results are also the experimentally observed is reassuring.
But the important feature is that the imprecise probability model can capture
some intuitively reasonable behaviour that the standard account cannot. Put it
this way: the intuitive Ellsberg preferences put a constraint on what the norms can
say. The norms should rationalise behaviour that we consider reasonable. Thus,
descriptive adequacy in this case points to success as a normative theory. One
might argue the other way: one might argue that the norms of precise probabilism
are rationally compelling and that therefore the observed behaviour is irrational.
One man’s modus ponens is another man’s modus tollens.
Here is another decision problem. This one is set up to make clear that the
agents are violating an apparently plausible principle of rationality known as the
Sure Thing Principle. I will discuss this principle in more detail in chapter .
R B Y
L1 “ pR,0q 1 0 0
L2 “ pB,0q 0 1 0
L3 “ pR_Y ,0q 1 0 1
L4 “ pB_Y ,0q 0 1 1
Table ..: Another decision problem
The bets involved in this problem can be shown as in Table . (using the same
urn set up as before). The paradoxical preferences that people tend to exhibit are
L1  L2 but L4  L3. These pairs of bets differ only in what happens in the “Y ”
column, so the preference should go the same way in each case. That is, L1 and
L3 look the same if you ignore the Y column. Likewise for L2 and L4. Now, in the
choice between L1 and L2, the Y column shouldn’t make a difference, since you
get the same thing if Y from both bets. Likewise for L3 and L4. So you should
choose the same way in both choices. That is, L1  L2 iff L3  L4. These are not the
preferences people tend to express.
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Again, a similar analysis to the one above allows the imprecise probabilist to
rationalise these preferences.
... Objective Bayesianism without precision
I find myself sympathetic to much of what Williamson () argues in defence
of Objective Bayesianism. Williamson offers a list of criteria for an adequate
theory of rational belief. I agree with the spirit of Williamson’s norms, but not the
precise forms he appeals to. Williamson’s norms are: Probabilism, Calibration
and Equivocation. I will say a little about each in turn. It turns out that I agree
with the spirit of each norm, but I disagree with the exact versions Williamson
advocates.
The first of the norms of Objective Bayesianism is Probabilism. This is the claim
that degrees of belief should be probabilities. I feel I have probably already said
enough to make clear what my opinion of this norm is. Williamson uses what he
calls the “betting interpretation” of degrees of belief. That is, he takes your having
a degree of belief p in X to mean that p would be the betting quotient you would
agree to buy or sell bets on X. This set up should be familiar from section .. But
the use it is put to is different. Williamson is serious about interpreting degrees of
belief as simply meaning having a particular disposition to accept certain betting
quotients as fair.
Williamson accepts, in effect, what I earlier called Complementarity. He is
aware of the apparent unreasonableness of this as a constraint on betting prefer-
ence, but argues that it is appropriate for an interpretation of degrees of belief.
That is, he concedes that actual models of real-world betting are better off not
taking Complementarity as a constraint, but that this does not preclude the “fair
buy/sell betting quotient” being a reasonable explication of strength of belief.
And given this, the Dutch Book Argument secures the conclusion that degrees of
belief must be probabilistic.
As I spent some time discussing in the previous chapter, I don’t buy this conclu-
sion. I do however accept that probability theory serves as a regulative ideal: in
the absence of severe uncertainty, strength of belief is appropriately modelled by
probability theory. But when there is severe uncertainty – when Complementar-
With the proviso that I don’t quite buy the centrality of pragmatic “avoiding sure loss” argu-
ments.
I actually think epistemic utility arguments are stronger than the pragmatic betting related
arguments for probabilism. Williamson doesn’t consider these kinds of arguments.
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ity is unwarranted – the DBA sanctions DS belief functions. So if I were to accept
a modified version of Williamson’s “betting interpretation of belief”, then the
appropriate model of belief would be Dempster-Shafer theory. But I don’t agree
with this. I take one part of the understanding of degree of belief to be its role in
decision making. But this role is not exhausted by the setting of betting quotients.
So while the buying quotients and selling quotients do somehow constrain belief,
DS theory isn’t the complete theory of belief.
The second norm of Objective Bayesianism is Calibration. The spirit of the
Calibration norm is that your degrees of belief should be sensitive to your evidence.
As Hume puts it:
A wise man. . . proportions his belief to the evidence.
Hume ( [], p. )
Williamson considers a variety of formal ways of cashing out what this sensitivity
to evidence should amount to (pp. –). All of these various ways essentially
put constraints on what probability functions would count as beliefs consistent
with the evidence. So an evidential constraint is essentially a set of probability
functions, and Calibration is the claim that your belief should be in the set of
probability functions determined by your evidential constraints. Williamson
considers two broad kinds of evidence: evidence of chances and structural con-
straints. The first kind of evidence consists of constraints like {prpXq “ x} or
{prpXq P rx,ys}. These are essentially constraints that tell you what the chance
of a certain proposition is. Principles like Miller’s principle or Lewis’ Principal
Principle are examples of precursors of the Calibration norm. In our Ellsberg
example, we had a constraint of this form: {prpRq “ 0.3}.
The second sort of evidential constraint – the structural constraints – will be
things like “X and Y are independent”, or “X is more likely than Y ”. In the
Ellsberg example the constraint {prpBq “ 0.7´prpY q} is a constraint of this form.
Williamson offers a pragmatic argument for the chance constraint (pp. –),
but doesn’t offer much in the way of justification of the structural constraints. In
any case Calibration seems justifiable on directly epistemological grounds. Of
course your degrees of belief should be responsive to your evidence! That’s what
they are for. How exactly the evidence you have imposes constraints on the per-
missible set of probabilities is tricky. Statistical evidence might inform constraints
Later, in section .., I discuss my reasons for not being content with DS theory.
There are, in fact, many distinct notions of independence for sets of probabilities. See Cozman
().
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of the first kind. Evidence of causes might inform structural constraints.
The exact constraints that evidence puts on belief are difficult to pin down,
as Williamson agrees. But I certainly endorse the idea that evidence should
constrain belief. What I would like to highlight here is that Williamson uses sets
of probabilities to represent the constraints that evidence imposes of belief.
The constraints that evidence puts on belief can’t be mere consistency. That is, it
can’t be that a belief is ruled out only when it is formally inconsistent with the
evidence. Consider the evidence that  of  tosses of a coin of unknown bias
have landed heads. It is consistent with this evidence that the coin is heavily biased
towards tails. However, intuition suggests that in this case the evidence should
determine that belief in heads should be around 23 . Wheeler and Williamson ()
offer the beginnings of an understanding of how the Calibration norm should
be cashed out using Henry Kyburg’s work on Evidential Probabilities. Deciding
what beliefs should be considered consistent with the evidence will involve an
element of subjectivity. I discuss Evidential Probabilities in a little more detail in
section ...
The final norm of Objective Bayesianism is Equivocation. This norm says that
degrees of belief should be as equivocal as is consistent with the evidence. That is,
Calibration determines a set of possible probability functions, and Equivocation
determines which of those should be used as your belief: it picks the most equiv-
ocal one. The most equivocal member of P is denoted ⇓P . This is a necessary
step since Williamson’s version of the Probability norm only allows for a single
probability to represent belief. Equivocation can be seen as one way of cashing
out what I think of as the “dual norm” of Calibration: you should not believe
anything more strongly than is sanctioned by the evidence. I agree with this
idea: that evidence constrains belief, and that going beyond your evidence is also
unreasonable. However, I take issue with Williamson’s cashing out of this idea
in terms of his Equivocation norm. I will say two things about this. First, I will
discuss Williamson’s argument from caution. Second, I will discuss Williamson’s
argument against the interval-valued probabilist.
Equivocation, for the Objective Bayesian, amounts to choosing the probability
function consistent with the evidence that is closest to the equivocator function.
This is a special probability function that assigns the same probability to all
atoms of the algebra of events. The argument for this Equivocation norm is
another pragmatic argument: equivocal beliefs lead to more cautious behaviour
and thus minimise worst-case expected loss. Williamson’s argument relies on the
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Figure ..: The decision problem of Example 
following claim: “the risks associated with actions triggered by middling degrees
of belief tend to be less severe than those triggered by extreme degrees of belief.”
(Williamson , pp. –). The argument for this is an appeal to intuitions: you
can afford to take risky decisions only when you are confident of the outcome
(that is, only when you have extreme beliefs). But I think Williamson is conflating
degree of belief and degree of support. The following example serves to illustrate
the difference.
Example  You are betting on a coin of unknown bias. It will be tossed twice.
The following bets are available to you.
Half Win £0.50
Different Win £1` ε if the coin lands on different sides each time,
win ε otherwise
HH HT TH T T
Half 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Different ε 1` ε 1` ε ε
As is clear from Figure ., Different maximises expectation only when prpHq
is very close to a half. Imagine you have no evidence about the bias of the coin.
It seems the high risk action – the action with higher variance in expectation – is
the one sanctioned by a middling credence. Extreme beliefs in this case would
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sanction the constant (zero risk) action. If you were now given lots of evidence
that the coin lands heads very nearly half the time, then and only then does it seem
reasonable to choose betting on Different. This illustrates that it isn’t high degree
of belief that triggers high-risk actions, but it is high degree of support. The two
are indistinguishable at the level of beliefs in the Objective Bayesian framework;
this prompts Williamson to conflate them.
So I don’t think Williamson’s argument from caution works. Williamson is
committed to getting close to the equivocator being the right way to have non-
committal beliefs. I would argue that taking the full set of probabilities consistent
with the evidence is the more non-committal approach. Williamson meets this
challenge head-on (pp. –). There are two arguments against the imprecise
view that I wish to address.
First, Williamson argues that imprecise probabilities can fail to determine an
optimal action. He may be right about this, although a more sophisticated analysis
of imprecise decision theory would be required to properly ground this claim (see
chapter ). But even if it is true that imprecise probabilities make decision making
hard, this is not a bug: it’s a feature! In the presence of severe uncertainty decision
making should be hard. It’s obvious that if you have very little evidence, then it
should be difficult to determine what the best course of action is. So Williamson’s
claim that Objective Bayesianism is better because it makes decision theory easier
is misguided: it makes decision theory too easy. There are only some circumstances
when “Newtonian mechanics is easy, so we should use it rather than GR” is a
good argument. Important, decision relevant uncertainties are lost when you
equivocate. It is helpful to know when your evidence doesn’t make choice among
the options straightforward. This should focus the decision maker on other aspects
of the available options, like their reversibility, their robustness, their adaptability
and so on. This line of argument will take centre stage in a later chapter. This
argument can be recast in terms of my weaker version of rationality. Williamson
argues that imprecise probabilities might fail to determine a best course of action.
I argue that such a failure is an advantage because imprecise probabilities fail to
determine an optimal action just when we shouldn’t expect rational constraints
on choice to determine such an action.
Williamson’s second argument against imprecise probabilities is a direct re-
The figure has ε “ 0.05. If the figure isn’t sufficiently convincing, consider that as ε tends to 0,
Different tends to a weakly dominated act.
Williamson is actually concerned with interval-valued probabilities, but his comments carry
over to the full imprecise probabilities framework.
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sponse to the claim that Objective Bayesianism fails to distinguish weight of
evidence and balance of evidence. Williamson argues that on the contrary, impre-
cise probabilism is wrong to make the distinction. This is because weight/balance
is a distinction concerned with evidence, not with belief. The claim is that the
distinction should not be represented at the level of belief. Williamson is right
that the weight/balance distinction is one that is primarily about evidence. But, I
would argue that the weight/balance distinction is decision relevant. And if it is
belief – not evidence – that informs decision, the distinction needs representing
on the level of belief. If I am right about Williamson’s conflating of degree of
belief and degree of support in his discussion of extreme beliefs leading to risky
actions, then he has already really conceded that both parts of the distinction are
decision relevant.
Ultimately, my objection boils down to this: I feel it is important that the full
range of the set of probabilities be represented. The equivocation norm is the
wrong way to be true to Clifford’s maxim. We shouldn’t want to try to reduce our
uncertainty down into a single probability measure. Representing the diversity of
the calibrated probability functions is important.
... Suspending judgement
A precise Bayesian can’t even ask when it is reasonable to suspend judgement.
That is, the precise probabilist does not have the resources to represent the state of
withholding belief. This is related to the distinction between weight and balance
mentioned above.
Consider the coin of unknown bias again. The Bayesian agent must have a
precise belief about the coin’s landing heads on the next toss. Given the complete
lack of information about the coin, it seems like it would be better just to suspend
judgement. That is, it would be better not to have any particular precise credence.
But there just isn’t room in the Bayesian framework to do this. The function must
output some number.
It is helpful to look at the relationship between DS theory and probability theory
in this context. One interpretation that is given of the Dempster-Shafer belief
function belpXq is that it represents the degree to which the available evidence
supports X. Then belp Xq is the degree to which the evidence supports  X. One
can then consider the quantity IpXq “ 1´belpXq ´belp Xq. This measures the
degree to which the evidence is silent on X. Huber () points out that precise
Williamson tacitly concedes this in using his model of belief to discuss decisions.
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probabilism – which is a special case of DS theory – can then be understood as
making the claim that no evidence is ever silent on any proposition. That is,
IpXq “ 0 for all X. One can never suspend judgement. This is a nice way of seeing
the strangeness of the precise probabilist’s attitude to evidence.
The committed precise probabilist would respond that setting prpXq “ 0.5 is
suspending judgement. This is the maximally noncommittal credence. I would
argue that this only seems to be the right way to be noncommittal if you are wedded
to the precise probabilist approach. Suspending judgement is something you do
when the evidence doesn’t determine your credence. But for the precise probabilist,
there is no way to signal the difference between suspension of judgement and
strong evidence of probability half. This is just the weight/balance argument
again.
To make things more stark, consider the following delightfully odd example
from Adam Elga:
A stranger approaches you on the street and starts pulling out objects
from a bag. The first three objects he pulls out are a regular-sized tube
of toothpaste, a live jellyfish, and a travel-sized tube of toothpaste. To
what degree should you believe that the next object he pulls out will
be another tube of toothpaste? Elga (, p. )
In this case, unlike in the coin case, it really isn’t clear what intuition says about
what would be the “correct” precise probabilist suspension of judgement. What
Objective Bayesian Equivocation recommends will depend on seemingly arbitrary
choices about the formal language used to model the situation.
Another response to this argument would be to take William James’ response to
W.K. Clifford. James argued that as long as your beliefs are consistent with the
evidence, then you are free to believe what you like. So there is no need to ever
suspend judgement. Thus, the precise probabilist’s inability to do so is no real
flaw. This attitude, which I called epistemic voluntarism has some adherents, but
also some detractors. The main line of argument against voluntarism is that there
is no reason for your belief’s being thus and so, rather than some other way.
I side with the Objective Bayesian in thinking that it is better for your beliefs
to not have this subjective, unreasoned element. Your evidence should not just
constrain your belief; it should determine it. There is then a need to be able to
suspend judgement when evidence is silent. That is, we are interested in rational
Williamson is well-aware of this language relativity problem. He argues that choice of a language
encodes some of our evidence.
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belief: belief informed by rational constraints. When the evidence is silent, it
seems that rationality cannot but require that you suspend judgement.
On the subject of suspending judgement, consider the question of logical omni-
science again. In the case of full or categorical belief, you can be logically ignorant
in two distinct ways: you can believe the negation of a consequence of your other
beliefs; or you can simply fail to believe some consequence of your beliefs. The sec-
ond is clearly a lesser sin, and the modifications to your beliefs required in order
to accommodate believing the consequence are easier to achieve. In the graded
belief case, there is no such distinction: a precise probabilist must have some
particular value attach to every proposition. There is only one way to be logically
ignorant; which is to fail to believe consequences of a proposition more strongly
than the proposition itself. There is no easy way to effect the appropriate belief
change in order to accommodate learning of your mistake for the precise proba-
bilist. I take this to show that if we wanted to explore logical ignorance and graded
belief, an imprecise probabilist framework, with its resources for suspending
judgement, would be better suited than a precise probabilist framework.
... Regress, vagueness and practicality
Imprecise probabilities is a theory born of our limitations as reasoning agents,
and of limitations in our evidence base. If only we had better evidence, a single
probability function would do. But since our evidence is weak, we must use a set.
In a way, the same is true of precise probabilism. If only we knew the truth, we
could represent belief with a valuation function, or just a set of sentences that are
fully believed. But since there are truths we don’t know, we must use a probability.
And indeed, the same problem arises for the imprecise probabilist. Is it reasonable
to assume that we know what set of probabilities best represents the evidence?
Perhaps we should have a set of sets of probabilities. . . Similar problems arise for
theories of vagueness (Sorensen ). We objected to precise values for degrees
of belief, so why be content with sets-valued beliefs with precise boundaries?
This is the problem of “higher-order vagueness” recast as a problem for imprecise
probabilism. Why is sets of probabilities the right level to stop the regress at? Why
not sets of sets? Why not second-order probabilities? Why not single probability
In the belief revision literature this can be made precise: Remedying the situation where you
fail to believe a consequence is achieved by an addition. Remedying the situation where you
believe the negation of a consequence is achieved by a revision, which is (by the Levi identity)
a contraction then an addition (Hansson ).
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functions? This is something of a pragmatic choice. The further we allow this
regress to continue, the harder it is to deal with these belief-representing objects.
So let’s not go further than we need.
I have argued above that imprecise probabilism does have some advantage
over precise probabilism, in the capacity to represent suspending judgement, the
difference between weight and balance of evidence and so on. So we must go at
least this far. But for the sake of practicality, we need not go any further. This
is, ultimately, a pragmatic argument. Actual human belief states are probably
immensely complicated neurological patterns with all the attendant complexity,
interactivity, reflexivity and vagueness. We are modelling belief, so it is about
choosing a model at the right level of complexity. If you are working out the tra-
jectory of a cannonball on earth, you can safely ignore the gravitational influence
of the moon on the cannonball. Likewise, there will be contexts where simple
models of belief are appropriate: perhaps your belief state is just a set of sentences
of a language, or perhaps just a single probability function. If, however, you are
modelling the tides, then the gravitational influence of the moon needs to be in-
volved: the model needs to be more complex. I am arguing that an adequate model
of belief under severe uncertainty needs to move beyond the single probability
paradigm. But a pragmatic argument says that we should only move as far as we
need to. So while you need to model the moon to get the tides right, you can get
away without having Venus in your model. This relates to the contextual nature
of appropriateness for models of belief that I mentioned earlier.
... Nonprobabilistic chance
What if the objective chances were not probabilities? If we endorse some kind
of connection between known objective chances and belief – for example, Lewis’
Principal Principle (Lewis ) or a form of calibration norm – then we might
have an additional reason to endorse imprecise probabilism. It seems to be a
truth universally acknowledged that chances ought to be probabilities, but it is
a “truth” for which very little argument has been offered. For example, Schaffer
() makes obeying the probability axioms one of the things required in order to
play the “chance role”, but offers no argument that this should be the case. Joyce
() says “some have held objective chances are not probabilities. This seems
unlikely, but explaining why would take us too far afield.” (p. , fn. ). Various
other discussions of chance – for example in statistical mechanics (Frigg b;
Loewer , ) or “Humean chance” (Lewis , ) – take for granted
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that chances should be probabilistic. Obviously things are confused by the use
of the concept of chance as a way of interpreting probability theory. There is,
however, a perfectly good pre-theoretic notion of chance: this is what probability
theory was originally invented to reason about, after all. This pre-theoretic chance
still seems like the sort of thing that we should apportion our belief to, in some
sense. And there is very little argument that chances must always be probabilities.
If the chances were nonprobabilistic in a particular way, one might argue that
your credences ought to be nonprobabilistic in the same way.
I want to give a couple of examples of this idea. First consider some physical
process that doesn’t have a limiting frequency but has a frequency that varies,
always staying within some interval. It might be that the best description of such
a system is to just put bounds on its relative frequency. If we took a Humean
perspective on what chances are, this would make it the case that its chance is
nonprobabilistic (Hájek and Smithson ). If you were committed to appor-
tioning your credence to the chances, then in worlds with these sorts of entities,
you ought to have nonprobabilistic credences. If instead you lived in a world of
genuine indeterminacy, then imprecise statistics would also move you towards
nonprobabilistic credence (I discuss imprecise statistics in the next section).
.. Formal arguments for imprecise probabilism
I have above discussed some conceptual, epistemological reasons to consider
imprecise probabilism superior. I now consider more formal arguments. These
include some subversions of the arguments for probabilism that occurred in the
last chapter, as well as some new ones.
... Completions of incomplete preferences
As should be clear from the previous discussion, I am no fan of complete prefer-
ences (section ..,..). However, I don’t believe that complete preferences are
irrational: I simply feel that completeness of preference is a counsel of perfection.
Since there is an Ought-Can principle at work, and since you cannot always have
complete preferences because of severe uncertainty, it follows that we must not
demand that you ought to have such preferences. My objection to completeness is
a “not-ought” objection, not an “ought-not” objection.
Precise probabilism is serving as a regulative ideal. Completeness of preference
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is what the thoroughly informed agent ought to have. Without complete prefer-
ence, Savage’s representation theorem doesn’t work. However, for each completion
of the incomplete preference ordering, the theorem follows. So if we consider the
set of probability functions that are such that some completion of the incomplete
preference is represented by that function, then we can consider this set to be
representing the beliefs associated with the incomplete preference. We also get,
for each completion, a utility function unique up to linear transformation.
A similar kind of argument can be given for the richness assumptions. That
is, the uncountable infinity of states required to ensure the uniqueness of the
probability function was considered unreasonable in the previous chapter. If
this richness is considered, not as a condition on reasonable models of decision
problems, but as a condition of extendibility, then it isn’t as unreasonable. The idea
is that your state space may be finite or countably infinite, but it should at least in
principle be possible to extend it consistently to a richer one. So again, consider
each possible sufficiently rich extension of a finite or countable state space. For
each extension, the representation theorem holds. Taking the set of probability
functions thus acquired delivers us an imprecise probability representation.
So, sets of probabilities offer a representation of incomplete preferences or
incomplete qualitative belief orderings. If all we wanted was a way to represent
incomplete beliefs, what need would we have of this framework, however? Surely
the preference ordering or the belief ordering itself would serve as a good enough
representation. However, there are kinds of belief state, kinds of opinion, that
I feel I have and that the ordinal representation fails to adequately represent.
For example, I can think “X is much more likely than Y ”, or that “X and Y are
independent”. These kinds of belief attitude aren’t captured by the ordinal
representation. So the set of probability approach allows one to represent these
more subtle kinds of belief state. Thus we should move beyond the merely ordinal
representation of belief.
Given that a particular purely ordinal preference ordering that satisfies Savage’s
postulates will have a unique probability representation, it could be argued that
the “is twice as likely” type information is somehow in the ranking. The point,
however, is that it isn’t represented in a way that we can easily see it. If we want a
I don’t wish to wade into the debate about genuinely incommensurable goods. For the purposes
of the current debate, let’s assume there are no such basic incommensurabilities in play. But
see Hsieh ().
Obviously, I can’t be appealing to probabilistic independence here, but there is an intuitive sense
in which events can be independent.
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model where we can discuss this kind of “slightly more than ordinal” information,
the brute preference ordering isn’t appropriate, even if it is in some sense formally
adequate to express those aspects of belief.
The purely ordinal approach to representing belief can’t do justice to the action
guiding dimension of decision theory. Consider the choice between bets pX,αq
and pY ,βq where X b Y but β ≺u α. That is, X is more likely than Y , but the bet
on Y leads to a better prize (the bet costs less). How are we to trade off the better
prize versus the bet more likely to win? It depends on the strength of belief and
how much the prizes are valued. The representation theorems take these sorts of
preferences among bets – or lotteries or acts more generally – and uses them to
determine cardinal measures of belief and value. But if you want to use decision
theory as a way to help us determine these preferences by using your attitudes to
the events and prizes, then the purely ordinal approach isn’t sufficiently expressive
to allow you to make all the determinations you might want.
... Unknown correlations
Haenni et al. () motivate imprecise probabilities by showing how they can
arise from precise probability judgements. That is, if you have a precise proba-
bility for X and a precise probability for Y , then you can put bounds on prpX^Y q
and prpX _ Y q, even if you don’t know how X and Y are related. These bounds
give you intervals of possible probability values for the compound events.
For example, you know that prpX^Y q is bounded above by prpXq and by prpY q
and thus by min{prpXq,prpY q}. If prpXq ą 0.5 and prpY q ą 0.5 then X and Y must
overlap. So prpX ^Y q is bounded below by prpXq`prpY q´ 1. But, by definition,
prpX ^ Y q is also bounded below by 0. So we have the following result: if you
know prpXq and you know prpY q, then, you know that prpX^Y q is somewhere in
the interval:
rmax{0,prpXq`prpY q´ 1} , min{prpXq,prpY q}s
Likewise, bounds can be put on prpX_Y q. prpX_Y q can’t be bigger than when
X and Y are disjoint, so it is bounded above by prpXq`prpY q. It is also bounded
above by 1, and thus by the minimum of those expressions. It is also bounded
below by prpXq and by prpY q and thus by their maximum. Putting this together,
Apparently Seidenfeld and Levi also favour this motivation.
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prpX _Y q will be in the interval:
rmax{prpXq,prpY q} , min{prpXq`prpY q,1}s
So if your evidence constrains your belief in X and in Y , but is silent on their
interaction, then you will only be able to pin down these compound events to
certain intervals. Any choice of a particular probability function will go beyond
the evidence in assuming some particular correlation between X and Y . That is,
prpXq and prpX|Y q will differ in a way that has no grounding in your evidence.
... Imprecise statistics
The statistical evidence that we often use to constrain our beliefs does not, as a
rule, give us precise probabilities. This is the motivating idea behind the work
of Peter Walley (Walley , ; Walley and Fine ). This is related to a
similar idea propounded by Kyburg and Teng (), which I will discuss later.
A contrived example will serve to illustrate the idea behind what I mean by
“imprecise statistics”. Imagine you are collecting statistics on hair colour, and
you have a number of categories: Grey, Blonde, Brown, Black. . . And imagine you
are collecting data in the evening. You see someone who has dark hair, but you
can’t tell whether they have brown or black hair, given that the light is fading.
You might be tempted just to guess one way or the other and put the subject in
one category. However, the motivating idea behind imprecise statistics suggests
putting the subject in the disjunctive category “Brown or Black” without putting
them in either of the disjunct categories. The statistics thereby built up would be
superadditive, but not additive.
... Imprecise scoring rules
This argument has some of the same flavour as the “completions of incomplete
preference” idea above. If epistemic utility arguments appeal to you, but you
can’t decide on exactly which inaccuracy measure to use, then take the set of all
probability functions that accuracy dominate your nonprobabilistic belief and
take this set as the right belief.
One might want to go further and try to generalise epistemic utility functions
such that they can measure the utility of sets of measures. Then one might try to
prove that sets of probability functions are vindicated. I don’t know of any work
in this area.
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Perhaps it would help to step back and ask the more basic question. What makes
a set of probabilities a good belief? First let’s look at the question of what makes a
good probabilistic belief. Say you make a prediction that there’s a % chance of
a “barbecue summer”. That summer in fact turns out to be unusually cold. You
take a lot of flak for having made a bad prediction. How aggrieved should you
be? More generally, when is a probabilistic prediction a good one? There is quite a
literature on this question. For example, see Bröcker and Smith ().
One can score beliefs in the same way you can score probabilistic forecasts.
This gives you a way to answer the question “What is a good belief?”. The same
question arises in the imprecise probabilities setting. What is a good imprecise
belief? Can scoring rules be modified to answer this question? One crude attempt
at scoring imprecise beliefs would be to take the set of inaccuracy values for each
pr P P as representing the inaccuracy of the representor. Note the analogy to
taking sets of expectation pointwise. We could then consider the upper and lower
limits of this set of inaccuracies. I don’t know of any work on this, and am sceptical
that this crude approach will yield much in the way of interesting results.
If the aim were to use some sort of scoring rules approach to vindicate impre-
cise probabilism, we would have to be careful to set things up so as to not give
an advantage to singleton probabilities. For example, if the inaccuracy of the
representor were its average inaccuracy, then there would always be a precise
probabilistic belief with lower inaccuracy: that’s how averages work! Implicit
in the DS approach to belief – with its understanding of “suspend judgement”
to mean belpXq “ 0 “ belp Xq – is the idea that it is better to underestimate a
chance that to overestimate it. Presumably if we built scoring rules that built in
this asymmetry then they would vindicate DS theory over probability theory. In
fact, it is some sort of asymmetry of this sort that was at work in my earlier Dutch
book theorem for DS theory: focus on the buying odds (the αXs) means that we
end up with DS belief functions. Williams (a) points to an analogy between
Dutch book arguments and gradational accuracy. Betting success could be seen as
a kind of score, so this gives hope for the possibility of “asymmetric” gradational
accuracy arguments to vindicate nearby theories.
It is well known that the Brier score can be decomposed into parts, each of
which can be given an intuitive interpretation (Joyce , Section ). The decom-
position in fact holds of any strictly proper scoring rule (Bröcker ). The terms
Let’s not worry for now what I mean by average.
The decision problems of Frigg et al. (b) set up an asymmetry by only offering selling odds,
and not buying odds. So the conclusion there is effectively a DS plaus measure.
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of the decomposition are a calibration term and a discrimination term. The first
tells you how reliable your belief was and the second tells you how informative
your belief was. Presumably any sort of asymmetry in the scoring rule should
be built into the calibration part, rather than the discrimination part.
... Non-classical logic
We saw earlier that at least the Dutch book and gradational accuracy arguments
can be subverted by replacing the underlying logic by a non-classical one. If
you were a big fan of intuitionistic logics of some variety, for example, then
perhaps these facts would convince you to abandon probability theory. However,
this route would not lead you directly to a sets-of-probabilities approach, since
the conclusions of the above mentioned arguments sanctioned Dempster-Shafer
theory. Indeed, it is built into both frameworks that some sort of single-function
model of belief will be chosen.
So to make this sort of argument work for me, I would need to argue that sets of
probabilities offer a good explication of DS theory and other nearby theories. I
will do a bit of this in section .. But I don’t consider this my main motivation
for imprecise probabilities, so I won’t discuss this too much.
.. Nearby theories
Imprecise probabilities do not exist in a vacuum. There are many similar alterna-
tives to precise probabilism in the vicinity. I discuss a few of the more important
and more interesting ones.
... Evidential probabilities
Evidential probabilities are a kind of “interval-valued” probability together with
a thorough theory for inferring them from statistical data, and for logically rea-
soning about them. The theory is most fully set out in Kyburg and Teng ()
and more clearly in Haenni et al. (); Wheeler and Williamson (). The
theory is discussed more with an eye to the concerns of psychologists and experi-
mental economists in Kyburg (). The fundamental guiding principle behind
This is following Joyce. The discrimination term can be further broken down into terms that
Bröcker calls “uncertainty” and “resolution”. The details aren’t important at this level.
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the inference from data step comes from “Reichenbach’s principle”, which can be
explained as follows:
If we are asked to find the probability holding for an individual future
event, we must first incorporate the case in a suitable reference class.
An individual thing or event may be incorporated in many reference
classes. . . We then proceed by considering the narrowest reference class
for which reliable statistics can be compiled.
Reichenbach quoted in Kyburg and Teng (, p. )
Given a particular significance level, we take statistically significant sample
frequencies as evidence of population frequencies. The significance level is used
to determine the “Evidential Corpus” of evidence claims that determines belief.
We give a kind of “confidence interval” of values for the population frequency. We
take this interval as an interval-valued representation of the correct belief about
the property in question. The significance level, which is somewhat subjective,
can be thought of in this context as a sort of “threshold for reliability of statistics”.
Relative to this choice of significance level, the impact of evidence is objective
and determinate. So evidential probabilities are relative to a choice of significance
level. This is an element of subjectivity in the theory.
Wheeler and Williamson () discuss using evidential probabilities as a
method for putting restrictions on which probability functions are compatible
with a certain corpus of statistical data. If we stop there – rather than going
the further step and equivocating – then we can take evidential probabilities as
sanctioning a particular (imprecise) representor as the correct belief to have about
the world.
I don’t take evidential probabilities to be a rival to my brand of imprecise prob-
abilism, so much as a method for inferring representors from data. Indeed, I am
sympathetic to Wheeler and Williamson’s interpretation of evidential probabilities
as providing a method for carrying out the Calibration procedure of Objective
Bayesianism.
As typically understood, Evidential Probabilities are interval-valued functions,
or at least set-valued functions. They are not sets of probability functions. How-
ever, it is easy enough to understand the interval valued function as determining
a set of probabilities, P , such that P pXq is exactly the interval for X for all X.
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... Unreliable probabilities
Gärdenfors and Sahlin () introduce a theory that they term Unreliable Prob-
abilities. It bears some resemblance to Kyburg’s theory – they in fact discuss
Kyburg – but it is a theory built with decision making in mind. The basic idea
is that you have a set of probabilities and attached to each probability function
is a measure of its reliability. Depending on the circumstances, you pick some
reliability threshold ρ0 and restrict your attention to the set of probabilities that
are at least as reliable as that threshold. They then have a story about how decision
making should go with this set. I defer discussion of the decision part to a later
chapter. Note that they don’t really need a measure of reliability, all they need
is something to order the probabilities in P . The threshold then becomes some
cut-off probability: anything less reliable than it doesn’t make the cut.
Gärdenfors and Sahlin don’t really discuss this measure of reliability a great
deal. Presumably reliability increases as evidence comes in that supports that
probability function. Gärdenfors and Sahlin offer an example to illustrate how
reliability is supposed to work. They consider three tennis matches. In match A,
you know that the two tennis players are of roughly the same level and that it will
be a tight match. In match B, you have never even heard of either player and so
cannot judge whether or not they are well matched. This should remind you of
the weight/balance distinction I discussed earlier. In match C you have heard that
the players are really unevenly matched: one player is much better than the other,
but you do not know which of the players is significantly better. If we graphed
reliability of a probability against how likely that probability thinks it is that the
player serving first will win, the graphs would be as follows: graph A would be
very sharply peaked about 0.5; graph B would be quite spread out; graph C would
be a sort of “U” shape with high reliability at both ends, lower in the middle.
Graph A is peaked because you know that the match will be close. You have
reliable information that the player serving has about a % chance of winning.
Graph B is spread out because you have no such information in this case. In case
C, you know that the probability functions that put the chances at near – are
unreliable: all you know is that the match will be one-sided.
The index on Kyburg’s evidential corpora and the current reliability index
Let’s assume there are no other events in our algebra in order to guarantee that each probability
value for server-wins corresponds to one and only one probability. This is for illustrative
purposes only.
Case C here is an excellent example of why convexity of imprecise probabilities should not be
mandated.
. Imprecise probabilism 
threshold both indicate a place where an element of subjectivity enters rational
belief. Where to set that cut-off affects which things get counted as beliefs and
which things influence learning, deliberation, choice, action, assertion and so on.
The threshold is somewhat arbitrary, perhaps context sensitive, but not rationally
derivable in any case.
What might be part of deciding how reliable pr P P is? One idea we might
use is that probabilities that have scored well at predicting past evidence (by
the lights of some scoring rule like the Brier score, for instance) are reliable.
Probabilities that consistently assign high probability to events that don’t happen
and low probability to events that do happen will not score well and will thus be
considered unreliable. This method of scoring the reliability of probabilities will
help with some of the problems we encounter in section ..
What might be deciding what the threshold for inclusion in P is? Earlier I
suggested that it could include an element of subjectivity. It should vary with
context. Perhaps the threshold should be something like “anything more than
% of the most reliable pr gets in”.
With this framework we can begin to ask some interesting questions: such
as “what are the preconditions for reliability to covary with distance from the
equivocator?” Williamson seems to think that reliability always covaries with
distance from ⇓P ; I have discussed above why I think this is mistaken. However,
the two things will often coincide and it would be interesting to see whether we
can understand more carefully what the relationship is.
... Dempster-Shafer theory
We have already met some of the formal details of Dempster-Shafer theory in
section ... Here I outline a little more broadly the motivations behind the
project.
The DS belief function belpXq is considered to represent the degree to which
the evidence supports X. To return to the imprecise statistics example, we can see
that the evidence that the subject has dark hair supports the proposition that the
subject has brown or black hair, but one might take the view that the evidence
isn’t sufficient to support either disjunct.
It is well known that DS belief functions are intimately related to imprecise
I’m not suggesting that this interpretation of the situation is uncontroversial: a committed
precise Bayesian might argue that dark hair is equally strong evidence for each disjunct, or
something along those lines.
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probabilities. Every DS belief function can be associated with a set of probabilities
such that the lower probability of that representor is that DS function. This is
the content of Halpern’s theorem .. (Halpern , p. ).
The problem, I feel, with DS theory is that it makes decision theory harder,
without really providing the advantages of imprecise probabilities. But I want to
just focus on one way that decision making with DS belief functions seems to get
things wrong. Let’s imagine that we want DS decision making to work more or
less like it does for probabilities. That is, we want to take the bel function and just
drop it in as a replacement for pr throughout our decision making discourse. So
agents should be acting to maximise:∑
i
belpXiqupapXiqq (.)
There’s a little subtlety here. What is that i ranging over? That is, what are the
Xi? Is it ranging over the atoms? Is it ranging over some partition such that each
act is constant on each element of the partition? Since probabilities are additive,
this doesn’t matter at all for the precise probabilist. But for DS belief, it matters a
lot! Consider this pair of bets on a coin of unknown bias: {pH,0.4q,pT ,0.4q}. This
should straightforwardly come out as being an acceptable set of bets whatever
your beliefs. But consider the DS-expected utility on the partition {H,T }:
belpHqp1´ 0.8q`belpT qp1´ 0.8q (.)
Now, if bel is such that belpHq “ 0“ belpT q, as would be reasonable for complete
ignorance of the coin’s bias, then this set of bets is valued at zero. Valuing this
set of bets at 0 determines preferences that are in conflict with Bet Dominance.
However, the act of taking both bets also happens to be constant on the trivial
partition {J} since H _ T ” J. With this partition, the DS-expected value comes
out as 0.2.
There are two lessons to take from this. First, DS-expected utility seems to be
sensitive to choice of partition. I take this to be a flaw of a decision theory. This
sort of difference of presentation should not affect the choiceworthiness of the
acts. Second, some choices of partition seem to lead to undesirable choice profiles.
The natural way to pick a partition in a principled way would be to just sum the
bel-weighted utilities over the atoms. But this choice is most likely to lead to
odd results, as equation (.) shows. I suppose you could try to argue that the
correct partition is the coarsest partition such that all the acts are constant on all
The set of probabilities is not unique. There is, however, a unique convex set.
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the elements of that partition. This would rule in favour of the trivial partition
in the example. But this sort of rule looks ad hoc, and vulnerable to odd results
through gerrymandering the set of bets on offer to manipulate the partition.
Imprecise probabilities don’t have this problem. Expectation is done pointwise
for each member of the representor, and since each pr P P is a probability, the
choice of partition doesn’t matter. These problems for DS theory are also problems
for many similar theories: Choquet expected utility, upper and lower probabilities,
interval valued probabilities and so on. In each case, the way out of the problem
is to find the imprecise probability that best matches the representation, and
use that as the basis for decision making. As I suggested above in the case of
Evidential Probability, one can interpret an interval valued probability as the set
of probability functions with values in the intervals.
.. Updating beliefs
So far, I have only discussed “static” or “synchronic” structure on belief. But
beliefs change in response to evidence. I won’t have too much to say about this
in the following chapters, but I feel something should be said about updating
sets of probabilities. There are two reasons for this. First, no formal model of
belief would be complete without a discussion of how belief should respond to
new evidence. Second, imprecise probabilities suffer from some problems with
updating.
... Kinds of learning
There are, as I see it, several kinds of updating. I shall describe a few here. I
don’t mean to suggest that this list is exhaustive, nor that each kind of learning
requires its own mechanism. But there do seem to be interesting distinctions to
draw between each of the following kinds of learning.
Learning a proposition
The simplest kind of learning is arguably learning that a proposition is true. This
is the sort of learning that is straightforwardly modelled by conditionalisation
For an alternative characterisation of types of learning, see Bradley () where three types of
learning are considered – revision, formation and withdrawal – with parallels to the literature
on AGM-type revision for full belief.
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in the precise case. The most obvious way to update sets of probabilities in this
case is to take sets of updated probabilities. And it seems natural to understand
“updated probabilities” as meaning conditionalised probabilities. Grove and
Halpern () offer a theorem that says that given certain conditions on how
updating should work, sets of conditionalised probabilities is the only method for
updating imprecise probabilities. Their conditions are not all intuitive and I don’t
mean to discuss them further.
An argument for a slightly weaker conclusion goes as follows. Whatever else
happens, updating for singleton sets of probabilities should be exactly like updat-
ing single probability functions. This is effectively a kind of “boundary condition”
on updating. We want things to reduce to conditionalisation in the precise limit.
The imprecise probabilities framework I am developing is supposed to be a some-
what conservative generalisation of orthodox Bayesianism. Take P E to be P
updated on evidence E. This first condition amounts to:
If P “ {pr} then P E “ {prp¨|Eq} (.)
Second, if P contains all the functions in P 1, then updating P should result in a
representor that contains all of the updated version of P 1. That is:
If P 1 Ď P then P 1E Ď P E (.)
This second condition can be seen as a commitment to a kind of “pointwise” view
of how updating should work. It denies that any kind of holistic properties of the
representor should impact on how each committee member updates. Together,
these imply that an updated representor should contain at least all the conditional
probabilities of its members. The procedure that takes the updated represen-
tor to be exactly the set of conditional probabilities has been called generalised
conditioning.
A related, more restricted kind of updating has been contemplated by Gilboa
and Schmeidler (). They take the updated representor to consist of only those
conditionalised probabilities that assigned the evidence a high prior probability.
They call this “Maximum likelihood” updating. This is a “subset” of generalised
conditioning, in that the ML update is always contained in the GC update.
Learning a constraint
Imagine if you were to learn “X is more likely than Y ”. This seems like it is
interestingly different from learning the truth of a proposition. This sort of
Proof: P Ě pr for all pr P P . So P E Ě {prp¨|Eq for all pr P P .
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updating might best be captured by recalibrating. That is, by repeating the
calibration procedure we discussed in section .. and section ...
Henry Kyburg’s Evidential Probabilities aren’t updated by conditioning. At
each stage, the same process is conducted: given the current state of evidence,
the evidential probability of X is the proportion of Xs in the smallest reference
class for which we have good statistics. When new evidence comes in, the EP in
X could change if the evidence determines statistics for a smaller reference class
containing X.
The Objective Bayesian paradigm also rejects conditionalising as a method of
updating. Like Evidential Probabilities, OB uses the same procedure to determine
credence at each stage. Evidence determines the set of consistent probabilities,
and then you must equivocate over them. If we ignore the equivocation part, we
have a view of learning where new evidence can change the belief in X if the
evidence rules out some previously consistent probability functions.
The difficulty that these sorts of approaches have is to do with diachronic consis-
tency and reasoning about the future. It seems reasonable that what you imagine
your beliefs would be were you to learn E and what your beliefs actually are once
you learn E should match. In orthodox Bayesianism, the conditional probability
plays a double role in being both belief under supposition of E and belief up-
dated by E. So responses to evidence that take this recalibration route must tell
a convincing story about how supposing-that-E beliefs relate to learning-that-E
beliefs. If supposing that E involves doing the updating “in a subjunctive mood”,
or something like that, then there will be no inconsistency, but it will probably
be computationally intensive. The nice thing about the orthodox Bayesian way is
that the supposing-that-E beliefs are already part of your credence.
Undermining evidence
Another possible sort of learning is to discover that some source of evidence
previously thought to be reliable turns out not to be. You then have to reassess
all the evidence that came to you from that source in the light of its unreliability.
Weisberg () gives an example of this sort of evidence.
What you’d like to do in response to this sort of evidence is “rewind” to before
you learned whatever it was the unreliable source told you, and then go through all
your evidence since then and revise your attitudes in the light of it, without your
belief state being tainted by the unreliable evidence. Whether such a procedure is
practicable or even possible is something I shall not discuss further.
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Testimony and higher-order evidence
This is related to the above kind of update. You interact with other agents and
they will report their opinions to you. What are you to make of these reports? On
some simple models, you will take the other agents to be perfectly truthful and
this kind of learning will collapse into the first or second kind. But what if the
reports are noisy? Or the agents possibly strategically untruthful? What sort of
change in belief is appropriate in these circumstances? Under this heading we
can group concerns about the epistemology of disagreement (Christensen ) as
well as discussions of principles of reflection (van Fraassen ): think of your
future self as another agent whose opinions you care about. We can also see work
in Bayesian epistemology on unreliable signals as being an attempt to model this
sort of update (Bovens and Hartmann , Chapters  and ).
Language change
Even more drastically, we can imagine modelling changes in formal language that
describe the objects of belief. For instance, an agent might learn that “Superman”
and “Clark Kent” are co-referring terms. Or that “The philosopher Nagel” could
refer to either of at least three distinct persons. Or imagine someone at the
beginning of the Nineteenth Century. Such a person would not have had any
beliefs about the planet Neptune, since it wouldn’t be discovered until the middle
of the century. After its discovery in , astronomers had to expand the set
of propositions over which they had beliefs given all the new kinds of Neptune-
related facts they now had.
... Dilation
There are, as we have seen, a number of different ways you might try to update your
credences on learning new evidence. In this section, I discuss some problems for
generalised conditioning and related theories. I focus on generalised conditioning
because it is the most common updating rule assumed in the literature and
because it is closest in spirit to orthodox Bayesianism. It makes achieving precise
Bayesianism in the precise limit easy. So these are problems for learning of the
first type.
Imprecise probabilities suffer from two updating-related problems. The first
of these – dilation – is well studied. This section will discuss it briefly. The next
section deals with the less discussed problem of belief inertia. These are problems
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for generalised conditioning and related updating methods like the maximum
likelihood method.
Dilation occurs when a precise representor becomes less precise on learning
something. This seems worrying, since one would hope that evidence should
decrease your ambiguity and thus sharpen your beliefs. Roger White’s coin puzzle
(White ) has been influential in the debate about imprecise credence in the
philosophy literature, and so I feel I should outline and discuss his example. The
example is, however, a little more complex than it needs to be, so once I have set
out his example, I will introduce my own example which makes things clearer, I
feel. The difference is a difference in presentation only.
White’s coin puzzle
White’s coin puzzle goes like this. I have a proposition P , about which you know
nothing at all. I have written whichever is true out of P and  P on the Heads side
of a fair coin. I have painted over the coin so you can’t see which side is which. I
then flip the coin and it lands with the P uppermost. Using P to stand for your
credences before the flip, and P Pup for your credences after having seen the coin
land, and Hup and Pup for the propositions that the coin lands “Heads up” and “P
up” respectively the following claims seem plausible.
. P pP q “ X
. P pHupq “ 12
. P PuppP q “ P PuppHupq
. P PuppP q “ P pP q
. P PuppHupq “ P pHupq
The first is just a commitment to imprecise probabilism: if you know nothing
about P , your belief in P should be maximally imprecise. Let X stand for whatever
it is that fulfils this commitment. The second is just a commitment to have your
beliefs guided by the objective chances. Third, seeing the coin land P uppermost,
Pup, means that you now know that the coin landed Heads up if and only if P is
true. That is, Pup is now equivalent to Hup ” P . You should thus have the same
beliefs in Hup and in P . The fourth and fifth items on this list just formalise the
intuition that seeing the coin land Pup shouldn’t change your opinions about the
truth of P , nor about whether the coin landed Heads.








Figure ..: White’s coin example, visually (after Joyce )
Figure . shows the situation for one particular belief about how likely P
is. The horizontal line can shift up or down, depending on what the committee
member we focus on believes about P .
From the above claims, we can show that X – the maximally imprecise belief
state – can only be 12 (Dodd forthcoming).
X “ P pP q





The figure makes this clear. The only way that learning that you are in the grey
area would leave you with conditional probability of Hup of exactly a half is if P
had prior probability 12 . It is only when the horizontal line is exactly in the middle
that the proportion of grey on the P side of the horizontal line is a half. White’s
paper seems to argue in favour of some form of the principle of indifference, so
perhaps this result isn’t all that inimical to his views. However, I should think
that many people will find this a strange outcome.
In order to diagnose this strangeness, let’s consider a variation on White’s puzzle.
I have a stack of cards labelled “” up to “”. On the back of the number 
card I write whichever is true of P and  P . I write the false one on the back
of all the other cards. I shuﬄe the cards and draw one at random. I show you
that the drawn card has a P on it. Were White’s above argument still valid in
this example, the only possible value for P pP q would be 1100 . However White’s
argument is not valid: premise  is false. It is not the case that P PuppP q “ P pP q.
. Imprecise probabilism 
Seeing that a P -card is drawn at random is good evidence that P is false, since the
odds favour a draw of a false proposition. This means that there is no requirement
for the observation of Pup to be irrelevant in this situation. What this shows is that
despite the irrelevance of the number to the truth of P , the way the game is set
up can make a particular outcome good evidence for or against P . Note thus that
White’s premise  is only true because of an apparently unimportant feature of
the set-up. A biased coin would undermine the argument. We can, however, build
cases where dilation occurs even if we use a biased coin, but the initial belief in
these cases cannot be perfectly precise. I will give an example in the next section,
when I discuss the simpler set-up.
Now consider a case where there are only two cards, but you are initially pretty
confident that P . Seeing the P -card drawn now looks like it should be evidence
that the number  card has been drawn. This now goes against White’s premise .
Again, the game set-up makes it such that these apparently irrelevant instances of
evidence can carry information. A little more precisely, consider the case where
you know P to be true. Now seeing Pup is solid gold uncontrovertible evidence that
Hup. Likewise, being very confident of P makes Pup very good evidence for Hup.
If instead you were sure P was false, Pup would be solid gold evidence of Hup’s
falsity. So it seems that P PuppHupq is proportional to prior belief in P . So let’s go
back to the original coin example and consider what it means to have an imprecise
belief in P . Among other things, it means considering possible that P could be
very likely. It is consistent with your belief state that P is such that if you knew
what proposition P was, you would consider it very likely. In this case, Pup would
be good evidence for Hup, and therefore premise  would be false. Note that in
this case  Pup would be just as good evidence against Hup. Likewise, P might be
a proposition that you would have very low credence in, and thus Pup would be
evidence against Hup. This shows that if you are taking the imprecise position
seriously, you can’t assume that Pup can’t make a difference to your belief in Hup.
Put differently, the point is that since P PuppHupq is proportional to prior belief in
P , and your imprecise prior contains all the various priors for P , the posterior had
better contain all the posterior beliefs in Hup.
It seems strange to argue that your belief in Hup should dilate from 12 to r0,1s
upon learning Pup. It feels as if this should just be irrelevant to Hup. However, Pup
is only really irrelevant to Hup when P pP q “ 12 . Any other precise belief you might
have in P is such that Pup now affects your posterior belief in Hup. The imprecise
probabilist takes into account all the ways Pup might affect belief in Hup.
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Now I want to show that it is right that P PuppHupq should be equal to P pP q.
Consider some further principles:
. For all pr P P we have prpHup|P q “ prpHupq and therefore that prp Hup| P q “
prp Hupq
. Pup ” pHup^ P q_ p Hup^ P q
. Hup^ Pup ”Hup^ P
Knowing just P doesn’t change your beliefs in Hup. Their influence on each
other is mediated through Pup, if you like. P and Hup are completely independent
of each other until you know something about Pup which ties them together. Hence
condition .  is just a description of the logical relationships between the events.
It tells you how exactly Pup ties together the events P and Hup. This logic can be
seen in Figure ..  is a straightforward consequence of .
Now note that we can run the following argument for all pr P P since we know
that prpHupq “ 12 .
prpPupq “ prpHup^ P q`prp Hup^ P q
“ prpP qprpHup|P q`prp P qprp Hup| P q







Note that your belief in P seems to drop out of your belief in Pup which seems a
little odd. But this is due to the game set-up, not due to any funny conditions I
have imposed. The trick is that, as the above derivation makes clear, Pup is true
when one of two conditions holds. These conditions are such that whenever one is
unlikely, the other is likely and vice versa. With this fact in hand we can now do
the following:
prpHup|Pupq “ prpHup^PupqprpPupq
“ prpHup^P qprpPupq by 
“ prpP qprpHup|P q1
2
by the above argument
“ 2prpP qprpHupq by 
“ prpP q
Note that this result fits with the intuitive argument I gave earlier: if you have a
strong belief in P , then learning Pup is going to make you more confident of Hup.
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The above argument, coupled to White’s condition  would show that prpP q “ 12
as before. I take this to show that White’s condition  is unreasonable.
What I take this to show is that dilation is not forced on us by the reasonableness
of claims  to , but that dilation is the correct response given the unknown value
of the evidence Pup supplies about Hup. Given the reasonableness of conditions 
and , dilation really is the correct response to the evidence Pup.
Even if we accept dilation as a fact of life for the imprecise probabilist, it is still
weird. Even if all of the above argument is accepted, it still seems strange to say
that your belief in Hup is dilated, whatever you learn. That is, whether you learn
Pup or  Pup, your posterior belief in Hup looks the same: r0,1s. Or rather, what it
shows to be weird is that your initial credence was precise.
Marbles in urns
Now I want to introduce a slightly easier example of dilation. Imagine you know
that there are a total of  black and  white marbles distributed somehow among
the urns X and Y . Each urn contains  marbles. In other words, you know that
prpB|Xq “ 1´prpB|Y q for all pr P P . An urn will be selected at random by flipping
a fair coin, and a marble drawn from it. Consider your credences before learning:
P pW q “ {0.5}“ P pBq. You know that the number of white marbles and the number
of black marbles are equal and that over the two urns their probabilities average
out. It seems rational that your conditional credences are, however, imprecise:
you know nothing about how the marbles are distributed between the urns, and
so your belief representor, P , plausibly includes probabilities that represent
the possibility that urn X contains only white marbles and also functions that
represent the possibility that X contains no white marbles, and everything in
between. That is, PXpW q “ PXpBq “ P Y pW q “ P Y pBq “ r0,1s. So learning which
urn is drawn from dilates your belief for white/black from {0.5} to r0,1s. This
illustrates the problem of dilation: updating on X or updating on Y both dilate
your credence in B and in W from {0.5} to r0,1s. That is, your beliefs in B and W
get less precise, once you learn either X or Y . Note that this analysis of the problem
makes an assumption about what the right belief after learning ought to be. It
assumes the generalised conditioning strategy mentioned earlier.
Dilation seems like a problem. Why should your belief in B change on learning
something that doesn’t really affect what you know of the situation? Given that
you don’t know how X correlates with B, why should learning X make a difference
to your belief in B? Of course the point is that your representor encodes all
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possible kinds of correlations between the events. It still seems strange that the
prior belief is precise and the posterior belief is not, but note that some prior
beliefs are imprecise in this case, for example P pB^Xq.
I think, ultimately, dilation is a fact about imprecise probabilities that we must
learn to live with. It is ubiquitous (Herron, Seidenfeld, and Wasserman ;
Seidenfeld and Wasserman ). We must still do what we can to make dilation
seem less strange. The first thing to point out is that dilation only seems odd
because of the focus on P pBq. Recall that P pBq is only a summary statistic: it is
only a first approximation to what represents your belief in B.
Second, note that the prior belief is precise only because of the symmetry built
in to the example. We know that, if X and Y are disjoint and exhaustive events,
then for any event B,
prpBq “ prpXqprpB|Xq`prpY qprpB|Y q. (.)
Moreover, for our particular marbles in urns example, the following symmetry
also holds for all pr P P :
prpB|Xq “ 1´prpB|Y q.
Putting these together, we see that, for all pr P P ,
prpBq “ prpXqprpB|Xq`prpY qp1´prpB|Xqq.
It now follows from the fact that prpXq “ 1{2“ prpY q for all pr P P that prpBq “
1{2 for all pr P P . This is how the symmetry of B given X, and B given Y , leads to a
precise prior in our example. So each committee member “knows” how it will shift
on learningX or Y . It just so happens that for each member who thinks B andX are
positively correlated, there is one who thinks the correlation is negative to exactly
the same degree. This ensures that the final belief, whether X or Y is learned looks
“the same” at the level of P pBq. Note that the weirdness is due to two things: the
symmetry prpB|Y q “ 1´prpB|Xq; and the fact that prpXq “ 12 . If we didn’t have
the symmetry, it might be that, for example most of the marbles are in urn X and
only one black marble is in urn Y . The probabilities would then be prpB|Xq “ 919
and prpB|Y q “ 1. Which would mean that P pBq would include prpBq “ 2838 . So
the initial belief would not be precise. Since we could have swapped black and
white around, we also have P pBq would include prpBq “ 1038 . As you increase the
number of marbles, the range P pBq covers tends to r14 , 34s. Likewise, the precise
initial belief also relies on the coin’s being fair. Let’s repeat the above calculation
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but without assuming prpXq “ 12 (but let’s assume the symmetry holds).
prpBq “ prpXqprpB|Xq`prpY qprpB|Y q
“ prpXqprpB|Xq` p1´prpXqqp1´prpB|Xqq
“ prpB|Xqr2prpXq´ 1s ` 1´prpXq
It is obvious from this that the prpB|Xq only drops out when prpXq “ 12 . If prpXq “
1
3 then
prpBq “ prpB|Xq` 1
3
So if, as in the original example, the proportions in the urns are completely
unknown we have P pBq “ r13 , 23s. So dilation still occurs (since the conditional
probabilities are still maximally imprecise) but its extent is less severe.
The standard examples of dilation in the literature (e.g. Seidenfeld and Wasser-
man ; Walley ; Wheeler ms.) typically take the form of known proba-
bilities in two events having an unknown correlation; like the case discussed in
section ... The probabilities of X and Y are known, as are the (unconditional)
probabilities of B and W . But the correlation between B and X is unknown, and
this causes problems. In White’s coin example, this structure isn’t so clear. White’s
puzzle also perhaps trades on the intuition that fair coins land heads up about half
the time, no matter what is learned. The literature on the Sleeping Beauty puzzle
offers illustrations of how strong this intuition is (Bradley and Leitgeb ; Elga
; Schwarz ms.). For these reasons, I think that it is better to think about the
current marbles-in-urns example.
Dilation doesn’t seem quite so mysterious now. This example makes it clearer
that P consists of a bunch of functions that encode specific opinions about how
learning X would affect belief in B. White’s example didn’t make this clear and
thus made dilation seem more mysterious than it should. It is a non-obvious
aspect of the set up of White’s coin puzzle that makes it the case that the updated
credence in Hup should change unless the prior is exactly 12 . In the marbles in urns
example, this link is made more obvious.
Reflection and dilation
It has been suggested that dilation examples show that imprecise probabilities
violate the Reflection Principle (van Fraassen ). The argument goes as follows:
“given that you know now that whether you learn X or you learn Y your credence
in B will be r0,1s (and you will certainly learn one or the other), your current
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credence should also be r0,1s.” The general idea is that you should set your
credences to what you expect your credences to be in the future. More specifically,
your credence in B should be the expectation of your future possible credences
in B over the things you might learn. Given that, for all the things you might
learn in this example your credence in B would be the same, you should have
that as your prior credence also. So having a precise credence in B to start with is
irrational. Your prior P is not fully precise though. Consider P pB^Xq. That is, the
prior belief in the conjunction is imprecise. So the alleged problem with dilation
and reflection is not as simple as “your precise belief becomes imprecise”. The
problem is “your precise belief in B becomes imprecise”; or rather, your precise
belief in B as represented by P pBq becomes imprecise.
I think the issue with reflection is more basic. What exactly does reflection
require of imprecise probabilists in this case? Now, it is obviously the case that
each credal committee member’s prior credence is its expectation over the possible
future evidence. That is exactly what equation (.) expresses. But somehow, it is
felt, the credal state as a whole isn’t sensitive to reflection in the way the principle
requires. Each pr P P satisfies the principle, but the awkward symmetries of the
problem conspire to make P as a whole violate the principle. This looks to be the
case if we focus on P pBq as an adequate representation of that part of the belief
state. But as I have said before, this is not an adequate way of understanding the
credal state. P pB|Xq ‰ P pBq, but is this what reflection should require? Given
that I think dilation is actually the reasonable response to the examples discussed,
I think this suggests that we should look for a version of reflection that allows
dilation.
If you were keen on reflection and wanted something to respect the principle,











QprpXq is what pr expects your credal state to be relative to learning some Ei from
a partition. Qpr is what committee member pr expects the committee belief to be
after learning some Ei . That is, pr takes each committee member (q) and works
out what its beliefs would be on learning Ei . pr then takes the expectation over
these (that is, expectation using her own beliefs pr). QpXq is the set of the opinions
See also Bradley and Steele (ms.[c]); Topey ().
One man’s modus tollens is another man’s modus ponens. . .
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of the prs. You could then take this Q to be the right representation of belief. It
will respect reflection and not be subject to dilation: QpBq “ r0,1s. Even if worries
about Q being sensitive to choice of partition {Ei} could be overcome, I don’t think
this would be a particularly sensible response to dilation.
So dilation is a funny feature of imprecise updating. It is something imprecise
probabilists must learn to deal with, but it is not a fatal flaw. Work still needs to
be done to find out what sort of reasonable reflection principle holds of imprecise
probabilities; what sort of representation of imprecise belief – that replaces P pBq
– can be said to be properly reflective. Dilation might lead to some odd results
in sequential decisions with learning, but that is beyond the scope of the current
project.
Dilation and the weight/balance distinction
It seems that examples of dilation undermine my earlier claim that imprecise
probabilities allow you to represent the difference between the weight and balance
of evidence: learning X appears to give rise to a belief which one would consider
as representing less evidence since it is more spread out. This is so because the
prior credence in the dilation case is precise, not through weight of evidence,
but through this symmetry I discussed earlier. We cannot take narrowness of
the interval rP pXq,P pXqs as a characterisation of weight of evidence since the
interval can be narrow for reasons other than because lots of evidence has been
accumulated. So my earlier remarks on weight/balance should not be read as
the claim that imprecise probabilities can always represent the weight/balance
distinction. What is true is that there are cases where imprecise probabilities can
represent the distinction in a way that impacts on decision making. Dilation shows
that I probably can’t say much more than that.
... Belief inertia
To introduce this second problem for imprecise probabilism, I want to return to an
example similar to the one I discussed in relation to understanding the representor
as a set of possible chances. This was based on Example .. from Halpern ().
Consider tossing a coin of unknown bias. Let’s say that the proposition Hi encodes
the history of observed tosses of the coin up to (but not including) the ith toss.
And let’s say that Xi is the proposition “The ith toss will land heads”. So P pXi |Hiq
But see Bradley and Steele (ms.[a]).
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is the belief in the next coin landing heads given the history of the coin up to
that point. Let’s say that there are a number of chance hypotheses Ck on the table
which each give some particular objective chance of the coin’s landing heads. For








prpXi |Ck ^HiqprpCk|Hiq (.)
Conditioning on the chance hypothesis screens off any correlation between Hi and
Xi , because coin tosses are i.i.d. so:
prpXi |Ck ^Hiq “ prpXi |Ckq (.)
So any learning that happens goes through the effect of the history of tosses on the
chance hypotheses prpCk|Hiq. Fix some pr, then by the Central Limit Theorem,
the posterior probability converges to the chance almost certainly. This is true
however biased against the true Ck the prior is (assuming it doesn’t assign zero
to the truth). That is, as i increases – as more coin tosses are observed – exactly
one Ck has its posterior probability tend to 1. This is a good result. The precise
Bayesian can learn.
And this is, of course, true for each probability in P . However, there is a worry
that despite this, there is a sense in which the imprecise probabilist might not be
able to learn in the same way. Let’s break down the important term in equation
..
prpCk|Hiq “ prpHi |CkqprpCkqprpHiq (.)
Now, the prpHi |Ckq are determined by whatever that Ck says the objective chance
of heads is. That’s some basic combinatorics and the binomial distribution. So then
things come down to this ratio of prior probabilities. If you know nothing about
the chance hypotheses or the histories of coin tosses before any coins are tossed,
then it seems reasonable that your representor contain functions that assign any
allowable values to these sentences. In particular, P should contain functions
that assign values to prpCkq and therefore, through equation . to prpCk|Hiq
arbitrarily close to 0 and arbitrarily close to 1. Given the role prpCk|Hiq plays in
learning about Xi , this entails that P pXi |Hiq “ p0,1q, however big i is. That is,
however much information you have gathered on the bias of the coin, there is
some prior probability in your representor that is so confident that the chance is
thus and so, that it won’t be moved much by all the evidence you have amassed.
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It might seem like I have said two contradictory things, but careful attention
to quantifier order shows this is not true. First I said “pick a pr, this pr will
eventually converge to the chance”. Second I said “pick some initial sequence of
coin tosses Hi , at this time, there will be pr functions that have failed to converge,
and indeed that have remained arbitrarily far from convergence”.
The case can be seen clearly if we say there are only two chance hypotheses:
C1 “ 〈chpHq “ 13〉 and C2 “ 〈chpHq “ 23〉. And let’s say we have seen one hundred
tosses, with approximately two thirds heads. This is, arguably good reason to
believe C2 and disbelieve C1. However, if you started off being fully non-committal
as to whether C1 or C2, then there are probabilities in your representor arbitrarily
close to probability one in C1. More specifically, fix Hi , now for any ε ą 0, there
will be some pr P P such that prpC2|Hiq ă ε. To see this all you need to do is make
prpC1q close enough to 1. Now, it is also true that for this pr, with enough evidence,
it will eventually begin to believe C2. But for this new higher level of evidence
there’s an even more intransigent prior that was even closer to prpC1q “ 1 to begin
with, and so on. The problem is that you’re always stretching out the really crazy
priors from the ends of the interval.
Thus, sadly, it seems that P pXi |Hiq “ P pXiq however much evidence is in Hi . So
it seems that the imprecise probabilist cannot learn. Now, if we look at the credal
committee members, they seem to be “bunching up” around one particular value,
but there’s always enough arbitrarily opinionated priors to always cover the same
interval.
I don’t claim to have a good solution to this problem, but let me note two
things. First, there is something to this intuition that the committee members are
“bunching up”. Whatever measure you put over the set of probability functions –
whatever “second order probability” you use – the “mass” of this measure gets
more and more concentrated around the true chance hypothesis. Second, if your
committee contained only finitely many members, then these problems would
disappear. There would be a “most opinionated” member who would eventually
believe the true chance. The problem arises in the infinite case because there
are always more extreme, more opinionated priors. The endpoints don’t move
(if prpC1q “ 1, no amount of evidence can shift it) so no matter how much the
posteriors get squished together around the true chance, there’s always more
A similar subtlety of quantifier order and what to hold fixed is well known in the phenomena of
sensitive dependence on initial conditions and continuous dependence on initial conditions in
chaos theory.
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intransigent priors being stretched out from near the endpoints. Taking large
finite samples of probabilities from the representor doesn’t help with the problem
of dilation, which can occur for finite sets of probabilities, so this isn’t a full
solution to the problems of updating. If the prior representor’s endpoints were
not 0 and 1 but values strictly larger and smaller respectively, then the problem
doesn’t arise. This would be a very strong version of a principle of regularity.
Maybe there is the beginnings of an answer to this problem of belief inertia in
the above comments. Perhaps learning should be understood as the movement of
the functions, rather than the spread of values of the posteriors. This doesn’t offer
much solace to the decision theorist, who would very much like to take certain
bets on the coin toss and not others after learning some Hi , bets that she wouldn’t
have taken before learning. But if the sets of values for Xi are the same in each
case, then how is this to be rationalised?
Sets of probability values, or rather, sets of expected values are going to play a
big role in decision making. So it seems that just repeating the mantra “P pXq does
not represent belief in X” can’t be all there is to responding to these problems.
Can we say something more helpful to the decision theorist? Here are a couple of
observations. First note that |prpXi |Hiq´ 23 | ď |prpXiq´ 23 | for all pr P P . So there
is a sense in which the evidence does make certain bets look more favourable.
Everyone agrees that a betting quotient of 23 looks better after learning than it did
before.
A second response to the problem of belief inertia is to consider what the
“problematic” functions have in common: they are all outrageously opinionated
at the start. Is it reasonable to be so confident that the chance is one third that
seeing two thirds heads in a hundred tosses only leads you to assign probability ε
to the proposition that the chance is two thirds? Maybe some kind of p-value-like
“reasonableness cutoff” would allow you to ignore the crazy intransigent committee
members? This response seems to somehow go against the inclusive, not-going-
beyond-the-evidence roots of the imprecise probability framework. But if we take
this to be “subjective” only in the sense that the choice of standard of evidence
is subjective is, then this is perhaps enough to justify this response. The scoring
rules approach to the reliability measure I discussed earlier in section .. could
help with this problem. Those extreme probabilities over the chance hypotheses
The large finite sample approach will appear again in the next chapter, as one possible solution
to the problems with decision making.
The standard principle of regularity has it that only tautologies should get degree of belief 1
and only contradictions get 0.
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are going to give rise to predictions that will have very low scores. If we use this
as a criterion for reliability and then employ some sort of reliability cut-off, then
they will drop out and the imprecise probabilist can learn after all. This happens,
however low our reliability threshold is, so long as it does actually rule out some
functions eventually. Perhaps there is something to the Maximum Likelihood
method, or at least to the intuition behind it: you can safely ignore pr if pr makes
the observed history very unlikely.
Wilson () gives an example of another quirk where the posterior representor
becomes more precise despite the evidence intuitively strongly supporting one
hypothesis over the other. His solution is something like this second solution:
excise the implausible priors.
A third response – and this is a response to both dilation and belief inertia –
is to argue that what these examples show is that conditionalisation is not the
right update rule. Perhaps the above problems speak in favour of going for some
sort of recalibration update rule. Returning to the marbles in urns example of
dilation, learning X does not give you any smaller reference class for which you
have reliable statistics. That is, the “marble drawn from X” reference class (which
we now know is the right one) is not a class for which we have good statistics.
This means that the credence for B is still the proportion of black marbles in
the “urn X or urn Y ” reference class. Thus, PXpBq “ 12 for this kind of updating.
The uncertainty regarding whether GC satisfies Reflection – or whether it even
needs to satisfy Reflection – makes the worries regarding diachronic consistency
of recalibration update rules less of a sticking point: all the update methods have
problems on this front.
In any case, there is work still to be done on this topic. For now I want to move
on to discussing how to make decisions using imprecise probabilities.
. Imprecise decisions
An economist is an expert
who will know tomorrow




This chapter is the second half of the project I started in the last chapter: namely,
to develop a conservative extension of the orthodox view on rational belief and
decision under uncertainty. Such an extension is needed because of the difficulty
that the standard view has with belief under severe uncertainty. This chapter
focuses on decision making under severe uncertainty. A later chapter (chapter )
discusses similar issues from a more practical angle.
We have now seen what imprecise probabilities are. This chapter asks the
question “How should we make decisions with imprecise probabilities?” As we
shall see, it is not nearly as simple as in the case of standard Bayesian decision
theory.
After introducing the concept of a choice function, I situate imprecise choice
between two other better-studied kinds of choice problem. I then discuss various
kinds of imprecise choice and discuss their flaws. I use this discussion to motivate
some criteria for rational imprecise choice.
.. The choice function
We have already met choice functions briefly in section .. when we discussed
Luce and Raiffa’s representation theorem. We are going to be a little more careful
here, as these functions will be central to this chapter. We think of a choice
function as something that takes the set of available acts and outputs the set of
choiceworthy acts. That is, it maps a set of acts into a subset of that set.
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Definition .. A choice function is a function C : 2A Ñ 2A such that for all AĂA
we have C pAq Ď A and C pC pAqq “ C pAq.
We interpret C pAq as being the set of choiceworthy acts among the feasible acts
A. Call C pAq the “choice set”. There are many ways of interpreting C pAq. A
“Strong” interpretation would say that acts in C pAq are all equally the best act:
there is nothing to choose between the acts in C pAq and you should be equally
happy to take any of them. A weaker interpretation might be to say that all the
acts in C pAq are better than the acts not in C pAq. This interpretation does not
preclude there being strict preference between the acts in C pAq. An even weaker
interpretation would be just to say that C pAq includes the best act, but to make
no further assumptions about how acts in C pAq compare to those outside C pAq or
among themselves.
I think that at least some of the scepticism about particular imprecise choice
functions can be defused by being clear about what kind of interpretation we give
the function. In precise Bayesianism, we can always take the strong interpretation
of the choice function, but this interpretation might not always be applicable in
the imprecise case.
Obviously, a weaker kind of choice function is less useful, but it may be that
that is all we can achieve in this context. To return to a theme that runs all through
this thesis, the kind of severe uncertainty at issue here might just preclude the
determinate answers to decision theoretic questions we might wish to have. This
relates directly to my weaker understanding of rationality. That is, perhaps in
cases of severe uncertainty, rationality can only deliver us a weaker kind of choice
set.
Rationality can provide necessary conditions for an act to be choiceworthy – or
rather, sufficient conditions for an act to be unchoiceworthy – but it is harder to see
why rationality should always provide necessary conditions for choiceworthiness.
One criticism that was levelled at the imprecise probabilities approach in the
last chapter was the claim that imprecise choice functions might fail to always
determine an act that was optimal: they might fail to give you any advice. As I
said when I discussed this earlier, such a criticism misses the point. To criticise
imprecise choice for this flaw is to hold the theory to too high a standard. In cases
of severe uncertainty, such determinate answers shouldn’t always be available.
A choice group talk by Conal Duddy on “shortlisting” inspired much of this discussion of
interpretations of choice sets.
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So perhaps it’s best to keep two projects separate. First we want to know what
rationality demands of imprecise decision; second we want to know how we
should act in cases of imprecision. The answer to the former question might not
fully determine an answer to the latter. But in those cases, we still need an answer
to the second question. We will have to accept that the answer might not be fully
rational. That’s not to say that it will be irrational – violating rationality – but just
that it will be arational: without rationality. Rationality can only get us so far. I
leave the latter question until I discuss a specific example in the final chapter. I
do this because I think the response to how to make decisions when rationality
doesn’t determine the answer will be context sensitive.
.. Kinds of decision
Here I situate the imprecise decision problem between two more familiar examples
of decision problem. These examples differ only in the kind of belief representation
you have. That is, we can think of the acts, outcomes and states being the same
throughout. All that changes is the representation of belief over the states.
Example  Let’s say I offer you the choice of two tickets c and d (on the
understanding that you could choose neither n).
c Gain £ if X, lose £ otherwise
d Lose £ if X, gain £ otherwise





Which of these tickets should you pick? Well, you might say, it depends on what
you think about X. The next three sections outline three different kinds of decision
problems, involving three different kinds of attitude you might have to X. The
three kinds of attitude are not fully distinct: one shades into the other, as we shall
see.
... Ignorance
Let’s say you know absolutely nothing about X: you have no idea what sort of
proposition it might be. In this instance you are in a situation of decision under
ignorance. Decision theorists have been exploring this sort of problem for some
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time and the theory of decision under complete ignorance is pretty well covered
(see Peterson  chapter  or Luce and Raiffa  chapter ). So there are
some possible events (in the example above, we have X and X) and which obtains
determines what your payout will be. These are the objects of belief, as we have
seen before. You know nothing about which event is the case, so how ought you
choose?
Probably the simplest decision rule is “Maximise minimum possible gain”. I
call this rule “Wald”. So you evaluate each act by its lowest possible outcome,
and you act to maximise that. Let’s define the worst and best outcomes that a can
lead to as follows:
Definition .. For a PA
• a“minX{apXq}
• a“maxX{apXq}
Definition .. WaldpAq “ argmaxaPA{a}
This rule recommends going for n in Example . That is, Waldp{c,d,n}q “ {n}.
Is this a reasonable decision rule? Consider Example :
Example  You are offered the choice between these two acts:
a £100 if X, £1 otherwise




Wald sanctions taking b in this case. The following reasoning might support
choosing a over b: “Unless X is very unlikely, a is the better bet.” The point is
that in genuine decision under ignorance, you can’t rule out the possibility that
X is very unlikely. So choosing a on this basis would be to make an unwarranted
probabilistic assumption about how likely X could be. Criticism of particular
ignorance choice rules often implicitly makes unwarranted assumptions about
the probabilities of the various states. Some approaches we will see later basically
amount to trying to make a principled probabilistic assumption in cases like this.
If Wald seems a rather pessimistic way of looking at things, perhaps the Hur-
wicz rule would suit better. It says “Maximise a weighted sum of maximum and
minimum possible gains”.
I borrow this naming scheme from Milnor ()
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Definition .. HurwiczρpAq “ argmaxaPA{ρa`p1´ ρqa}
If ρ “ 1 then this is just the same as Wald. For all but the biggest values of ρ,
Hurwicz opts for a in the decision problem in Example . In Example , for ρ ď 23 ,
c and d are both chosen over n, otherwise n is chosen.
A different way to look at Example  is as follows: “even when b is better than a,
the difference is small. But when a is the better act, it is much better. This points
to another possible ignorance rule: Savage. Also known as “minimax regret”, this
rule says you should evaluate acts in terms of their “regret” and aim to minimise
your maximum possible regret. Regret is defined as the difference between what
you got from your act and what you could have got in that state by choosing a
different act. So we first define Reg which gives us the maximum regret of an act
a. Then Savage outputs the acts that minimise this quantity.
Definition .. Regpaq “maxX maxbPA{bpXq´ apXq}
Definition .. SavagepAq “ argminaPA{Regpaq}
So for Example , the maximum regret of a is 1, because if X turns out false, you
could have got 2 by choosing b rather than the 1 you actually got. b’s maximum
regret is 98 because if X is true, you could have got 100 from a rather than the 2
you actually did from b. Savage opts for n in Example .
Another way you might try and evaluate acts is not in terms of their regret, or in
terms of the maximal and minimal outcomes, but in terms of the average outcome.
This is the essence of Laplace. How this rule is normally formulated is to say
“treat each state as equally likely, and maximise expectation”. This comes out the
same as saying “maximise average outcome”. So assign probability of X and  X
to be one half each and then maximise expectation. Laplace effectively claims
that there is a warranted probabilistic assumption in cases of ignorance. Laplace
subsumes ignorance under the category of decision under uncertainty, which we
shall turn to shortly.
There is some debate over which ignorance rule is the best. I find the debate
somewhat strange: if you know literally nothing about the situation you find
yourself in, why assume there should be some rationally determined course of
action? Might it not be the case that you simply don’t have enough information
to make an informed choice? That’s not to say that “anything goes”. There are
still unequivocally bad options even in decision under ignorance. For example,
consider the case where we have acts a,b,c and act a is b´ 5. That is, it is 5 worse
than b for all states. It seems obvious that a should not be chosen. But this does
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not mean we are any closer to an answer as to which of b or c is better. I will return
to this point later.
Before we move on, note that all of these rules satisfy the following property: if
apXq ě bpXq for all X, then b is not in the choice set. This property of not choosing
acts that are dominated is typically something we would like to have for our choice
rule.
... Probabilistic expectation
Ignorance is one extreme of decision problems. To return to Example , the other
extreme is where you know exactly the probability of X. Perhaps you know that
X is the proposition “The next flip of this biased coin will be heads”. In this
case, again, decision theory has you covered: decision under risk typically says you
should maximise expected value. Let’s say you have examined this biased coin














Figure ..: c and d as functions of degree of belief
have expected value £7 and d will have £´2 (see Figure .). So c is a better bet
Well, the other extreme is where you know whether or not X is true, but that is uninteresting for
decision theory
There are dissenting voices, I shall ignore them
Graphs of expectation against probability appear in Seidenfeld () and Steele ()
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in this case. I don’t have much to say about this case, except that it serves as a kind
of “ideal limit” for imprecise decisions.





So the above probabilistic expectation-based rule is then:




The Laplace rule we saw in the previous section is a special case of this rule: the
special case where the pr in question assigns equal probability to all states.
... Imprecision
Now we come to imprecision. How are you to decide when you know something
about X, but not enough to determine a probability distribution over the state
space?
You could always resort to “decisions under ignorance” discussed above. But
this seems unsatisfactory: if you know something about the probabilities, this
information should feed into your decision making. This seems to be the guiding
norm of decision theory: your decisions should be guided by your current state of
knowledge. Ignoring the probability information you do have in your representor
seems to violate this norm.
You can’t use the same maximising rule that precise probabilists can, because
there’s no guarantee that there will be one act that maximises expectation with
respect to all probabilities in the representor. But when there is one act that
maximises with respect to all probabilities, then you should certainly choose it.
If all probabilities agree that a maximises, then a should be in the choice set.
We could put it this way: a minimum requirement on imprecise choice is that if
Epaq ěEpbq for all b, then a is optimal.
To return to Example , which I discussed earlier, which of the bets c or d ought
you take? Let’s say your belief in X ranges over the interval r0.2,0.8s. For each
probability in your representor there is some expected value assigned to each
event. For example, in Figure ., the probability that assigned 45 toX has expected
value £7 for c and £´2 for d. We can consider the sets of expected values. For
Indeed, on some interpretations of credence, it’s impossible: that is, how you act is what
determines what your beliefs are.
Recall the definitions of these things from page .
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each act, there is a range of expected values in the representor. Act c’s expectation
covers the range r´2,7s as does act d. Act n is such that all probabilities in the








Figure ..: The range of expected values
There is no clear best act in this scenario. So how best to make decisions? In the
strict Bayesian model there is some act that maximises expected value. Or some
collection of acts each of which maximises expectation. Figure . for the strict
Bayesian would just be a series of dots, and it is obvious that the highest dot is the
best. In the imprecise case, intervals can overlap, so what is “best” is not as clear.
Acts whose expectations overlap are “incommensurable”. It is not clear how to
compare them to each other, thus evaluating them with respect to each other is
difficult.
This imprecise belief model is, in a sense, “between” these two better studied
modes of decision making. If there is just a single probability in your represen-
tor you’d better act like a maximiser. If your representor contains all possible
probability functions – if all possible probability functions are compatible with
your evidence – then you are effectively in a state of complete ignorance and you’d
better act accordingly.
This is deliberately vague: whichever decision-under-ignorance rule you endorse, you’d better
act that way when all probability measures are in your representor. Personally, I don’t find any
of the ignorance rules compelling, so maybe an approach to imprecise decision will inform the
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Note that I have been restricting myself to choices that happen at a time. I will
not be discussing sequential choice at all. The static case will give us problems
enough as it is.
.. How to think about imprecise choice functions
What does a reasonable imprecise choice rule look like? First, we need to be clear
about what sort of rule we are interested in. Are we looking for one that admits of
the strong interpretation discussed earlier? Or only some less strong interpreta-
tion? Second, we could wonder about necessary conditions on reasonable choice,
or we could wonder about sufficient conditions.
There are many places in the literature where enterprises like this this have
been developed. There are a great many ways we could approach the question of
how best to settle on an imprecise decision rule. I survey some ways here.
One major source of inspiration is the literature on decision under ignorance.
This will suggest some kinds of choice rule, as well as some of the conditions for
reasonable imprecise choice. The most important sources here will be Milnor
() and Luce and Raiffa ().
Another important inspiration will be work on social choice theory: how to
aggregate many individuals’ preferences into a single group choice. If we think of
each probability in your representor as a member of a credal committee that has
to vote on what you should do, then the parallel between imprecise decision and
social choice becomes clear. Here I will draw on Arrow’s theorem (Gaertner )
and the work of Amartya Sen (Sen , ).
There are two ways one might frame the discussion: in terms of an ordering
over the acts (Arrow, Milnor), or in terms of a choice rule (Luce and Raiffa, Sen). I
will talk in terms of choice rules, but we will see that relations will also play an
important role.
There are two ways we could describe conditions on the choice function. One is
just to put conditions on the functional form of the choice function. That is, we
could impose intuitive conditions on the function with respect to how it interacts
with unions and intersections of sets of acts. For example, is it reasonable to
demand that if B Ď A Ď A then C pBq Ď C pAq? It turns out the answer is no. But
that’s an example of the kind of condition we might think to impose on a choice
choice of ignorance rule.
But see Bradley and Steele (ms.[a],[b]); Steele ().
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function.
There is another way we might want to impose constraints on reasonable choice
functions. This is by restricting various kinds of relation associated with the choice
function.
For this, we need some definitions.
Definition .. A choice function C pairwise satisfies a relation  when, for all
a,b PA:
• If a  b then a P C p{a,b}q
• If a  b then {a}“ C p{a,b}q
Definition .. A choice function C satisfies a relation  when, for all a,b P AĎA:
• If a  b then b R C pAq
• If a„ b then a P C pAq ô b P C pAq
We could then constrain reasonable choice by demanding that the choice function
(pairwise) satisfies some particular relation defined on the acts. If C satisfies 
then it pairwise satisfies it, but the converse need not be true.
A relation can also determine a kind of choice function.
Definition .. The maximal set for a relation  is M :
M pAq “ {a P A : Db P A,b  a}
This M  is the set of acts that aren’t strictly dispreferred to something else in the
set.
Theorem .. (i) M  is a choice function and (ii) M  pairwise satisfies . (iii) If 
is acyclic on A where A is finite then M pAq is non-empty. (iv) Furthermore, if  is
transitive, then M  satisfies .
Proof (i) M pAq Ď A by definition. It is equally obvious that M pM pAqq “
M pAq.
(ii) We need to show that if a  b then a PM p{a,b}q. The only way a could
fail to be in M p{a,b}q is if b  a. But this is ruled out by definition of . If
a  b then a  b, so by the above, we have that a PM p{a,b}q, and by definition,
b RM p{a,b}q.
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(iii) Let  be acyclic on some finite A. By a result similar to Lemma *l of Sen
(, p. ), acyclicity is sufficient to ensure non-emptiness of M pAq.
(iv) If a  b then b RM pAq by definition. Finally, assume for contradiction that
a„ b and a PM pAq but b RM pAq. This means there exists some c  b. But b  a
so by transitivity c  a, contradicting a PM pAq. 
Call a choice rule C more discriminating than C 1 when C pAq Ď C 1pAq for all A.
M  is the least discriminating choice function that satisfies .
Theorem .. If C satisfies  then C pAq ĎM pAq for all A.
Proof Let a P C pAq. Assume for contradiction that there is some b P A such that
b  a. If there were such a b, then a would not have been in C pAq by definition of
“satisfies”. Thus  Db P A,b  a. This is exactly the condition required for inclusion
in M . 
What if, instead of talking about maximality, we talked about optimality?
Definition .. The optimal set for a relation  is: OpAq “ {a P A : @b P A,a  b}
What we will find is that optimality – which is stronger than maximality – is too
strong a property. That is, O is often empty. Consider the set {a,b} where no
preference holds between the two options. For this set, there are no optimal acts –
although both acts are maximal. If the relation is complete, reflexive and acyclic
then O is nonempty (Sen , p. ).
In summary, we want to analyse what sort of choice rule makes sense for impre-
cise decision. We are going to proceed by imposing certain intuitive constraints
on choice and showing that certain decision rules violate these principles. The
principles will come in two flavours: restrictions on the functional form of C and
relations that C must satisfy.
... The basic requirements on imprecise choice
Here we want to put in place the absolutely basic, non-negotiable properties of
decision rules. Let’s consider a first possible decision rule. What about C pAq “ A.
This satisfies the definition of a choice function. Unfortunately, it is thoroughly
unhelpful! This choice rule is maximally permissive, or minimally discriminating.
In general, we would like our choice rules to be as discriminating as possible.
Strictly speaking, we don’t really need transitivity here: we only need that b „ a and c  b imply
c  a.
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This is something of a guiding principle for this chapter: ceteris paribus, more
discriminating choice rules are better.
It seems obvious that if Epaq ě Epbq for all b, then a should be chosen. If a
cannot do worse than the best any other act can do, then a is clearly the best act.
Definition .. IDpAq “ {a P A : @b P A Epaq ěEpbq}
This is the decision rule that Henry Kyburg suggests in Kyburg (). It is called
“Principle III”. Unfortunately, ID is often empty. That is, there is often no
unambiguously best act in this sense.
This sort of failure to choose any choiceworthy acts seems a flaw in a choice rule.
This suggests the first absolutely non-negotiable principle on choice functions:
Decisiveness If C pAq “H then A“H.
We need our choice functions to actually help us make choices. If the choice
function can just “give up” then it isn’t really that useful. There may be cases
where “giving up” is in fact the right thing to do; for example in cases where you
have to choose among acts of the form “n days in heaven followed by eternity in
hell” for all n P N. It seems no choice of n is permissible, since there will always be
a much larger n. Even if we want to grant this, the ID rule looks like it is definitely
giving up too easily.
But we can use this interval dominance idea to further restrict reasonable choice
rules: when some act does interval dominate all others, then the dominating act
should be in the choice set.
Definition .. a ID b iff Epaq ěEpbq
Note this is defined directly as an irreflexive relation, since it doesn’t lend itself to
having a reflexive part. This gives us another non-negotiable condition.
Interval Dominance C satisfies ID
Often ID is empty, so this condition will put no restrictions on choice. However,
when it is not empty, the restrictions it puts on choice are reasonable.
So the plan in the following sections is to suggest some possible imprecise
decision rules, including the main contenders from the literature, and show what
conditions they violate.
In response to Teddy Seidenfeld’s comments (pp. –), Kyburg changes his mind (p. ).
We will discuss this in due course.
Note that a ID b and b ID a implies a and b have the same precise expectation. So the second
condition of Definition .. is still reasonable in this odd case.
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.. Ignorance analogues
Now we move on to consider some imprecise decision rules built as “imprecise
analogues” of our rules for decisions under complete ignorance.
... Maximising lower and upper expectation
So our first decision rule is probably the simplest possible rule: “maximise E”. We
might term this EWald after the way it mirrors our “maximise minimum gain”
rule (Wald) for decisions under ignorance.
Definition .. EWaldpAq “ argmaxaPA{Epaq}
This is sometimes described as “gamma-maximin” (Seidenfeld ). Like Wald
in the ignorance case, this rule maybe seems overly pessimistic. This is the rule
that Gärdenfors and Sahlin () advocate.
Maybe some rule that takes account of both the top and bottom of the interval
would do the trick? Take an “ambiguous analogue” of the Hurwicz criterion:
Definition .. EHurwiczρpAq “ argmaxaPA{ρEpaq` p1´ ρqEpaq}
This is actually a whole class of different decision rules depending on choice of ρ.
If ρ “ 1 then we recover maximise lower prevision (EWald). If a precise ρ value
seems arbitrary, perhaps consider looking for acts that do well for many different
values of ρ. Bandyopadhyay () suggests a rule that, effectively, amounts to
preferring a to b just in case a is better according to all values of ρ. This is obviously
an incomplete relation, but it is more discriminating than Interval Dominance.
However, there are some problems. EWald and EHurwicz suffer from the same
problems, essentially and Bandyopadhyay’s rule has the same flaws. Any decision
rule that is sensitive to only the set of expected values looks like it will lead to
problematic results.
Domination
Consider the following situation.
It might be said that given the slightly sophisticated account of the P that they give, my criticisms
of EWald don’t apply to these authors. I will leave off further discussion of their particular
theory until later.
For the examples in this chapter, unless otherwise specified, I assume that your representor is
maximally uncertain. That is, I will assume P pXq “ r0,1s.
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Example  There is a coin of unknown bias. you are offered the choice
between these two bets:
f Win £1 if the next toss lands heads
g Win £1 if the next ten tosses all land heads
The first of these is clearly better. However, the set of expected values for each
is r0,1s so a choice rule that only pays attention to the set of expectations will not
be able to discriminate between these bets. Call an act b “dominated” if there is






















Figure ..: Graphs of Example 
another act a such that, for every member of the representor, a has at least as great
an expectation as b.
Definition .. b is (weakly) dominated by a if, for all pr P P we have Eprpbq ď
Eprpaq. Call b strongly dominated if the inequality is always strict.
It seems reasonable that in this circumstance we should prefer a to b and in fact
that we can safely ignore b when making our final decision.
For a fixed pr P P , consider the relation Epr defined by a Epr b iff Eprpaq ě
Eprpbq. Each pr defines such a relation. If you like, Epr is the relation that the
function Epr represents. Consider Dom“⋂P Epr . Relations are often thought
of as ordered pairs, so the set theoretic operation makes perfect sense. That is,
the relation that holds between two acts only when every pr P P agrees about the
It is normal to add the clause “and sometimes strictly greater” to this definition. This is to stop a
being dominated by itself. Because of how I define Dom in a moment, I don’t do this.
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direction of the inequality in their expectations. This is clearly exactly the relation
of weak dominance. This motivates another important desideratum for imprecise
choice.
Non-domination C satisfies Dom
Note that this condition entails Interval Dominance. That is, when a interval
dominates b, a dominates b. Put another way, DomĚID .
The Sure Thing Principle
EWald and friends violate another property, known as the Sure Thing Principle
(STP). Depending on what framework you work in, STP will be framed in a variety
of ways.
The sure thing principle is often said to be violated by people’s actual choices in
games like those of the Ellsberg paradox. The property does, however, have some
intuitive appeal, so it is worth discussing with a view to perhaps limiting if not
eradicating violations of it. Luce and Raiffa’s Axiom  corresponds to the “sure
thing principle”. Or, as Luce and Raiffa put it:
Consider a probability mixture of two decision problems with the same
actions and states. If the payoffs in the second problem do not depend
on the act chosen, then the optimal set in the mixed problem is the
same as in the first problem. Luce and Raiffa (, p. )
As we saw in section .., Savage’s version of STP (P) talks only in terms of his
“preference given X”. This makes sense, since Savage doesn’t, at this stage, have
access to a probability function he can mix acts with. Broome () characterises
STP in terms of what he calls Separability. The idea is that how good sub-parts
of the decision problem are can be evaluated in isolation. It guarantees that the
evaluation of the acts will, in a certain sense, be an aggregation of the evaluations
of the sub-parts. In the standard case that aggregation is done by probability-
weighted sums.
Perhaps the best way to understand STP is with an example.
Example  I am going to ask you to choose a or b. Then I am going to flip a
fair coin. If the coin lands heads, you gain £6 if  X, nothing otherwise. If it
lands tails, a and b pay out as set out here:
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a Gain £ if X, nothing otherwise




The idea is that since what you choose – a or b – doesn’t make a difference if the
coin lands heads, then you should choose in order to get the better of the options
when it matters (in the tails branch of the game).
EWald chooses b over a in the tails branch. But when you mix with the heads
branch, a ends up looking better. Given the intuitive force of the above reasoning
behind STP, this violation does seem to speak against rules that violate it, like
EWald.
Buchak (ms.) argues that violating STP is reasonable. Buchak’s focus is on
decision theories sensitive to risk – I made the simplifying assumption that you
are risk neutral – but her argument is interesting nonetheless. She argues that
the intuitive appeal of STP is actually intuitive appeal for only a weaker property:
State-wise dominance. The claim is that STP is piggy-backing on the plausibility of
this strictly weaker principle, and that in general STP is not plausible. State-wise
dominance is the principle that “If apXq  bpXq for all X and that preference is
strict at least once, then a  b”. STP entails SWD but not vice versa. The argument
is that the intuitive cases of STP are also cases of SWD, and that cases of STP that
aren’t also cases of SWD are not as intuitive. This undermines the claim that STP
is intuitive. However, the above example is not a case of SWD but it is a case of
STP. It seems that there is something intuitive about the principle even in this
non-SWD case. So I don’t see the force of Buchak’s argument. I appreciate that
this is just trading on intuitions and so isn’t a very strong argument.
Everything I say to criticise these sorts of simple EWald type rules applies
also to decision theory built up from some other kinds of representation of un-
certainty. For example, there is some literature in economics on maximising
Choquet-expected utility (Eichenberger and Kelsey ). In this sort of work –
typically in the behaviourist/representationalist paradigm I have criticised else-
where – the ultimate conclusion is that maximising Choquet expected utility is
rational. Recall a Choquet capacity is analogous to a lower probability function in
that it represents a lower bound on estimates of the probability. This framework
is less expressive than sets of probabilities: it lacks the resources to express the
That is, the payouts of a and b for the “mixed” decision problem are “5 if X, 3 otherwise” and “1
if X, 4 otherwise” respectively.
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structural constraints on beliefs like “betting on one head is always at least as
good as betting on ten heads”. Ignoring this dominance reasoning is the flaw both
with Choquet-expected utility and EWald in the current setting.
... Minimising regret
What about anE Savage rule? For example, we could define an imprecise analogue
of “regret” as follows:




For an act b, we look at how far b is from the act that performs best for that
probability function. We do this for all probabilities, and take the maximum
of these “probabilistic regrets”. We then try to minimise this. That is, for each
probability in your representor, subtract the expectation of act b from the “top
act” for that probability.
Definition .. E Savagepaq “ argminaPA{E Regpaq}
The maximum of those values over all probabilities in your representor is your
maximum regret for act b. you should act to minimise that.
This at least gets it right for Example . The single heads bet has regret 0
everywhere, while the ten heads bet has positive regret everywhere except prpHq “
0 and prpHq “ 1. This rule is sensitive to important aspects of the structure of the
belief representor that get lost when thinking about E and E only.
Unfortunately, E Savage violates STP, as well as some even more important
properties. Consider the following scenario. You go to a restaurant and see that
the menu consists of Fish, Steak or Chicken. You decide on Chicken. The waiter
comes to take your order and tells you there is no more Fish. So you decide to
have the Steak. This story seems a little odd. Why should the availability of an
option you don’t choose cause a switch in choice like the one exhibited in the move
from Chicken to Steak? It seems like a reasonable choice rule should be somewhat
consistent under various kinds of expansion or contraction of the option set.
See also the partition-sensitivity worry I mentioned in section ...
For example, in Example , both acts have the same regret in the tails branch, but a has lower
regret in the mixed game. So a minor modification of this game would demonstrate a proper
violation.
Imagine you are at a sushi restaurant. You prefer salmon over tuna, but find that salmon needs
to be prepared by a good chef in order to be tasty. So you take the safe option and go for
tuna. Now you notice that the restaurant offers fugu – pufferfish – which is poisonous unless
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There are many different properties of varying strengths in this domain. Arrow
had “Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives” which, among other things, entails
a form of expansion and contraction consistency. Sen has his alpha and beta (etc.)
properties, which we will see in due course. Luce and Raiffa have their axioms
 and  and its strengthenings. Milnor had “row adjunction” and “special row
adjunction”. All of these will be fitted into this framework.
Consider contraction of the option set first.
Contraction Consistency CpAYBq Ď C pAqYCpBq
This rule is more normally seen in one of these equivalent forms:
If a P C pAq,BĎ A,a P B then a P C pBq (.)
If a R C pBq,BĎ A,a P B then a R C pAq (.)
Think about moving from A to B. The idea is that if it was good enough in A,
and it’s still an option, it should still be good enough in B. This property is also
known as Sen’s alpha condition (Sen , ). I am following Gaertner ()
in calling it “contraction consistency”, but it also somewhat restricts expansion of
the option set also. Luce and Raiffa have a version of (.) as their Axiom .
E Savage violates this property. Given that the assessment of each act depends
on maxima over the set of acts, it shouldn’t be surprising that adding or removing
acts can affect how the acts are evaluated.
Example  Consider the following acts, and consider choosing when h is an
option, and when it isn’t.
f Gain  if X, nothing otherwise
g Gain  if X,  otherwise





Now, in a choice between f and g, f wins, since it is at most 1 from the best act
(when prpXq “ 0) while g drops to 2 less than the top act (when prpXq “ 1). All
this changes when h becomes an option. Now, when prpXq “ 0, f is 3 from the top
prepared properly. You change your order to salmon. This seems like a failure of Contraction
Consistency, but it isn’t really. Learning that the restaurant offers fugu gives you evidence that
they have a good chef. This changes each of the acts on offer, so the change isn’t just a simple
addition of a new act. Thus the axiom doesn’t apply. Thanks to Nick Baigent for this example.











Figure ..: Example  as a graph of expectation against probability
act while g’s maximum distance from the top stays at 2. So the addition of h has
switched the evaluation of the two acts round! In short, E Savagep{f ,g,h}q “ {g}
but E Savagep{f ,g}q “ {f }. This violates Contraction Consistency.
We have seen that adding acts to the choice set should not be able to make a
non-choiceworthy act into a choiceworthy one, at least not without giving you
extra information about the choice problem. What about the other way? When
should a choiceworthy act be made no longer choiceworthy by the addition of new
acts?
Let’s consider an example of an expansion where turning a choiceworthy act
non-choiceworthy seems reasonable. A new act can make some old choiceworthy
act no longer choiceworthy. That is, if I add b to a decision problem where a
used to be the best, and b is better than a, then a is no longer choiceworthy. So
perhaps we should demand that the new act’s being choiceworthy is a necessary
condition for the old act changing from optimal to non-optimal. Let’s call this
“strong expansion consistency”. This is Luce and Raiffa’s first strengthening of
Axiom . They call it Axiom 1.
StEC If a P C pAq but a R C pAY Bq then there is some b P B such that b P
C pAYBq
E Savage also violates this stronger property.
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... Equivocating
What about the fourth kind of decision under ignorance rule? Is there any impre-
cise analogue of Laplace? What we need to do in the ignorance case is construct
a probability function that makes each state equally likely and maximise expec-
tation with that. What we need to do in this case is pick out some particular
probability function depending on your representor, and use this to maximise
expectation.
I’ve already criticised the Objective Bayesian norm of Equivocation, which is
effectively a method for picking out a probability to use.
Another approach with some of these characteristics is the “Transferable Belief
Model”. Smets and Kennes () argue that you should maintain a set of proba-
bilities in a “credal set” but that when called on to make a decision, you should
collapse this into a “pignistic probability” and maximise expectation with respect
to that.
In what follows I have less to say about this sort of approach. It seems there
are epistemological problems with deciding how to “average” your probability
judgements, but once that is achieved, the decision theory is wholly orthodox. I
have argued that representing the level of your uncertainty is important, so to
then have your decision theory “average away” all the severe uncertainty would
be counterproductive. So I focus my attention on properly imprecise decision
theories.
However, it might be that E⇓P pf q – the expected value of f by the lights of the
maximally equivocal probability – is a component in a more complex choice rule.
I will discuss one such rule later.
.. Ruling out acts
All of the above rules basically work the same way: they determine some quantity
that measures how good an act is, and then they recommend trying to pick acts
that maximise that quantity. So they output strong choice sets, in the sense that all
the acts in the choice set come out the same on the measure of choiceworthiness.
They try to find some quantity that determines a sufficient condition for an act’s
being reasonable. But this seems a little strong. Given the kind of ambiguity we
are dealing with, Who’s to say that there is some metric that always delivers the
optimal act?
Perhaps it is safer to take a different tack to constructing decision rules. Let’s
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look at restricting the space of reasonable acts. Instead of considering which acts
are the “best” in some sense, I want to focus on which acts you can justifiably
rule out. I want to look at the necessary conditions on an act’s being good. This
gives us a choice set that only admits of a weaker interpretation. That is, all we
can say of the acts in the choice set is that they are all better than those that have
been excluded. But we cannot say that the acts remaining in the choice set are
necessarily all choiceworthy (or comparable).
... Non-domination
Recall that in Example  we criticised rules that focus only on the set of expec-
tations for not taking into account that one act is always better than the other
whatever the chance of heads. This suggested our Non-domination condition. So
we want our choice function to satisfy this dominance relation. Let’s explore the
rule that satisfies this property, but is otherwise undiscriminating. That is, choose
only among acts that have no act that is always better.
Definition .. U pAq “M DompAq
This rule satisfies Non-domination, obviously, but also Contraction Consistency
and STP.
Non-domination is, arguably, too weak a requirement however: many intuitively
unreasonable acts are nevertheless undominated. U is not discriminating enough.
Non-domination also has a couple of minor problems.
All-or-nothing expansion consistency
First, let’s look at an unproblematic violation of a property found in the literature.
I shall call it “all-or-nothing expansion consistency”. It is called 2 by Luce and
Raiffa and “beta” by Sen. This says that if an old choiceworthy act is made non-
choiceworthy, then all old choiceworthy acts are made non-choiceworthy. As Luce
and Raiffa show, this “all-or-nothing” character of 72 makes sense only when you
are evaluating the acts on a single scale.
All-or nothing If a P C pAq but a R C pAYBq then, for all b P C pAq, we have
b R C pAYBq
Here is an example of how U fails all-or-nothing expansion consistency.
Example  Consider the choice between f and g, and the choice between
f ,g and h.
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f Gain £ if X, nothing otherwise
g Gain nothing if X, £ otherwise
h Gain £ if X, £ otherwise
h dominates f , so in the expanded decision problem, f is not optimal. However, g
is still undominated, so this violates all-or-nothing.
Imagine you are picking your team for the school gymnastic competition. You
need the best long jumper and the best high jumper in class A. So you have a
choice function that picks out Laura as the best long jumper and Horatio as the
best high jumper. That is, the choice function “best athletes” chooses these two
students. Now imagine that we expand the set of available students to be the
whole year group not just the class. As it happens, Herbert, in class B is a better
high jumper than Horatio. But Laura is the best long jumper in the year. So the
choice rule now picks out Laura and Herbert for the team. This rule violates
the above all-or-nothing rule, because different members of the choice set are
included based on different kinds of evaluations. The choice function for each
sport will satisfy this condition, but the overall “best athletes” function does
not. Such a choice function can’t be given a strong interpretation. I claim that
imprecise decision can be a little like this, and thus that all-or-nothing should not
be required. So it’s no flaw in U that it violates this property.
Sugden () discusses a similar example where one race car is faster and
another is more manoeuvrable: the first will win in a head to head race, but
the second will win if there are other cars on the track. Thus the “race winning
function”, if you like, does not satisfy this property.
Continuity
First consider a minor modification on an example we saw earlier (Example ).
Example  There is a coin of unknown bias. You are offered the choice
between these bets:
f Win £1 if the next toss lands heads
g Win £1` ε if the next ten tosses all land heads win £ε otherwise
Now g is no longer dominated, but it is still, intuitively, a bad deal. Unless the
probability of heads is pretty extreme, you’re better off with f . One might phrase
the intuition this way: g is only ε away from being dominated. The smaller ε
gets, the less reasonable this act seems. One might consider it a flaw in a decision
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Figure ..: A graph of Example 
function that it allows an act to be in the choice set no matter how close it gets to
some limit, but still make the “limit act” impermissible.
This motivates a property termed continuity. Continuity is about sequences of
decision problems. A sequence of decision problems is defined by a collection
of sequences of outcomes. I borrow Ken Binmore’s gloss on Milnor’s “continuity”
axiom here:
Consider a sequence of decision problems with the same acts and
states, in all of which aj  ai . If the sequence of matrices of outcomes
converges, then its limiting value defines a new decision problem in
which aj  ai . Binmore (, p. )
Continuity says that if we keep changing the payoffs slightly and the preference
remains stable, then in the limit of our fiddling, the preference will still be stable.
The change from “” to “” is to allow this to be consistent with a case where
act aj tends to ai . Or rather, each consequence of aj tends to the corresponding
consequence of ai . In the limit, they are equal, so there cannot be strict preference
between them. Or in terms of optimal acts, if we keep changing the payoffs slightly
and the set of optimal acts remains stable, then in the limit, the set of optimal acts
is stable.
Note that the slightly less discriminating choice rule “choose only among the
non-strongly-dominated acts” does satisfy continuity. That is, a sequence of un-
dominated acts can have a weakly dominated limit, but not a strongly dominated
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one.
Convexity
I don’t really have an intuition for the following property, but it appears in a
number of places, so it is worth discussing briefly.
Convexity says that “if a1, a2 P C pAq then xa1` p1´ xqa2 P C pAq for x P r0,1s”.
This is Luce and Raiffa’s Axiom . Milnor has a version of this that says that
mixtures of acts are weakly preferred. That is, it says “if a1 „ a2 then xa1`p1´
xqa2  a1, a2 for x P r0,1s.” Of course, this only makes sense if these “mixtures” are
in A.
A mixture of undominated acts can be dominated (See Table .). Now each of
a1 and a2 are undominated. But the mixture is dominated by a3. So convexity is





0.5a1` 0.5a2 “ a4 0 0
Table ..: A mixture of undominated acts can be dominated
Would it be possible to construct a rule that never picks an act whose mixtures
with other acts can be dominated? Would it be desirable?
I find myself untroubled by violations of convexity. So why might we consider
it a condition of rational decision? There is an idea that a mixture is at least as
good as the worst part of the mixture, and at most as good as the best part. This is
related to what Bradley () calls the “Averaging Slogan”. In particular, if both
parts of the mixture are good enough to make it into C pAq, then so should the
mixture be. But this seems to be trading on the same “single-criterion” intuition
as the above “All-or-nothing expansion consistency”. Say Horatio is a terrible
long-jumper and Laura a terrible high-jumper. Someone who was a “mixture”
between these people – call him/her Lauratio – would not be as good as them.
If Lauratio is an average high-jumper and an average long-jumper, then she/he
doesn’t deserve a place on the athletics team.
The ten heads plus epsilon act in Example  is not ruled out by this less discriminating rule
either.
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... E-admissibility
Another restriction of the act set – “E-admissibility” – is due to Isaac Levi (Levi
, ). An act is E-admissible if there is some probability in your representor
such that that act maximises expectation with respect to that probability function.
In picture terms an act is E-admissible if it is “on top” for some probability value
in the representor. Levi argues that you should only choose among E-admissible
acts.
Definition .. LpAq “⋃prM Epr pAq
This might be more perspicuously rephrased as:
LpAq “ {a P A : Dpr P P ,@b P A,Eprpaq ě Eprpbq} (.)
As it stands, the definition of E-admissible isn’t quite good enough. Recall
Example  where we had the choice between a bet on heads and a bet on ten heads
in a row. The latter maximises expectation for prpHq “ 0 and prpHq “ 1 so it is
E-admissible. This act is, however, weakly dominated. I expect that Levi would
want to rule out choosing weakly dominated acts, even if they maximise for some
pr. We could do two things here. We could either weaken our definition of U
so that only strongly dominated acts are thrown out, or we could give Levi the
benefit of the doubt and say that what he was really interested in was LpU pAqq.
We shall call this LpAq.
We know that LpAq Ď U pAq. There are undominated acts that are not E-
admissible, for example n in Example . So we in fact know that LpAq Ă U pAq for
some A. So L is more discriminating that U .
One motivation that might be offered for preferring L to U is that undominated
acts can be dominated by mixtures of other acts, but E-admissible acts can’t
be dominated by mixed acts. For example, n in Example  is undominated but
dominated by a : mixture of f and g. No E-admissible act can be so dominated.
This seems like a strange argument. If the mixed acts are available acts, then n
won’t be undominated. If the mixed acts aren’t in the set of available acts, then it’s
irrelevant that there is something that dominates it. A second point against this is
that not all undominated acts can be dominated in this way. In a moment, we will
see such an undominated act that can’t be dominated by mixtures. The “Same” act
in Example  is one such act.
More carefully, fix a set of acts A. Only some undominated acts in A are dominated by mixtures
of acts in A. We could still have that the act is undominated in some larger set of acts A1 such
that it is dominated by mixtures of acts in A1.
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Given that E-admissibility is more discriminating and given that non-domination
is arguably too permissive (not discriminating enough), one might think that E-
admissibility is obviously the better rule. But L seems to “get things wrong” in
certain cases, where U gets it right. That is, L rules out some intuitively reasonable
acts as we shall see shortly. L doesn’t help solve any of the problems with U . That
is, L also violates continuity and convexity as well as sanctioning betting on ten
heads in Example .
Union consistency
L violates the following reasonable seeming property.
Union consistency C pAqXC pBq Ď C pAYBq
This is Sen’s gamma condition. It is sometimes seen in this equivalent form:
If a P C pAq, a P C pBq then a P C pAYBq (.)
The motivation here is that if you would choose Steak out of Steak or Fish, and
you’d choose Steak out of Steak or Chicken, then you should choose Steak when
all three options are on the menu. L violates this property, as can be seen from
considering Example . Lp{f ,n}q “ {f ,n} and Lp{g,n}q “ {g,n}, but Lp{f ,g,n}q “
{f ,g}.
As I mentioned earlier, Kyburg () suggests his Principle III, which is es-
sentially what we called Interval Dominance. In the commentary on Kyburg’s
paper, Teddy Seidenfeld suggested two improvements on Principle III which are
effectively U and L. Seidenfeld notes that L violates Union consistency (although
he mistakenly refers to it as Sen’s beta condition). Ultimately, Seidenfeld suggests
that despite this failure L is the better improvement on Principle III (Kyburg ,
pp. –). In Kyburg’s response (p. ) he concedes that Interval Dominance
should be improved on, but finds the violation of the above property to be unde-
sirable, and thus opts for U . Seidenfeld () points out that L violates Union
consistency and also All-or nothing.
Intuition failure
E-admissibility also just seems to get it wrong in certain intuitive cases.
Example  You are betting on a coin of unknown bias. It will be tossed
twice. The following bets are available to you.
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Figure ..: The decision problem of Example 
Same Win £1´ ε if the coin lands the same way twice, lose ε otherwise
Different Win £1 ` ε if the coin lands on different sides each time, win ε
otherwise
Heads Win £1 if the first toss lands heads, 0 otherwise
Tails Win £1 if the first toss lands tails, 0 otherwise
HH HT TH T T
S 1´ ε ´ε ´ε 1´ ε
D ε 1` ε 1` ε ε
H 1 1 0 0
T 0 0 1 1
The intuition here is that whatever value pr takes, S does almost as well as the
better of H,T , and normally better than D as well. However, S is not E-admissible.
It’s always close to whatever act maximises – something not true of any of the other
acts – but it never actually maximises for any pr.
Despite being more discriminating, E-admissibility does not seem like an im-
provement on non-domination. It seems to get things wrong in some intuitive
cases, and it violates additional plausible properties for choice rules.
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.. Improving on non-domination?
Can we improve on U? That is, U typically contains the reasonable acts, but
sometimes contains unreasonable acts too. Can we do better than this? This
section considers some attempts to find more discriminating choice functions that
still always choose undominated acts. I think, ultimately, we aren’t going to be
able to do much better than U as our choice function. This at least rules out the
obviously bad acts. There are two ways the following proposals might be read.
First we could take them as being on a par with the proposals we have seen so far:
that is, as suggestions for how fully rational decisions should be made. I think
each will be found wanting on this interpretation. We might instead consider
each of these proposals as somewhat rational – semi-rational? – ways to determine
choice when U is not discriminating enough. On this understanding, the following
proposals’ failures are less damning: we have accepted now that fully rational
decision making isn’t always sufficiently discriminating. We now want to know
how to make a choice that isn’t rationally determined, and we want to do so while
maintaining as much rationality as possible.
I am introducing, here, a sort of hierarchy of choice rules. When the fully rational
choice rule – U – fails to be discriminating enough then perhaps other more
discriminating but less rational choice rules take over and help narrow down
the choice. There is a trade-off between rationally determined decision and fully
discriminating decision.
... Savage again
Note that the E Savage rule never picks a dominated act. It does, however, violate
a lot of plausible conditions on reasonable choice. But there is something going
right in this rule. It seems to get the right answers, even in the cases of Examples 
and . It also satisfies continuity. So it seems to have some advantages over
U . And it seems like it is a bad thing to choose an act if it can only do slightly
better than some other, and could be a lot worse. That is, the motivation behind
E Savage seems to point in the right direction.
Let’s try and find a restriction on choice that is in the spirit of E Savage, but
that doesn’t have all its bad consequences. Consider the following relation:
Definition .. a PWR b iff maxpr{Eprpaq´Eprpbq}ěmaxpr{Eprpbq´Eprpaq}
This is basically the relation that holds between a and b when a’s regret is less
than b’s when the two are compared pairwise. Because the comparison is done
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a b c
Epr1 10 1 8
Epr2 1 9 1
Epr3 1 2 4
Table ..: Cyclic Pairwise Regret
just over pairs of acts, it won’t violate the various kinds of contraction consistency
properties in the same way that E Savage does. We will see later that it does still
violate there properties.
Can we demand that C satisfy this relation? Unfortunately not, since the relation
isn’t in general acyclic. For example consider acts that satisfy the properties in
Table .. This means that PWR would impose inconsistent demands on C . In
short, M PWR can be empty.
We can see some analogy here between this rule and the decision rule that
Mark Colyvan suggests in Colyvan (). His decision rule is also a pairwise
comparison of acts that relies on differences in their outcomes. However, he is
working in a precise framework, so he takes probability weighted differences of
utilities over the states. His rule has more or less the same problems as this rule
does.
Despite its failings, there is a feeling that this rule is getting something right.
Satisfying this relation in Example  – betting on whether two tosses of a coin
will be the same or different – gets you the right choice of act (S). In example
Example  (where E Savage failed), pairwise regret points to a consistent choice:
whether or not h is included, f is the most preferred act. This is, of course, some
way short of showing that a rule based on this relation would satisfy the various
expansion and contraction consistency properties that counted against E Savage.
Given thatM PWR can be empty, it’s not immediately clear how to build a decision
rule out of this relation. Perhaps we should demand only that when the maximal
set is non-empty, that set should be the choice set. In the same way that we want
C pAq “ IDpAq whenever IDpAq ‰H, we want C pAq “M PWRpAq whenever this is
nonempty.
Consider the following choice rule.
Given how similar this table looks to tables of Condorcet cycles in social choice, I conjecture
that some sort of single-peakedness property suffices to have the pairwise regret relation to be
acyclic.
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Definition ..
S pAq “
M PWRpAq if M PWRpAq ‰H⋃
xPA{S pAz{x}q} otherwise
The maximal set is never empty for two element sets of acts since you can’t have
cycles on pairs. This guarantees that this recursive definition never yields an
empty set. What it effectively says is “if there is no maximal element, try all the
ways of removing one act and look for maximal elements there.” Since it is cycles
that cause there to be no maximal elements, this procedure will look at all the
ways you could remove an element from the cycle, and thus induce there to be a
maximal element. Every element of a cycle will end up in the choice set.
Theorem .. S pAq ‰H for all finite A.
Proof Let |A| mean the size of the set A. If |A| “ 2 then M PWRpAq ‰ H. This is
just because you can’t get the sort of “cycle” behaviour on sets that small. For
induction, assume S pAq ‰ H for |A| “ n. Now let |B| “ n` 1. The only difficult
case is if M PWRpBq “H. Thus S pBq “
⋃
xPB{S pBz{x}q}. But |Bz{x}|“ n for all x P B.
Thus by our assumption, S pBz{x}q ‰H. The union of nonempty sets is nonempty,
so S pBq ‰H. 
I have been a little conservative in only aiming to prove the finite case here. I think
the proof holds much more generally, and I hope it is clear how one would extend
the proof. There may be some awkwardness caused by infinitely long cycles that
may require something a little more sophisticated than S to get the proof through.
The idea, at least, should be clear: make a rule where, if you hit a cycle, take the
union of the ways you might break the cycle by dropping an element (or possibly
a set of elements).
What properties does this rule satisfy? It is a subset of U . To show this, I first
need two short lemmas.
Lemma .. If a Dom d then a PWR d.
Proof Since a Dom d we have that Eprpaq ´Eprpdq ě 0 for all pr P P . Therefore
Eprpdq´Eprpaq ď 0. From this it follows that a PWR d. 
This shows that the PWR relation is more discriminating than the Dom relation.
Next we need to show we have a sort of transitivity.
Lemma .. If c PWR a and a Dom d then c PWR d.
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Therefore c PWR d. 
From the above lemmas, we can show the following.
Theorem .. S pAq Ď U pAq for all AĎA.
Proof We need to prove that if d is dominated, then d R S pAq. Say that d is
dominated by a. If M PWRpAq ‰H then, since a PWR d by Lemma .., d cannot
be in M PWRpAq.
We now need to show that if M PWRpAq “ H we still have d R S pAq. The only
place we need to check is S pAz{a}q since in all other subsets the above result
guarantees that d is not in S pAq. If M PWRpAq “H that means, in particular, that
there exists some c such that c PWR a. If no such c existed, a would have been
in M PWRpAq. c is in Az{a} and c PWR d by Lemma ... Therefore, d is not
maximal in Az{a}. 
Unfortunately, this rule violates Contraction Consistency. Consider a cycle
a PWR b PWR c PWR a. Now consider S p{a}q and S p{b,c}q. The first of these is {a}
and the second is {b}. However, S p{a}Y {b,c}q “ {a,b,c}. Despite not being chosen
in either smaller set, c is among those chosen in the larger set. This is because the
larger set contains a cycle and thus the whole cycle is part of the choice set. In the
smaller sets, there are no cycles and so only the maximal elements make it into
the choice set.
If all the acts available are “linear in prpXq” for some X, then M PWR is non-
empty and the rule satisfies Contraction Consistency. By “linear in prpXq” I
mean Eprpf q “ uprpXq `w. If the graph of expectation against probability is a
straight line. This holds of bets on X. Note that this doesn’t hold when we take
more complex bets. For example in Example , you were betting on a coin’s
landing the same way twice in a row. This is not linear in prpHq. It is linear in
prpHH _ T T q, but the other acts on offer are not linear in this proposition. There
may be a more general set of cases where M PWR is guaranteed to be non-empty,
perhaps something similar to the idea of “single-peakedness” from social choice
theory (see Gaertner , pp. –). In the simplified circumstances of choosing
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between a set of well behaved bets that are all simple bets on the same proposition,
then S is a good choice rule since it is more discriminating than U but satisfies
many of the same properties. In the more general case however, the possibility of
cycles means that the rule does not do so well. Despite this, it does seem to get the
right answers in most of the example decision problems I have discussed in this
chapter.
This is obviously much less than a cast-iron argument that some choice function
in this vicinity is the best. Indeed, I have only made gestures towards even showing
that this sort of rule is any good at all. It doesn’t show much that it looks like it
gets things roughly correct in the examples I have discussed.
There is another practical problem with this rule. Given that it relies on pairwise
comparisons between the acts, and each pairwise comparison requires comparing
maxima ranging over probability values, it is quite computationally intensive.
... Levi’s rule
Isaac Levi champions LWald as the best imprecise decision rule. That is, he argues
that you should maximise minimum expectation among acts that can maximise
expectation. This rule is EWaldpLpAqq. He argues that only those acts that have
some chance of being the best are worthy of consideration. He argues for the
“maximise minimum expectation” part by analogy to what happens in precise
cases of equal expectation.
He considers a bet like the following: I offer you a bet where you win £1 if heads
comes up, but you lose £1 if tails lands up. Should you accept this bet, or refuse it?
Both acts (accept, refuse) have the same expectation – £0 – so how do you choose
between them? Levi suggests that in this situation you should maximise minimum
expectation. He says that the reason to refuse the bet is:
not that refusal is better in the sense that it has higher expected utility
than accepting the gamble. The options come out equal on this kind of
appraisal. Refusing the gamble is “better” however, with respect to the
security against loss it furnishes. Levi (, p. )
He suggests the same reasoning works in the imprecise case. We should use
“security” as a tiebreaker.
I have already criticised L and LWald inherits many of its problems, while
adding some new problems of its own. LWald violates Contraction Consistency,
for example, as Seidenfeld () points out.
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Example  Consider the choice between f ,g and the choice between f ,g,h.
f £ if X, nothing otherwise
g £ if X, £ otherwise











Figure ..: Graph of Example 
In a choice between f and g, it is g that does best by LWald. However, adding h
means that g is no longer E-admissible and of f and h, f does better. For large
values of ρ, LHurwicz inherits all the same problems.
The trick that causes LHurwicz to violate these properties is as follows: some
act g is E-admissible in virtue of maximising for some value of prpXq. And it also
maximises minimum expectation at some other value of pr1pXq for which g does
not maximise expectation. So you can make it fail E-admissibility while still having
it maximise minimum expectation. Since you have this independence of the two
parts of this “lexicographic” rule, you get all the strange behaviour associated
with lexicographic orderings.
Now, for ρ small enough – take the case of ρ “ 0: maximax – you can no longer
do this: the places where it wins the Hurwicz criterion test are also the places
where it is E-admissible. So the trick that works for ρ “ 1 is harder to pull off,
and in the limit, impossible. I don’t know of anyone who argues in favour of
maximax-expectation as a choice rule. It rarely accords with intuition in the
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kinds of examples we have been discussing: typically a modicum of ambiguity
aversion seems rational, but maximax is maximally ambiguity-loving. If there is
any possible chance that some act might be the best, then maximax prefers that
act.
What we saw in Example  is that g maximises minimum expectation but
an act that performs worse on this metric can still make it not E-admissible and
therefore not optimal. This means that some other previously non-optimal act
must become optimal.
Recall Example : where a coin will be tossed twice. LWald gets things wrong
here. Not only does E-admissibility rule out what seems like the best act (S), but
then maximising minimum expectation picks out D, which seems like the worst
act of the four. Likewise in Example  – one head versus ten heads plus ε – LWald
results in betting on  heads being uniquely rational, for all ε ą 0.
I don’t think LWald is a good rule at all. If you are going to violate Contraction
Consistency, it seems likeE Savage gets the intuitive examples right while LWald
gets them seriously wrong. If you are committed to Contraction Consistency,
then I’m not sure that any simple decision rule can improve on the relatively
permissive U .
... Spread-sensitive equivocation
Recall that the objective Bayesian framework endorses three norms, the third
of which was Equivocation. I was sympathetic to the spirit of this norm, but I
criticised the form it took in Williamson’s formulation of the position. Call ⇓P
the probability function that is maximally equivocal in P . The details need not
concern us here. ⇓P is the probability function in your representor that is the
least informative.
We could take maximising expectation with respect to ⇓P to be a decision rule.
Obviously, we restrict ourselves to choosing among the nondominated acts, but
among those we choose the act that maximises expectation for the maximally
equivocal member of your representor. Call this the Equivocal Expectation.
Definition .. EEpAq “ argmaxU pAq{E⇓P pf q}
This rule is more discriminating than U , but does it get things right in the examples
we have been considering? It gets things right in the “one head versus ten heads
plus ε” case (Example ). However, EE doesn’t always satisfy continuity. In fact,
we have already seen a case where maximising equivocal expectation seems wrong
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and this is a case that shows that the rule violates continuity. Recall Example 
from page . In that example you were offered a choice between a sure £0.5 or a
bet that wins £1`ε if a coin of unknown bias lands on different sides in two tosses.
The intuitively correct answer is to take the sure money: the expectation of the bet
is only better when the chance of heads is very close to 0.5, or rather, the bet looks
best only when your credence is very close to a half. But since equivocating means
you have credence of exactly 0.5 the bet comes out looking like the best option.
Well, you might argue, what we need to do is make the equivocal expectation
sensitive to the spread of possible expectations over the whole representor.
Definition .. SPP pf q “EP pf q´EP pf q
Using this spread penalty we can define the spread-sensitive equivocal expectation
as follows:
Definition .. SSEEσ pAq “ argmaxU pAq{E⇓P pf q´ σSP pf q}
The σ reflects your opinion about how much weight to give to the “spread penalty”
SP pf q.
Unfortunately, this rule also has its problems. Consider Example  on page 
again. This is a similar set-up with bets on coins landing the same way or different
ways on two tosses. The spread-sensitive equivocal expectation again chooses the
worst act in this example. The problem is that there is another act that does better
than it apart from very near 0.5, and this act has the same spread.
The spread-sensitive equivocal expectation induces a complete order on the acts,
and the assessment of an act depends only on properties of the act. so it satisfies
all the expansion and contraction consistency properties. So in some ways, this
choice rule seems better than LWald, but it is not without its problems.
One might want to extend this idea to a very customisable choice rule: one that
has three parameters and that covers the current rule and also EHurwicz.
C rα,β,γspAq “ argmax
U pAq
{αEpf q` βEpf q`γ E⇓P pf q}
Gärdenfors and Sahlin () interpret Hodges and Lehman () as doing
something like this, with γ proportional to the reliability of ⇓P , β “ 0,α “ 1´γ .
Recall that their model attached a reliability score to each of the probabilities in P .
This requires strictly less than what those rules discussed in the next section do.
We can recover EHurwicz by taking γ “ 0,β “ 1´α. We can recover SSEEσ by
taking γ “ 1,α “ σ,β “´σ . For judicious choices of the parameters, this rule can
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be made to work for most of the examples we have seen so far. This rule induces a
complete order on the acts which means that it satisfies most of the properties we
have seen too.
This rule is perhaps too general. With so many adjustable parameters, it can
probably be made to rationalise most kinds of choice. For various parameter
choices it will fail to satisfy various properties. Consider setting the parameters
such that it mimics UWald: it will now inherit the problems with that rule.
... Second-order probabilities to the rescue
Let’s return again to the “one heads versus ten heads plus ε” case (Example ). U
fails to discriminate between the acts in this case, despite the intuitive judgement
that there is some reason to prefer the bet on one head. The intuition goes
something like this: “Most of your representor thinks that the one head bet is best.
Only a small minority think that the ten heads bet is better.” This is appealing
to some sort of second-order probability: some measure on the representor. This
reasoning is unfounded for the same reason that the unwarranted probabilistic
assumption in the decision under ignorance case is. You can’t really say that “more”
of your representor prefer the one head bet. There’s no justification for saying that
there is more of your representor here or there. The graphs I have shown make it
look that way because they suggest that the size of a subset of your representor P 1
should be measured by the size of the interval P 1pHq. Strictly speaking, this isn’t
allowed. And even if it were, the size of a subrepresentor would be sensitive to
the choice of event to measure it with.
With all that said, there is some intuitive appeal to the idea of measuring the
size of the subrepresentor that prefers a over b and using these size comparisons
as input into choice. Think of it as the faction within the credal committee that
prefer a. Some particular choice of how to measure a representor determines,
effectively, a second-order distribution over the representor. One way we might
use this to inform decision is to take large finite samples from the distribution and
then make the sample credal committee “vote” on which act they like best. This
leads to as many decision rules as there are voting procedures and this isn’t the
place to go into that huge literature. Staying on the intuitive level, we can see
that a large majority will vote for one head over ten heads. So this gets things right
here. What about the same/different case in Example  on page ? This in
fact illustrates an important difference between different voting rules. A majority
But see Gaertner ().
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prefer Same to Different. But Same is first choice for no committee members (this
is just to say that it is not E-admissible). So if the voting rule takes account of first
choices only, Same won’t be in the running. So if you want to salvage the intuition
that Same is the right act, then you need some sort of run-off voting, maybe.
EHurwicz, the EE rule and the current large finite sample from a second-
order distribution voting rule all seem to be ways of averaging the opinions of
the credal committee members. EHurwicz averages the committee members’
expectations; EE averages the committee members’ views on the chances; and the
current proposal averages their preferences. Each is distinct in its outcomes.
The current proposal is, I think, the best of the three; in that it seems it has the
potential to get the right answer more often. There are two comments to make
on this sort of approach. First, impossibility theorems; second, impossibility of
measuring representors.
Impossibility theorems are a big part of the literature on voting. They have
the form “No voting procedure can jointly satisfy all of the constraints in C”,
where C is some collection of intuitively plausible properties we would like
voting rules to have. Will impossibility theorems like this undermine this large
finite sample voting method for imprecise decisions? On the current view, not
necessarily. One of the critical conditions in Arrow’s impossibility theorem – the
granddaddy of impossibility theorems – is that the individual preferences that
are the input to the preference aggregating procedure are purely ordinal. That
is, you cannot use information about how much more one committee member
prefers a to b in determining the group preference. This seems reasonable in
real voting: are there facts of the matter about interpersonal comparisons of
strength of preference? Even if there were, eliciting them would be nigh on
impossible. However in the current context, we have been assuming that all the
credal committee members share the same utility function, so inter-committee
member comparisons of strength of preference should be possible. This fact
undermines Arrow’s impossibility theorem. Having all committee members have
the same utility function was an idealisation that I made, however. It is plausible
that we should allow imprecise utility as well. This doesn’t however negate the
above undermining of Arrow’s result. Even if utility is allowed to be imprecise,
Each procedure satisfies something like the properties Ellis () ascribes to averaging func-
tions. They don’t exactly satisfy the conditions, but they are close enough that talk of them all
being kinds of averaging to be reasonable.
Weatherson (ms.) mentions voting in the context of imprecise decisions, though his remarks are
not fully developed.
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all the committee members are facets of one person: precisifications of the same
person’s beliefs and desires. As such, even if the utility functions are different
they should be such that the inter-committee member comparisons of utility are
possible. Even if different members value things differently, their values are all
calibrated to the same yardstick.
The second problem I mentioned above was the impossibility of measuring
sets of probabilities. There are some technical problems with measuring sets of
probabilities that I have already touched on. One method you might suggest for
measuring representors is to measure the interval the representor assigns to some
event. The measure will be sensitive to choice of “measuring event”. For instance
consider P that consists of all the probability functions that assign prpXq “ 0.5.
Y is independent of X and P is maximally uncertain about Y . Measuring with
respect to Y gives P a size of 1, while measuring with respect to X gives P size 0.
Unless some method can be determined for deciding what is the “right” event to
measure the subrepresentors for a given decision, any such method is doomed.
Another method you might consider for measuring sets of probability functions
is to consider each function to be a point in an N -dimensional vector space where
N is the number of atoms of the algebra. That is, every probability function can be
identified with an N -dimensional vector ~pr where the coordinates sum to 1. For
some ordering of the atoms, this vector just lists the values this function assigns to
each one. A probability function is determined by its action on the atoms, so every
point in the simplex corresponds to exactly one probability function. The set of
vectors whose components sum to 1 defines an N ´ 1-dimensional simplex. For
example, if N “ 3, the set of coordinates that sum to 1 is a triangle with vertices at
p0,0,1q,p0,1,0q,p1,0,0q. Now treat this simplex as a set of points in a vector space
and use your standard measure on such spaces to determine the size of sets of
probability functions. That is, the space of all probability functions on N atoms
is isomorphic to r0,1sN´1 and we can use the standard Lebesgue measure on this
space to measure the size of representors. This method seems not to have the same
sensitivity as the other did, but it will only work for finite algebras, and I can’t see
how you could justify the choice of measure except to say that it is the standard
one. Viewed as just a semi-rational tie-breaker, the arbitrariness of the measure
doesn’t undermine the method. This method does, however, suffer from language
relativity problems. One might replace some atom t but atoms t1 and t2 where
t ” t1_ t2. This would change the measure of representors.
This is just a sketch of a procedure of this sort, but it is up to fans of this sort of
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approach to fill in the details. I think the strongest thing to say against this sort
of approach is that it is monstrously complicated, and for real-world decisions,
determining the atoms of the algebra isn’t easy.
.. The worst rule, apart from all the others?
This brings us back to U . This rule can feel overly permissive, but perhaps this is
as far as rationality can get us. When we restrict ourselves to nondominated acts,
we have at least ruled out at least some of the unambiguously bad acts.
Echoing Winston Churchill’s famous quip about democracy, I think that U is
the worst decision rule, apart from all the others. I suggest that rational decision
making can only go so far in cases of severe uncertainty. As I said when discussing
decision under ignorance, what gives us the right to expect a determinate answer to
all these decision problems? I’d argue that the “half-answer” that nondomination
gives us is about as good as it gets as far as rationality determining choice goes in
these cases.
If most of the tiebreakers discussed in the previous section end up opting for
the same act, then perhaps that suggests that that act is good in a number of ways.
Perhaps we could value a certain “robustness to choice methodology”. But this
will only determine an answer in some situations.
So we return to the other question I started this chapter with. How ought we
make decisions? Rationality has only got us halfway; what is going to get us the
rest of the way? Perhaps there is a hierarchy of choice rules. At the top we have
nondomination. If nondomination is not discriminating enough, we have to move
down a level to some sort of tiebreaker rule. This move would have to involve
acknowledging that the choice the tiebreaker determines isn’t fully rational: I
have argued that full rationality doesn’t always determine choice, so some element
of arationality must creep in. Not all arational tiebreakers are created equal and
perhaps the desirable properties of choice rules that we have seen above offer some
methods to determine which tiebreakers are less bad. I would argue that such
an analysis would put the maximin tiebreaker in Levi’s LWald rule some way
from the top. I think there will be a contextual component to which tiebreakers
to use, and the last chapter of this dissertation will offer one analysis of kinds of
tiebreaker that might be applicable to climate decisions.
. Scientific uncertainty
The trouble with weather
forecasting is that it’s right
too often for us to ignore it
and wrong too often for us to
rely on it.
(Patrick Young)
Up until now the discussion of uncertainty has been operating at a fairly high
level of abstraction. This chapter and the next focus in on a particular example of
uncertainty and decision making. The aim is to show that uncertainty in science is,
indeed, multifaceted and diverse; and thus that imprecise probability models are
needed since precise probabilities don’t do justice to the nature of the scientific
uncertainty. The next chapter discusses decision making in this context.
We have already seen some of the ways people have tried to characterise different
kinds of uncertainty in section .. What I aim to do differently with this chapter
is discuss kinds of uncertainty with a view to what coping strategies we adopt
to deal with them. Lo and Mueller go some way towards this, but they treat
statistical techniques only. My own perspective will be broader both in the kinds of
uncertainty I countenance and in the uncertainty mitigation techniques I consider.
This chapter and the next are more focused, less abstract than the rest of the
dissertation up until now. I won’t be directly discussing imprecise probabilities all
that much any more. But some of the same general lessons and principles carry
over from the previous discussion. I take my weaker understanding of rationality
to be important in this context: we shouldn’t expect the scientific evidence to
always determine some precise degree of rational belief. What we believe on the
basis of the scientific evidence should be sensitive to the quality and amount of the
evidence, and to the kinds of uncertainties that evidence is subject to. My main
aim here is not to advocate the adoption of imprecise probabilities for representing
climate evidence, but what motivates my advocating imprecise probabilities in
Although, I am in favour of this, too.
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the abstract case also motivates what I have to say about climate evidence: be
sensitive to the nature of the uncertainties. As I said in the introduction, this
chapter and the one following it are motivated by the same concerns that led me
to my preferred formal theory of belief and decision: severe uncertainty precludes
the satisfaction of the strong standard of rationality that requires determinate
answers to all decision theoretic questions; severe uncertainty shows that there is
a need to represent the nature and quality of the evidence in some way that makes
that relevant to the decision maker.
.. Two motivating quotes
How do error and uncertainty enter science? What can we do about it? This
chapter explores these questions in the context of scientific modelling, specifically
climate modelling. While my main interest is in models of the climate, I think a
lot of what I say will translate into other disciplines. I want to start this chapter
with two quotes that highlight two aspects of the modelling process.
... Laplace’s demon: ideal scientist
In trying to characterise what determinism was, Laplace described his famous
“demon” who was a kind of ideal scientist.
We may regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its past
and the cause of its future. An intellect which at a certain moment
would know all forces that set nature in motion, and all positions of
all items of which nature is composed, if this intellect were also vast
enough to submit these data to analysis, it would embrace in a single
formula the movements of the greatest bodies of the universe and those
of the tiniest atom; for such an intellect nothing would be uncertain
and the future just like the past would be present before its eyes. The
perfection that the human mind has been able to give to astronomy
affords but a feeble outline of such an intelligence. Discoveries in
mechanics and geometry, coupled with those in universal gravitation,
have brought the mind within reach of comprehending in the same an-
alytical formula the past and the future state of the system of the world.
All of the mind’s efforts in the search for truth tend to approximate
A version of this chapter appears as Bradley ().
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the intelligence we have just imagined, although it will forever remain
infinitely remote from such an intelligence. Laplace ( [])
This demon knows everything there is to know: for him, there is no uncertainty.
We of course fall far short of Laplace’s ideal scientist, and our actual science is full
of uncertainties of various kinds. My aim here is to characterise what kinds of
uncertainty arise in science, and point out some of the ways we cope with them.
Laplace attributed three important capacities to his demon. First it must know
“all the forces that set nature in motion”: it must be using the same equations as
Nature is. Second, it must have perfect knowledge of the initial conditions: “all
positions of which nature is composed”. Laplace makes reference only to positions,
but let’s grant that he was aware his demon would need to know various other
particulars of the initial conditions – momentum, charge, spin – let’s pretend
Laplace was talking about position in state space. The third capacity that Laplace
grants his demon is that it be “vast enough to submit these data to analysis”. This
translates roughly as infinite computational power. I will have less to say about
this third capacity, at least directly.
Laplace was operating in a purely Newtonian world, without quantum effects,
without relativistic worries. In this chapter, I will do the same. On the whole,
climate scientists make the assumption that it is safe to model the climate system
as a Newtonian, deterministic system. Even in this environment there are many
kinds of uncertainty.
... On Exactitude in Science
My second motivating quote is pulling in the opposite direction. Laplace is
thinking about the ultimate in accurate prediction, this story from Jorge Luis
Borges points to the limits inherent in modelling.
. . . In that Empire, the Art of Cartography attained such Perfection
that the map of a single Province occupied the entirety of a City, and
the map of the Empire, the entirety of a Province. In time, those Un-
conscionable Maps no longer satisfied, and the Cartographers Guilds
struck a Map of the Empire whose size was that of the Empire, and
which coincided point for point with it. The following Generations,
This is actually a slightly different translation to the one cited, given in Smith ().
 Smith () characterises Laplace’s demon in this way, and I follow his exposition.
The following quote is the story in its entirety.
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who were not so fond of the Study of Cartography as their Forebears
had been, saw that that vast Map was Useless, and not without some
Pitilessness was it, that they delivered it up to the Inclemencies of Sun
and Winters. In the Deserts of the West, still today, there are Tattered
Ruins of that Map, inhabited by Animals and Beggars; in all the Land
there is no other Relic of the Disciplines of Geography.
Borges (, p. )
The map here is serving as a metaphor for the modelling process. A map
that is too big is like a model that is too slow. And the point I want to make
is that modelling is inherently, inescapably a process of abstraction, idealisation,
ignoring of detail. In a way, at the very heart of the whole project of modelling
a phenomenon is the need to introduce error: an exact replica (a : map) of the
phenomenon of interest wouldn’t tell you anything. This isn’t strictly true. If we
had a perfect : replica of the climate we could run various different scenarios on
it and explore the system more in the way of a lab experiment. Simulation as a
kind of experiment is an idea explored by Petersen () in the context of climate
models. Given the time taken to actually run that sort of model, it would not be a
useful predictive tool. The actual world is an excellent model of itself, and to know
how it will evolve, we only need to wait until it has done so. This is not helpful
for many of the purposes we would like to use models for. So what follows isn’t a
criticism of scientific modelling, but rather marvelling at how much we can throw
away and still have informative useful models.
The question we always have to ask ourselves when looking at complex models
is: “what is the value added by incorporating these extra processes?” Does the
extra insight gained from adding in these extra feedbacks balance out making the
model slower and more complex? Does the extra detail justify making the map
bigger?
I’m not making any claims that what I say is specific to computer simulation. I
more or less agree with Frigg and Reiss () that simulation brings out no new
philosophical issues over and above those of other kinds of modelling. Simulation
does however emphasise different elements of the issues. The use of computers
also introduces interesting new possibilities for error which are worth discussing.
I believe it is up to someone who thinks there is a relevant difference to fill in exactly how this
distinction – between simulation and non-computational modelling – can be made.
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... Outline
This chapter explores the topic of scientific uncertainty. The motivation is to show
that we shouldn’t be satisfied with glib, easy answers to the question “What should
we believe about the climate based on this evidence?”
My examples and much of the discussion will be motivated by climate modelling.
However, I will keep things on a fairly “conceptual” and idealised level: much of
the detail will not reflect actual practices of working scientists. What I am aiming
for is to explore the basic sources of errors and the basic processes for mitigating
them. So my conclusions will apply to any model-based, predictive, quantitative
science.
We are nowhere near Laplace’s demon in our capacities. The next two sections
explore ways in which we fail to live up to Laplace’s dream. First I look at
uncertainty in our measurements of initial conditions (section .). Second I look
at uncertainty in our models (section .). Then I turn to looking at the coping
strategies we have developed to deal with uncertainty (section .), bearing in
mind the cautions of Borges’ story. In section . I discuss some more philosophical
topics raised by the foregoing sections. Finally, in section . I look at when
probabilistic prediction is reasonable.
.. Data gathering
Scientists gather a lot of information about the phenomena under study. These
data are uncertain in a number of ways. For example, the data we collect are
finite strings of integers, whereas the quantities we measure can presumably be
arbitrarily precise (..). Our measurement instruments might cause the data
to be inaccurate (..). Or worse, we might not be measuring the quantities we
thought we were (..).
... Truncated data: imprecision
Let’s say we’re measuring temperature at a weather station. The thermometer gives
a reading of, say 13.45 ˝C, but in fact the temperature is more like 13.452934 ˝C.
Our data of the system’s current state is truncated. This is one type of uncertainty.
It is a fairly mild form of uncertainty: the number is right as far as it goes.
One might complain that temperature is a derived concept, and it doesn’t
really make sense once you start trying to measure the temperature on smaller
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and smaller scales. I treat this issue at more length in section ... But even
granting that, our temperature data is still less precise than it could be. There are
meaningful significant figures that are not captured in the reading.
What are the reasons for truncated data? Often, the differences in value are not
important: for most purposes, all of the temperatures that round to 13.45 ˝C are
indistinguishable, so the truncation doesn’t matter. However, if we have reason to
believe the system of interest behaves chaotically, then even these tiny differences
can have an effect. This will be important later. The indistinguishability of
different temperatures that round off to the same number is context relative. If
you’re interested in whether or not to wear a jumper, then all temperatures around
13 ˝C are dealt with the same way. So in this context they are indistinguishable. If
you are interested in the temperature for the purposes of long term predictions of
some quantity that depends nonlinearly on temperature, then the temperatures
might not be indistinguishable in this context.
Second, our measuring devices have only a limited accuracy, so maybe even
where the differences do matter, we might not be able to detect them. Our capacity
to store data is also limited, so even if we could actually make arbitrarily fine
measurements, we wouldn’t be able to store all that data.
Third, the longer the strings of data we collect and feed into our models, the
longer the calculations take. So given our limited computational capabilities, even
if we could collect more fine-grained data, maybe we would truncate it before
feeding it into the computer, in the interests of computational tractability. If
predicting Thursday’s weather takes until Friday, the forecast is useless. There is a
trade-off between precision of the data fed into the model (and the precision of
the model itself) and how long that model takes to run. This is Borges’ argument
again. This also should remind us of this quote from Keynes that bears repeating:
The long run is a misleading guide to current affairs. In the long run
we are all dead. Economists set themselves too easy, too useless a task
if in tempestuous seasons they can only tell us that when the storm is
past the ocean is flat again. Keynes (, p. )
This awkward locution is necessary, since it is effectively unknowable whether some physical
system is mathematically chaotic or not. Indeed, a physical system’s being chaotic isn’t even
well defined: chaos is a property of mathematical equations.
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... Noisy data: inaccuracy
Sometimes our measurements are not perfect. To stick with the weather example,
imagine that the thermometer registered 13.47 ˝C rather than 13.45 ˝C. This isn’t
just a case of truncation: this is an error. This isn’t imprecision: this is inaccuracy.
This is to assume, of course, that there is a fact of the matter about what the value
should have been that is different from what it was. I defer a discussion of the
metaphysical assumptions underlying my project until section ...
There are many reasons why this sort of error might creep in. For example,
the equipment might be faulty, or slightly miscalibrated. The more accurate we
attempt to make our predictions, the more significant figures we try to determine,
the more danger there is that noise – random fluctuations in the system – might
overwhelm the signal. For most purposes these errors will be small. But again, if
we’re worried about non-linear systems, then these small differences can lead to
big differences somewhere down the line.
... Deeper errors
Measuring physical quantities is a tricky business. It is not a straightforward pre-
scientific enterprise that is, somehow, a precursor to scientific enquiry. Working
out how to measure certain quantities is a long, involved process that makes use
of theory and evolves in tandem with it. Chang () charts the fraught history
of thermometry, for instance. This suggests another way our measuring of the
initial conditions can go wrong.
Imagine if we did not know that there is a connection between temperature
and atmospheric pressure. We would not then be controlling for differences in
atmospheric pressure, and this would cause our measurements of temperature to
be faulty. We would falsely attribute changes in measurement reading to changes
in temperature, where actually the change is due to change in pressure. That is,
we would be implicitly making an assumption about our thermometer readings
not being sensitive to air pressure. If this implicit assumption turns out to be
important (and importantly false) then our readings would not be readings of
temperature, but readings of some combination of temperature and pressure. To
put it another way, we wouldn’t be measuring what we thought we were. There is
nothing wrong with the measurement per se, but with our understanding of what
See also Ellis (, Chapter )
If the air pressure where we are measuring doesn’t change, then this assumption – strictly
speaking still false – would not cause misleading results.
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we are getting from the measurement.
Given the indirect way we make a lot of measurements in climate science, this
is a live issue. What exactly studies of ice cores and tree rings show us about
the paleoclimate is a contested issue, so this is another example of where our
measurement techniques are not unequivocal (see Schiermeier ). How one
calibrates size of tree rings with estimates of the temperature at the time that ring
was growing involves theory, and a great deal of knowledge of different areas of
science. For example, if we made faulty assumptions about what constituted good
growing conditions for trees in the past, the size of tree rings wouldn’t be telling
us what we took them to be telling us.
Indeed, we don’t have as many actual measurements of data as we would like.
We mostly only have readings for surface-level land values. We don’t have as good
information about what’s going on out at sea or up in the atmosphere (Parker
, p. ). A technique known as “assimilation” is used to “generate missing
data” using a particular type of climate model (Talagrand ). Errors in these
models will lead to faulty “data” being used. This is another way that gathering
data can be indirect. Note also that in this way, even our data can be subject to
worries about model error (which we shall meet in the next section).
To summarise, even at the level of simple data gathering, we must take the data
with a pinch of salt. That’s not to say that we should be sceptical of all data: there
is certainly much information to be gleaned. The point is merely to stress that we
can’t take an uncritical, naïve view of measurement. Our measurement techniques
might not be measuring what we thought they were. This could be due to some
physical relationship among the quantities that we are not modelling, or perhaps
due to some artefact of the measuring process.
.. Model building
Now that we have gathered our data, what do we do with it? How do we turn our
data into predictions? We will typically have data in the form of time series. A
time series is a series of measurements of a quantity (for example temperature)
indexed by when the measurement was taken. We will have time series of several
quantities – temperature, pressure, precipitation, wind speed – from a variety
of locations. This gives us a rough summary of the climactic conditions at those
Other kinds of data aren’t all that different. I focus on time series since talking about “evolution
in time” is easy and intuitive.
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times, in those locations.
Using a variety of statistical tools – regression analysis, radial basis functions,
autocorrelation functions and so on – we can explore how these variables change
in time, and in response to changes in each other. We can also use our knowledge
of the basic physics to inform how we think the relationships among the variables
should behave. For example, using the Navier-Stokes equation, the basic equation
of fluid mechanics, we can guess at how wind speed in adjacent cells – in nearby
locations – should evolve in response to each other over time. Lloyd () claims
that this sort of support from basic science gives us confidence in our models. I
return to this point later.
There are a variety of simplifying assumptions that need to be made here, and
none of the techniques used is infallible, so the model building process adds its
own sources of error. I outline these sources of error now. I will first list the
sources of error, then in section . discuss how we deal with these errors.
What I should make clear before beginning is that I am interested in systems
that will often be chaotic or non-linear. This means that even small errors can
quickly becoming worrisome. For a more detailed discussion of the particular
issues with nonlinear dynamics and predictability, see Smith (, ); Smith
(). The upshot of a focus on these kinds of models is that even errors that are
very small can have important consequences.
As Figure . shows, the climate system is tremendously complex. In philosoph-
ical discussions of modelling, it is common to consider simple models of simple
systems, like a mass on a spring, or a point mass in orbit around another in an
otherwise empty space. It is important to stress that these models are extremely
simple. There doesn’t seem to be any need to wonder about the process of building
the model: it’s obvious that it should represent the target system in the relevant
ways. In the case of the climate system, finding the appropriate model is hard
work.
That said, our understanding of the Navier-Stokes equation is not perfect: indeed, we can’t even
be assured of the existence and uniqueness of solutions (Fefferman n.d.)
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Figure ..: The climate system is tremendously complex
... A toy example
To make the discussion more vivid, consider the following toy example. La-
place’s demon is trying to predict the evolution of the fish population in my pond.
That is, evolution in the sense of “change in population through time”; not as in
“evolution by natural selection”. He has observed the past evolution of the system
and has arrived at a model of the system. He knows that the population density of
fish in my pond in a week’s time Nt`1 depends on the current population density
Nt. These numbers are normalised such that the absolute maximum population of
fish possible is given by 1. He also knows that the future population is adversely
affected by how crowded the pond is (captured by the 1´Nt factor). The fish
population dynamics are given by:
Nt`1 “ 4Ntp1´Ntq (Log)
This is the famous “logistic map”, probably the simplest dynamics that produce
chaotic behaviour. May () discusses this model in detail. Figure . shows
how nearby initial conditions diverge radically after a few time steps. This is a
figure of  initial conditions very close together. The solid line represents the
“actual” evolution of the fish population, while the dotted lines represent what the
The example discussed here is due to Lenny Smith and Reason Machete. The “fish population”
gloss was suggested by Roman Frigg. The model is discussed in more detail in Frigg et al.
(b).
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Figure ..: Diverging time series. The blue line is the “actual” initial conditions.
The eight dotted lines are nearby initial conditions.
model would predict had you got the initial condition slightly wrong in one of 
distinct ways. As you can see, after about  timesteps, you could be very wrong
indeed. This is a characteristic feature of chaotic systems: sensitive dependence on
initial conditions. While there is some controversy on exactly how to define what
chaos is (Werndl ), for my purposes, this won’t be important. Many parts of
the climate system exhibit this kind of chaotic behaviour. There are many ways
in which the logistic map is not a good toy model of the climate, obviously, but
they do seem to share this feature that they exhibit sensitive dependence on initial
conditions. This sensitive dependence means that sources of very small errors
cannot be discounted. This means all the sources of error must be considered and
discussed.
... Curve fitting
Let’s start with an easy problem. We have a one-dimensional time series of data.
These might represent daily temperature readings from a particular weather
station, or volume of internet traffic through a particular router, or cases of a
disease at a particular hospital, or weekly estimates of the population of fish in
my garden pond. The question is: given the data, what kind of process could
generate that time series? What sort of equation describes the dynamics of how
I have generated a time series of the word count for my thesis for example. The trend is broadly
upwards, but all too slowly!
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the system evolves?
For any finite data set, any number of different graphs pass through all the
points. This is a well known problem with fitting curves to data. If there are n
data points, then there is a polynomial of degree n´ 1 that will go through all of
these points exactly. And in fact, there are infinitely many polynomials of higher
degree that go through each of these points. On what grounds can you say that
the process generating the data is represented by this rather than that function?
Choosing on the grounds of simplicity might be (at least pragmatically) appeal-
ing, but there are problems. First, what counts as a simple equation? For example,
consider the following equation:
α sinpβxq (Fit)
For any finite data set, there are values of α and β such that the graph of (Fit)
passes arbitrarily close to all the points. This equation is, arguably extremely
simple: it has only two parameters. On another measure, however, it’s a rather
complicated equation, since the graphs it gives rise to are normally “unnecessarily
wiggly” given the amount of data it needs to fit. That is, one feels like the curve
should bend only if it is bending towards a data point it would otherwise miss. A
second worry is the following: what guarantee do we have that simplicity is an
indicator of truth of a functional relationship? This is a very general worry about
science: how do we know that our theory is getting things right about the world?
... Structure error
The standard practice when trying to fit a curve to some data is to start with a
parametrised family of functions. We can then work out which member of this
family most closely fits the data: we can work out which parameters fit the data
best. But who’s to know that that first step – picking a family of functions – is
valid? What assumptions can underwrite that sort of choice? Sometimes we have
basic physics evidence that suggests the functional form is, say linear. But other
times, we don’t have this kind of information. When considering the climate
system, for example, there are any number of feedbacks all of them interacting
with each other; so we don’t really know what model structure is appropriate.
What interpretation can we give to this process? Fitting a curve from a family
of functions would make sense if we knew that that data had been generated by
The only case where this is not possible is if two points took the same x value, which is impossible
in a time series.
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some process that shares that functional form. That is, if we knew that data were
generated by some function in that parametrised family, then this would be the
obvious way to approach that problem. But it is almost never the case that we are
justified in making that kind of assumption. So what does the choice of family
mean? What justifies it?
This sort of worry about structure error arises from trying to solve the above
uncertainty (..). I discuss this concern at more length once I have outlined
what strategies are employed to overcome those worries.
... Missing physics
There are processes in the climate that we know we aren’t modelling. We have
improved greatly (for example, see Figure .) but there are still many aspects of
the climate system left out of our models. In the early s, we weren’t modelling
ocean currents: convection in the ocean wasn’t in the model. So we in fact don’t
want our models to fit too closely to the data, because they aren’t modelling all
the things that are going on in the world.
There are still processes that aren’t making it into our models. Some of these
processes will have a negligible effect on the climate, but we can’t be sure which.
Given the nonlinear character of our models, tiny differences due to apparently
negligible processes could cause the models to differ significantly from the target
system on the sort of timescales we are interested in. Here is a cautionary episode
from recent climate science that illustrates this point. At the time of the last IPCC
report (Solomon et al. ), there was broad agreement among models that there
is a poleward shift in storm tracks for extratropical cyclones in both hemispheres
(Section ...). However adding more model resolution to the upper atmosphere
led to the model predicting an equatorward shift instead (Scaife et al. ). Until
recently, scientists had expected the stratosphere and the mesosphere to have little
impact on the climate dynamics of the troposphere: there simply isn’t enough
mass of air up there to have much of an effect down here (or so they thought!).
This story illustrates that elements of reality that don’t make it into the model –
even if you expect them to be insignificant – can have an important impact on the
model predictions.
Thanks to Erica Thompson for pointing me to this story.
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Figure ..: How climate models have improved
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... Overfitting
As well as structure error, we can be uncertain of the parameters we fix. If there
is noise or inaccuracy in the data, then there is a danger of “overfitting”. Using
Lagrange interpolation to find the polynomial of degree n´ 1 that fits your n
points exactly is obviously a crazy idea if you know that some of those points are
inaccurate! All that you could be doing here is “fitting the noise” which clearly
leads to a functional relationship that has very little relation to the underlying
process. This is discussed in Hitchcock and Sober (). In their own words:
The data D are bound to contain a certain amount of noise in addi-
tion to the information they carry about the underlying relationship
between [the variables]. By constructing a relatively complex curve
that exactly fits [all the data, the scientist] is bound to overfit the data.
That is, she is bound to propose a theory which is too sensitive to
idiosyncrasies in the data set D that are unlikely to recur in further
samples drawn from the same underlying distribution.
Hitchcock and Sober (, p. )
So the question that needs to be asked whenever there is a choice between a
complex, better fitted model and a simpler model with less good fit, is: does the
extra model complexity really afford an increase in predictive accuracy, rather
than just an increase in capacity to accommodate past data? This is the question
implicit in the Borges story. One might want to split this question up into two
parts. Is the complex model better at interpolating unseen data?; is the complex
model better at extrapolating? The first of these asks is the complex model better
at predicting where unseen data points will fall in the time series interval covered
by the training data? The second asks is the complex model better at predicting
where data outside the time frame of the training set will fall? What is the value
added of the more complex model? Answering this question depends on how good
the models are at prediction, but we don’t really have that information for climate
modelling. Or rather, we can test how well the model does at interpolation, but
we are really more interested in extrapolation: prediction of future data.
This is a problem that worries climate scientists. Obviously, they want to build
the best models they can: they want to build models based on the best, richest
data available. They want the models to fit the data: if the models didn’t fit the
data, they wouldn’t be very good models! But this data will inevitably contain
noise. So how do they avoid the problem of overfitting? I defer answering this
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question until section ...
... Discretisation
Another issue is that most of the parameters and quantities we are interested in
in atmospheric science are more or less continuous. However, the data we have
are discrete: hourly values of particular measurements at particular locations, for
example. Quantities of interest vary continuously in time and space. We only have
particular measurements from particular places. The computer implementations
of our simulations are also discrete: computers are finite state machines, they can’t
really “do” continuity. So we have spatial and temporal discretisation problems.
This problem leads to “rounding errors”. Normally, these aren’t all that prob-
lematic, but for iterated procedures, chaotic dynamics and the like, these small
errors can compound themselves and quickly become serious.
This raises issues about how to go about accurately representing the continuous
system discretely, and how to evolve a discrete system so as to track the evolution
of the continuous target system.
In fact, there is a deeper problem here. Continuous and discrete systems of
roughly the same dynamics can have very different overall properties. The
logistic map (which I discussed in section ..) is chaotic, but the logistic equation,
the “continuous version” is non-chaotic, and in fact fairly tame. This “continuous
version” is given by the differential equation ddtxptq “ 4xptqp1´xptqq. The similarity
should be clear. Figure . demonstrates the quite different behaviour of the
logistic equation – sometimes called the logistic function – as compared to the
discrete logistic map discussed earlier.
Indeed, this must be the case, since one dimensional continuous flow cannot
be “chaotic” in any sense, and the logistic equation is one-dimensional. This is
a consequence of the Poincaré–Bendixon theorem (Smith , p. ). Discrete
dynamics, however, can exhibit chaos in one dimension, as the logistic map
demonstrates.
... Model resolution
There is some minimum resolution to the simulation: the world is split into grid
squares 100 km on a side, say. See Figure . for a taste of what Europe looks like
“More or less” because of the concerns about temperature and the like being derived quantities
built up out of discrete entities, but see section ..
Thanks to Charlotte Werndl for pointing me to this issue.
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Figure ..: Graphs of the logistic equation: all initial conditions tend to 1.
at this resolution. Processes that happen at smaller scales aren’t in the model.
For example, clouds are an important factor in climate models. However, typical
climate models will have too low a resolution to “resolve” clouds properly, so the
effects of clouds have to be put in “by hand”. How this is done will be discussed
later. Discretisation and model resolution are obviously linked. A particular
discretisation method brings with it a particular scale, a particular resolution.
... Implementation
Computer programs – which is what simulations are, after all – will inevitably
contain bugs. Typical General Circulation Models (GCM) run to hundreds of
thousands of lines of code. It would be surprising if there were no mistakes at all
in all that code. For example, perhaps a particular function takes “temperature”
as a variable, but it wants a relative temperature. If it’s used in some module
where it is fed an absolute temperature, then this will lead to problems. That
is, there are two equally valid ways one might write a function to work out the
temperature of a cell at time t2 given various details of t1. One approach would
have the function output the temperature at time t2 (an absolute temperature); the
other approach would have the function output the temperature change between
t1 and t2 (a relative temperature change). Each is perfectly valid, but it should
be obvious that things will go seriously wrong if some process were expecting to
receive an absolute temperature and got a relative one or vice versa. The process
would just receive a number, and would manipulate it as normal, but the mistake
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Figure ..: Europe as viewed by the models in IPCC AR ()
would propagate through subsequent processes and invalidate the results.
At an even lower level, hardware can be faulty or buggy (Muldoon ). For
example, the Pentium FDIV floating point unit bug caused some calculations to
go wrong by as much as  parts in a million. Hardly a big deal in general, but if
you are dealing with potentially chaotic systems, these things can cause noticeable
errors (after a few iterations). Recall Figure .: nearby initial conditions diverge.
Different chip architectures implement arithmetic differently, so running the
exact same program on different chips can lead to different results, even without
hardware faults. Even different compilers, compiling the same code on the same
chipset can lead to differences in output. So this is an extra source of problems.
On the other hand, computers are finite state machines. They can’t really
“do” chaos, since there is a limit to the accuracy with which they can represent
numerical values. As Smith () points out, if you run a computer simulation
of a chaotic system for long enough, it will settle into a cycle. This is related to the
inability of digital computers to properly represent continuity.
Lenny Smith in conversation
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.. Coping with uncertainty
This has so far seemed to be a fairly negative discussion. However in this section,
I want to outline why things aren’t as bad as they might be. I want to highlight
some ways we have of maintaining confidence in our models in spite of all the
above sources of error.
Before starting I want to point out that these ways of maintaining confidence
come in two varieties. One variety are the methodological ways of maintaining
confidence. These are methods we can use to cope with uncertainty. For example,
derivation from theory (section ..) and ensemble forecasting (section ..) are
such methods.
The other category is harder to name. These aren’t methods we can follow, but
rather, aspects of the output that give us confidence. Robustness (section ..)
and past success (section ..) are of this sort. These properties of output aren’t
really things we can aim for, but they are things that warrant confidence if they
turn out to hold.
... Make better measurements!
An obvious response to at least some of the issues raised above is that we need
to make better measurements. This is a reasonable point and there are certainly
cases where better measurements could help, but it certainly won’t solve all
our problems. While better measurements might mitigate against some of the
problems, it won’t really solve any of them. Better measurements would give us
more significant figures in our data, but wouldn’t really stop it being the case that
the data are truncated.
While mitigation of error is obviously still a good thing – and it’s normally all
we can do – I want to point out that it doesn’t solve the problems. For practical
purposes, good mitigation is as good as solving the problem. How good the
mitigation has to be depends on the practical purpose in question. How many
significant figures are needed such that the remaining error in initial conditions
doesn’t lead to an unacceptable level of error in the output depends on what
counts as “acceptable” error in the output. Parker () discusses the notion of
“adequacy for purpose”. The point is that it is important to be clear what you want
out of your model, since this affects what you can put in it and still be confident
of the results.
There’s a question of whether better measurements are a cost-effective way of
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increasing adequacy. For example, we could put thousands and thousands of
buoys in the seas to get more detailed readings of temperature and so on across
the ocean. Would this extra data (gathered at considerable cost) lead to better
models? Would other uses of that money have led to even better models?
The idea of making better measurements relates to Karl Popper’s idea of “ac-
countable” predictions (Popper ). John Earman discusses “Popper’s demon” as
a weakening of Laplace’s demon who is limited to only use finitely precise initial
conditions (Earman ). This demon can, however, calculate how accurate its
predictions are given the initial data. The idea is, for any given desired precision
of output, the demon knows how accurate its initial conditions would need to be.
So, given the model the demon has, it knows how quickly nearby initial conditions
diverge. From this, it can work out how accurate its initial data have to be in
order for the predictions to be adequately precise. Given the complexity of climate
models, even this ideal is unachievable for us mere mortals. That is, in order for
the trajectories to have not spread out too much yet we would need data orders of
magnitude better than our current data. And of course, model error – which we
shall discuss later – undermines the adequacy of the prediction even if we could
collect that data. This idea is related to those discussed in section ...
It’s important to be clear that for our purposes, we can be confident that making
better and better measurements would be uneconomical, even if it were possible.
Other sources of confidence in model output must be sought.
... Derivation from theory
One thing that helps with confidence is to know that our models and our parametri-
sations have a sound basis in basic physics. This is something Lloyd () men-
tions as a source of “confirmation” for climate models. If a model bases its heat
transport processes on basic thermal physics principles, then that is good reason
to think it will predict well. It’s clearly not sufficient to guarantee good predictions
that a model be based on theory, but it is a good start!
Here is an example of how a simple model of the climate can be derived from
some basic physics. McGuffie and Henderson-Sellers (, p.  ff) derive a
simple 0-dimensional “energy balance model” (EBM) from basic physics with the
Actually working out the precision of the data required is a non-trivial task, computationally
speaking. But we are operating on a conceptual level, so we won’t worry about this.
It seems Lloyd is using “confirmation” in a non-standard way: to mean something like “giving
us confidence”.
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Figure ..: Basic energy balance of the Earth
help of some geometry. The basic processes involved in these simple models are
summarised in Figure ..
Imagine a lump of matter subjected to a constant source of heat energy. If the
lump did not emit any energy, its heat must increase without bound. Now imagine
that the lump – which we will call a planet – emits radiation (loses energy) at a rate
that increases with temperature. The temperature of the planet will increase until
the outgoing radiation balances with the incoming radiation (Houghton ;
Pierrehumbert ).
From thermodynamics we know that on average, the energy input and the
energy output of the Earth must balance. The Sun provides effectively the only
external source of energy. How much sunlight the Earth’s surface reflects (its
albedo) will be an important factor in this process, as will how much of the energy
radiated from the Earth gets through the atmosphere. The “solar constant” S is a
measure of the amount of energy per unit area that the Sun provides. The amount
of energy received by the Earth is piR2S where R is the radius of the earth. That
is, the energy received is the energy per unit area provided by the Sun times the
area of the Earth “visible” to the sun at a time. This will be a circle of radius R.
A certain amount of this energy is reflected back by the surface and atmosphere.
In reality, given the uptake of heat by the deep ocean and similar processes, there is a gen-
uine question about whether this claim is true for any given timescale (Dave Stainforth in
conversation). This is, however, the basic assumption that underlies this derivation.
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The albedo (α) is a measure of the fraction of energy reflected back in this manner.
So the energy absorbed by the Earth is:
p1´αqpiR2S (.)
Imagine a “black body” that absorbs all incident radiation and whose only outlet
for energy is emission of radiation. The spectrum of wavelengths and amount of
radiation emitted depends only on the heat of the body. The Stefan–Boltzmann
law states that the energy emitted per unit area is proportional to T 4, where T is
the temperature of the body. The Earth emits heat over its whole surface of 4piR2.
So we can calculate the energy emitted by the Earth’s surface per unit time to be:
4piR2σT 4 (.)
Where σ is the Stefan-Boltzmann constant and T is the temperature of the Earth.
The energy input and output must balance. Putting these terms equal to each
other and cancelling some terms we get:
p1´αqS{4“ σT 4 (Temp)
Using S « 1370W m´2 and α « 0.3 and solving for T gives you a value of about
255 K which is about ´18 ˝C. If there were no atmosphere, this temperature –
the effective temperature – would be the surface temperature. This “effective
temperature” in fact differs from the surface temperature due to the effect of
greenhouse gases (GHGs), which act to insulate the surface.
The surface temperature and the effective temperature will differ depending on
how efficiently the atmosphere absorbs the radiation emitted from the Earth. From
(Temp) and an estimate of this efficiency, we can calculate what the temperature of
the Earth is, and how it would change if the atmosphere changes.
Greenhouse gases act like a “one way mirror” for radiation: they let in solar ra-
diation (mostly UV and visible spectrum wave lengths) but they absorb and reflect
some of the outgoing radiation from the Earth (mostly infrared spectrum). That
energy is absorbed back into the Earth and thus drives up the surface temperature.
The surface temperature and the effective temperature will differ depending on
how efficiently the atmosphere absorbs and reflects the radiation emitted from
the Earth. This “greenhouse increment” – the effect on surface temperature due to
energy absorption by the atmosphere – is about 33 K at present. Plugging these
numbers in gives us a surface temperature of 288 K, or almost 15 ˝C. Increasing
GHGs in the atmosphere will increase the amount of radiation absorbed and thus
will increase the surface temperature.
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From some well confirmed physics we have derived a simple model of the
climate system. More complex models require more work, but the same general
pattern can be seen in them as well. The next stage would be to build a 1-
dimensional climate model that captures the fact that more solar radiation falls
on the equator than falls on the poles. We would then need to model how heat
flows from hotter regions to colder regions. This model-building process would
be informed by the well-understood basic physics of heat transfer (McGuffie and
Henderson-Sellers , pp. –).
Knowing that the model we have built rests on these physical theories gives
support to the model. The model could still be wrong: some of the abstractions,
idealisations or approximations might be inapplicable given our purposes. But
on the whole, at a suitable level of abstraction we can take confidence from this
model building process. Note that this source of confidence relies on taking
the basic physics for granted. If we were being so sceptical as to question the
fundamental theories we appealed to, then no such confidence would accrue from
this procedure. Or rather, only conditional confidence would accrue: if the basic
physics is correct then the model is on solid foundations.
... Interval predictions
Returning to our fish population model; if the demon knows the exact initial
conditions – current population – he can predict the future population of fish with
perfect accuracy. But consider a different level of description. The demon is now
trying to predict the future population based, not on an exact initial condition,
but on some set of initial conditions, some “patch” of the initial state space. This
might correspond to some measurement of initial conditions with finite precision
(truncated data). In the logistic map example this would be making predictions
given some small interval of initial conditions. Recall Popper’s demon.
Obviously the demon cannot give pinpoint predictions for this sort of initial
condition, since different initial points in the initial condition patch end up at
different places once subjected to the dynamics. The demon can, however tell you
exactly what the patch of the final phase space is that houses all and only those
initial conditions that started in that initial patch.
The problem with this “patch prediction” is that for something like the logistic
map, it quickly becomes uninformative (see Figure .). Because of the chaotic
Recall this demon has unlimited computational capacity: it can complete the supertask of
putting every point in the uncountable set through the dynamics
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nature of the logistic map, the initial error grows rather quickly, so after a few
iterations the interval you predict is rather big, and it soon covers the whole
interval. This is obviously not a very helpful prediction. But it is interesting
as a measure of the predictability. That is, if the interval blows up quickly, this
indicates that the system is hard to predict. This relates to the discussion of
accountability above. For more on accountability and its relation to interval
forecasting and ensemble forecasting see Smith ().
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Figure ..: Graph of interval predictions. The interval covered at each lead time
(after each number of iterations).
Patch prediction can help against imprecision (section ..) but not much else.
This “exploring the uncertainty” is an important idea in climate science. While
not directly useful in improving the precision of our predictions, this is a good
way of learning about our models. We learn what interactions lead to big changes
by seeing which small differences in parameters have big effects.
This is all taking place at a fairly abstract level. How the comments in this
section (and those following it) relate to actual practice is complicated. But my
claim is that something roughly like these procedures underlies the (much more
complex) practices of working scientists. What scientists actually do will be far
more sophisticated (and in some ways more constricted), but the basic idea of
exploring the uncertainty through ensembles is the same.
Strictly speaking it will become dense over the whole interval.
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... Ensemble forecasting
Say instead of a patch of initial conditions, we give the demon some probability
distribution over the possible initial conditions. For example, a “noise distribution”
peaked around an observed value. The demon could evolve this distribution
through the dynamics and tell you what the distribution of final conditions looks
like. Now, what if the demon weren’t quite vast enough to submit all these data to
analysis? There are, after all, uncountably many initial conditions in any patch or
distribution, to subject to the dynamics. And each initial condition is of infinite
precision. So that’s an awful lot of computation to do. So, how would a demon
of unreasonably large, but still finite computational resources fare? What the
demon might do is sample from the noise distribution, say  initial conditions
of finite precision. That is, he would take his measured initial conditions, and take
some probability distribution centred on the measured values. This distribution
accounts for his understanding that the measured initial conditions could be
slightly wrong. He then samples from this distribution to give him his ensemble
of initial conditions. He could then subject each of these initial conditions to
the dynamics, and take the distribution of model outcomes as representing the
distribution of possible system outcomes. What the demon does is pick out a
set of possible initial conditions – sets of possible values for current temperature,
precipitation, wind speed and so on – and put each of these possible descriptions
of the current climate through the model dynamics. The demon can then explore
what future evolutions of the system are possible in the model. Figure . shows
an example of an ensemble forecast of the logistic map at various lead times. As
you can see, the error spreads out fairly quickly.
Why is ensemble forecasting better than “best-guess” forecasting? Before en-
sembles, the standard practice in weather modelling was to take the best available
data and the best available model and to run one simulation in as much detail
as possible. Now, we sample from a noise distribution and run each ensemble
member through some model. If there are  ensemble members, then this
takes  times as much computing time as one model run, so we need to use a
simpler model than if we just had the one member. So how does this lead to better
outcomes? What is the value added by the more complex ensembles approach?
A common practice is to take some ensemble of initial conditions and adopt a uniform prior
probability over them. This is more or less the same as the sort of procedure I have been
describing.
These graphs are generated by the same data as the previous figure.































































































































Figure ..: An ensemble of outputs at various lead times for the fish popula-
tion. The distribution of ensemble outputs after various numbers of
iterations.
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The problem with “best-guess” forecasting is that initial conditions very close to
the best guess end up looking very different (recall Figure .). Loosely speaking,
the weather exhibits some kind of chaotic behaviour: sensitive dependence on
initial conditions. So the ensemble method shows you what possibilities there are.
Smith () discusses how ensemble forecasting predicted a serious storm that
hit England in  which would have been missed by best-guess forecasting (see
pp. –,–).
The “patch prediction” I discussed above also has this feature of highlighting
the space of possible evolutions, but ensemble forecasting goes beyond this in
“quantifying the uncertainty” by means of the output ensemble. In this way,
ensembles can help quantify our knowledge of noise, and so it can deal with
inaccuracy (section ..), as well as imprecision.
One can make an ensemble of initial conditions but it is also possible to sample
from a distribution on a parameter value: this “uncertainty distribution” accounts
for possible errors in parameter values in the same way the noise distribution
does for initial conditions. In this way ensemble modelling can help to deal with
some worries about model error, as well as initial condition uncertainty. However,
we are still working within a parametrised family of functions so similar worries
apply as have been already voiced in section ... What guarantees do we have
that we are getting the model structure right? Initial Condition Ensembles – ICEs –
and Perturbed Physics Ensembles – PPEs – are often used together to try to sample
as much of the uncertainty of the model structure as possible. We can take the
brute statistics of the ensemble members, or we can use sophisticated methods of
weighting the ensemble members by how good they are (Tebaldi and Knutti ).
One method is to score models on how well the can predict twentieth century
climate. This folds in aspects of the next method I will discuss. ICEs and PPEs
are joined by a third kind of ensemble: Multi Model Ensembles – MMEs – are
formed by taking the outputs of several different research groups, using different
model structures, and looking at the statistics of these grand ensembles. This
does something to mitigate the worries about being tied to a particular model
structure, but not much. There are only a handful of groups running large scale
genuinely distinct GCMs. So we are not really properly sampling the space of
possible models. Indeed, models share structure and code, so even the small
sample we have isn’t really a good sample (Tebaldi and Knutti , pp.–).
It is an “ensemble of opportunity”.
PPEs and ICEs investigate uncertainty about numerical values, while
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MMEs investigate uncertainty about model structure. For the former,
it is relatively straightforward to conceptualize, and then sample sys-
tematically within, the space of plausible alternatives; for the latter it
is not. Parker (b, p. )
Even when we are sampling a parameter value, there is a worry that accidental
features of the set-up may lead to bias. Different ways of describing what is ulti-
mately the same parametrisation can lead to a uniform sampling of this quantity
being different. Stainforth et al. (a, p. ) give the example of “ice residence
time in clouds” versus “ice fall rate in clouds”. These are not linearly related so
uniformly sampling one leads to a non-uniform sampling of the other. This is
a nice real-world case of language relativity. They are obviously describing the
same physical thing, but the choice of one over the other leads to differences in
sampling.
Given that ensembles don’t deal with all the kinds of error, it is a mistake to take
ensemble distributions as being probabilities of events in the world. But there is
certainly decision-relevant information to be gleaned from these ensembles, and
more information than just the possible spread of outcomes; but probably less
information than a full probability distribution function over possible outcomes.
How much information, and exactly what information there is in ensemble outputs
is a question still under discussion (Frigg et al. a,b; Parker a,b; Stainforth
et al. a; Tebaldi and Knutti ).
The frequency distributions across the ensemble of models may be
valuable information for model development, but there is no reason
to expect these distributions to relate to the probability of real-world
behaviour. One might. . . argue for such a relation if the models were
empirically adequate, but given nonlinear models with large systematic
errors under current conditions, no connection has been even remotely
established for relating the distribution of model states under altered
conditions to decision-relevant probability distributions.
Stainforth et al. (a, p. )
Questions remain about what interpretation can be given to this ensemble.
The world has some particular initial condition, and there is some determinate
outcome that will happen, so what sort of probability is the ensemble distribution?
This is not a new problem: a similar issue has been extensively discussed in
philosophical literature about statistical mechanics (Frigg a; Uffink ).
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There are however differences between interpreting statistical mechanical prob-
abilities and climate projection probabilities. It is standard to interpret ensembles
of simulation outputs as probabilistic evidence. That is, we interpret the ensemble
of outputs as giving us information about the probability distribution function
(PDF) of possible future events in the target system. Recall that the ensemble is
discrete, while the PDF in the target system is presumably continuous. So do we
treat the output ensemble “as if” it is a representative sample from the system
PDF and infer things about the system PDF from it? Since the model PDF doesn’t
account for all the sources of error we have discussed, this seems unwarranted:
how do we know that model distribution is not importantly different from the
“system distribution”? It seems a more subtle approach to model output is needed.
Stainforth et al. (a) criticise ensemble PDFs for not being adequate for de-
cision support. Frigg et al. (a,b) demonstrate how such an approach can go
wrong.
... Training and evaluation
As we’ve already seen (in section ..), some processes that happen at scales
smaller than the grid scale are important. How are they dealt with? Let’s take
the example of clouds. Clouds affect the albedo of the Earth. Clouds also have
an insulating effect like greenhouse gases do. These two effects act against one
another: increasing albedo cools the earth below the cloud layer, insulation warms
it. Which of these factors wins out – the direction of the net effect – depends on
a number of factors related to the make-up of the cloud. The intensity of these
effects differs for different kinds of cloud.
Clouds can’t be put directly into the model, because they are smaller than the
size of the grid square. So we have to add correcting factors to the albedo and
insulation parameters for the square. The exact values of these parameters will
depend on other variables that affect clouds – e.g. humidity, temperature – and
will vary as these vary.
We aren’t really simulating clouds, merely simulating their effects. We aren’t
calculating what particular values of humidity and so on will generate what shape
clouds, but rather directly what effects these clouds would have on albedo and the
like.
How do we work out what values these parameters should have? Derivation
from theory is more or less impossible, since these aren’t parameters that appear
. Scientific uncertainty 
in basic physics theories. We do this by “training” the model on some data. So
for example we see what values the parameters should have in order to correctly
predict climate data from  to . We then test these parameter values
by seeing whether the model can successfully predict climate data from 
to . If this is successful, that gives us confidence that the parameter values
are successfully compensating for the unsimulated cloud effects. This kind of
statistical inference is a fairly widespread practice. Hitchcock and Sober ()
discuss why it is a good practice: in short, it is a good balance between having the
model fit the data and avoiding overfitting.
This helps us mitigate against worries about curve fitting (section ..) and
overfitting (section ..). And to some extent, training gives us confidence that
we’ve avoided structure error (section ..). That is, if the model predicts “unseen”
observations, then that seems to suggest it is getting something right about the
structure of the world.
There is something strange about this process, however. We take some parametrised
family of models and we use a statistical technique to find a model with good fit.
The statistical technique is “blind” to the physical interpretation of the model.
That is, we’re trying to parametrise clouds, but the statistical technique doesn’t
“care” about whether the parameter value it spits out is at all physically meaningful.
One would have thought that a reasoned process that took account of the physical
meaning of the parameters (and their interaction) would easily outperform such
blind fitting. So how do we get predictive models out of this process? And what
does this mean for our attitude to the models? Can we interpret the parameter
value as telling us something about the world?
As Hitchcock and Sober point out, the motivation for the training and evaluation
methodology is “purely instrumental in character.” They continue: “Even if we
know that the true curve is a polynomial of degree r, it may well be that the curve
of degree r that best fits the noisy data one has at hand will fare worse in future
predictions than a curve of lower degree.” (Hitchcock and Sober , p. ).
Petersen () criticises this blind statistical procedure, calling it “bad empiri-
cism”, in contrast to “good empiricism” which involves having your parametrisa-
tions be informed by basic science. Petersen wants us to derive our “cloudiness”
parameter from out understanding of the basic physics of cloud dynamics. This is
That said, we can get some information about the possible form they might take from theory.
The actual practice is significantly more complicated than this, but the basic idea is the same: fit
parameters with some data, validate it on other data.
Katie Steele pointed out how odd this process is.
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an admirable aim, but is it a practicable one?
One might argue that Petersen is right that in the limit, we should try and
have all parts of our model be physically motivated. But we need projections of
the future evolution of the climate today so we had better make them with our
current best physics. Our current best knowledge doesn’t include a capacity to
have physically meaningful parametrisations for all processes we need to model,
so if we want to model those processes, we had better be bad empiricists. Bad
empiricism is better than no empiricism. Is failing to model a particular process
better than modelling it in an ad hoc way? Covey () thinks not and I agree.
If the choice is between not modelling clouds (implicitly assuming they have no
overall effect on the climate) and modelling clouds in an ad hoc “bad empiricist”
way, then bad empiricism seems the better choice. But is this a false dichotomy?
Would it be better to somehow learn to live with only getting the kinds of predic-
tions we can justifiably secure with good empiricism alone? Going down this line
of reasoning might leave us with rather few predictions. This “theoretical limit”
would involve resolving clouds and all other currently parametrised processes,
and looks rather like if we were to follow this line to its end, we would be falling
into the trap that Borges outlined. So it’s not even clear that bad empiricism is
bad in the limit. That said, there is certainly something to the intuition that the
more we derive from well confirmed physical theories, the better we will do. So it
seems that “avoid ad hoc parametrisations” does serve as some sort of regulative
ideal. As Parker () discusses, there is a commitment to model the physical
processes in “the right way” as much as possible. Ad hoc fudges that just “save
the phenomena” are a last resort: physically meaningful, realistic solutions are
much preferred. So it seems there is a sense in which we do take ourselves to be
trying to “get at” the equations Nature uses.
What about the worries I raised earlier about simplicity being no guide to the
truth of a functional relationship? In fact, Akaike () shows that a measure
of predictive accuracy explicitly includes a “simplicity measure” in terms of the
number of adjustable parameters. Akaike defines a measure of predictive accuracy
that can be broken down into two components: one that measures the function’s
success so far (how close it is to fitting the training data); and another component
that is effectively the number of free parameters (a crude measure of simplicity).
Hitchcock and Sober (, section ) discuss this surprising result in the context
of model-building.
See also Sober ().
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There is a worry that future climate data won’t be like past climate data in the
way we would want it to be for this source of confidence to work. We are training
models on their ability to model the climate when GHG levels are at or below
current levels. GHG concentrations are rising, so the future climate system will
be unlike the past in having these higher levels of these gases.
Statements about future climate relate to a never before experienced
state of the system; thus, it is impossible to either calibrate the model
for the forecast regime of interest or confirm the usefulness of the
forecasting process. Stainforth et al. (a, p. )
This goes some way to undermining the use of training and validation. There is
still some confidence to be gleaned from these procedures since we might think
that models that do well at predicting past data will also be better at predicting
future data, just as long as the difference in GHG concentrations isn’t too large.
Another use that past data is put to is it is used to weight the different ensemble
members when producing ensemble statistics. That is, the predictions of those
models that better predict past data count for more in generating a PDF based on
the ensemble. For the reasons just discussed, ability to predict the past needn’t
entail ability to predict the future.
A further worry is that different parameter settings can be equally good.
[M]ultiple locations in parameter space can be identified which yield
simulations of present climate of comparable quality to the stan-
dard. . . while predicting a range of transient climate responses.
Murphy et al. (, p. )
If we take successful prediction to be confidence-warranting because it suggests
we have got something right about the parameter values, then this underdetermi-
nation is worrisome. If different settings of the parameters can lead to equally
good prediction, then which parameter setting truly reflects the physical target
system? Different errors may cancel out (Oreskes, Shrader-Frechette, and Belitz
). The next section turns this worry on its head and suggests that it may in
fact be a good thing.
... Robustness
We don’t just have the one model: different research groups have different models,
built using different data sets and techniques, for different purposes, at different
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resolutions, incorporating different mechanisms. Agreement between these dis-
parate models is an important source of confidence in their predictions (Lloyd
; Parker , ). Even a single model can exhibit a kind of robustness if
the same predictions come up for different settings of the parameters.
My usage of the word robustness is fairly broad and covers concepts that others
might want to distinguish: for example agreement among models and insensitivity
to changes in parameter values. I believe there is enough in common between
these various concepts that they can be discussed together, and I choose to use
the word “robustness” to refer to them. In short, I allow “robustness” to refer to
agreement across ICEs, PPEs and MMEs.
Let’s first consider parameter robustness. This might also be called “insensi-
tivity”. The idea is that if some particular prediction is insensitive to the value
of a particular parameter, then this prediction is robust in this sense. There are
some caveats to this characterisation of parameter robustness. If a result is robust
across the range r7,10s for some parameter x, and we believe the actual value
of x to be near 1, then this robustness is not confidence-warranting. This might
seem like a trivial point, but it’s not one I’ve seen discussed anywhere. Or again,
even if we have a robust prediction for parameter values p1,5s but pathologically
weird behaviour below that, then we still don’t have that much confidence in the
prediction.
The idea is that robustness is confidence-warranting if we have robustness for
a range of values around the physically expected value of the parameter. And this
important caveat also points to the reason behind the confidence: if we have that
robustness, then wherever the actual parameter value is in that expected range,
the prediction of the outcome variable will hold.
Imagine we knew we had the right model, but we were missing a parameter
value. Here, robustness of a result around the possible values of the parameter
does warrant confidence. Wherever the parameter is in the possible range, the
outcome is the same, so since we’ve got the model structure right, we know the
outcome is assured. To put it the other way, if a result is not robust across different
values of an unknown parameter, then we have no reason to be confident in our
prediction of that effect based on some estimate of the unknown parameter.
I take this to be the kind of thing people have in mind when thinking about
robustness of simple models. We have a simple model motivated by basic physics
and an unknown parameter. Say we’re investigating heat flow in some liquid
for which we don’t have a good estimate of thermal conductivity. Some effect
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that is robust across different values of this unknown parameter is likely to be
correct. We think that our model is getting something right about the structure of
the world. So robustness in the model suggests that, counterfactually, whatever
nearby value Nature could have picked for the parameter, the result would be
the same. So this gives us confidence that the result will hold in the actual world.
This is similar to the sort of “robustness analysis” that Weisberg () discusses.
The details of this line of thought will depend on what position one takes on the
theory-world relation.
Introducing model error into this discussion adds another level of complexity.
Now consider robustness of a result across different climate models. There are
elements of the model that we know to be unphysical. There are parts of the
simulation that we know aren’t mapping onto structure of the world (or are
mapping onto system-structure only very indirectly). So how is robustness of the
model evidence that the result is assured in reality?
If different models with different idealisations make the same prediction, that
suggests that the prediction is not an artefact of this or that idealisation (Muldoon
). What we have here is evidence that the prediction is due to the shared
structure of the models which we hope is structure they also share with the world.
This is defeasible evidence, obviously, but evidence nonetheless. What we have
is evidence that there are no troublesome systematic errors in our models. We
can think of running different models of the climate as exploring a part of model
space. Let’s imagine there is some model which is a perfect model of the actual
world. We can now put our intuitions about robustness like this: as long as we are
exploring the part of model space that contains the perfect model, then we can be
confident that robustness warrants confidence. However, we can’t always be sure
of achieving robust predictions. What to do with “discordant evidence” – when
our predictions disagree – is an open question (Stegenga ).
The missing stratosphere/extra-tropical storm tracks story I mentioned earlier
might give you pause for thought here. In , the IPCC authors felt that
there was enough consensus to mention model agreement in their report. They
did mention a dissenting opinion, but there was nevertheless something of a
consensus (Solomon et al. , Section ...). This consensus has now been
overthrown. This is an interesting case because the shared error of the earlier
models can’t be straightforwardly attributed to some shared modelling artefact.
There are, however, almost certainly some systematic errors that have not yet become trouble-
some. . .
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What the models “shared” was a lack of stratospheric resolution. I can’t see how
failure to model some physical process could cause the sort of spurious agreement
that this episode illustrates. One might worry that agreement with previously
existing models is being used as a criterion for adequacy of a model. This sort
of sociological interdependence undermines the confidence that robustness can
otherwise warrant.
... Past success
For something like weather forecasting, we have plenty of evidence that our
models are doing pretty well at predicting short term weather. This gives us
confidence that the model is accurately representing some aspect of the weather
system. Parker (a) discusses this issue. Past success at predicting a particular
weather phenomenon, together with the assumption that the causal structure
hasn’t changed overmuch does allow a sort of inductive argument to the future
success of that model in predicting that phenomenon. Past success suggests that
problems with implementation, hardware, and missing physics are not causing
the models to go wrong. If these things were causing the model to go wrong, we
wouldn’t have had the past success we did, in fact, have.
Climate modellers do not have access to this source of confidence. First, they
don’t have the same wealth of past successes: they are predicting things that
are still in the future, so they don’t know if they’ve predicted accurately yet!
Climate models have only so far managed to retrodict already existing data (see
section ..). Weather forecasters are predicting days in advance and they have
years of data on their performance. Climate modellers are trying to predict years,
decades into the future and only have a couple of decades worth of data on how
climate models have done. And even this data isn’t very helpful: how useful is
it to know how a particular climate model from the s did at predicting the
s? We now have much more sophisticated models, but these models have not
yet demonstrated any predictive success.
Climate predictions are conditional on particular CO emission scenarios, as
well. So we can’t even be sure that the causal structure isn’t changing in ways that
could undermine our ability to predict. Also, if the world is warming, past data
and data from the warmer future will not be similar in all the ways they need to
This point has come up in discussion periods at the Bristol Philosophical Issues in Climate
Change Workshop (May  ) and the European Philosophy of Science Association confer-
ence in Athens (October  ). Thanks to the participants at those events.
. Scientific uncertainty 
be to underpin the material induction. We can’t be sure of the “stable background”
we need to ground our induction (Norton ). So, even if we had past success,
we couldn’t be sure that the conditions hadn’t changed so as to invalidate any
confidence this success gave us.
... Summary
Table . summarises how each of the coping strategies discussed fares in relation
to each of the sources of error. Imprecision and inaccuracy can be mitigated
against by making better measurements and running ensemble forecasts rather
than “best-guess” forecasts. Deeper worries about measurement might be offset
by agreement among models which suggest that the quantities we are measuring
are the right ones. Basic physics might also give us confidence we are on the right
track as far as getting the relevant quantities right goes.
Some physical parameters can be measured independently of the climate mod-
elling so better measurements can sometimes help with worries about parameter
error. For example, the thermal conductivity of air, or the viscosity of water can
be determined independently of the role they play in climate models. Robustness
of a prediction across an ensemble of parameter values mitigates against worries
about parameter values, even in the absence of such direct techniques. We can
also train models on past data to determine unknown parameters.
Error in the structure is somewhat harder to deal with. Finding parameter
values through training on past data involves starting with some parametrised
family of functions, so we can’t train our models to account for error in picking the
model class. If basic physics suggests that the structure ought to be roughly this
way, then that warrants some confidence that we aren’t subject to structure error
there. If a prediction is robust across different models with different structures,
this gives us confidence that the differences in structure do not contribute to
making this prediction go wrong. Likewise, past success suggests we have got the
model structure roughly right. For similar reasons, past success and robustness
give us some confidence that the physics missed out of our models is not leading
our models to be seriously wrong. Missing physics can also be accommodated by
“training” unphysical parameters that correct for the processes we are leaving out.
That a model trained on some past data can still retrodict unseen data partially
mitigates worries about overfitting. Past success can be seen as warranting extra
confidence of the same kind. If the model isn’t too sensitive to changes in its
parameters, this also suggests that the model is not over fitted.
































































































































































































































. Scientific uncertainty 
Worries about discretisation and resolution effects can be somewhat allayed by
results not being sensitive to changes in resolution, and by past success at mod-
elling the system at that level of resolution. Deep worries about implementation
can be dealt with in the same way.
I have outlined a variety of sources of error in scientific modelling. I have also
explained some ways we have of maintaining confidence in our predictions despite
these errors. I tried to diagnose how these methods allowed us to remain confident
in the face of error.
.. Philosophical reflections
In various places in the above discussion of uncertainty I glossed over some
important philosophical topics. I return to a couple of them now.
... A digression on the meaningfulness of derived quantities
Temperature is a shorthand for “mean kinetic energy”. So “temperature at a
point” is meaningless. Temperature is a quantity defined for some volume, and is
defined by the average energy of the particles in that volume. Imagine shrinking
the volume of interest until it is of a size with the atoms. Now imagine that at
a particular time, that volume is empty. But say at some later time, a particle
whizzes through the volume. The mean kinetic energy of the box would suddenly
jump from 0 to k where k is the kinetic energy of that particle, and then it would
jump instantaneously back to 0 when the particle leaves the volume. On this scale,
it should be obvious that temperature is not a useful quantity. In short mean
kinetic energy is just not a stable, meaningful, useful concept on scales of the
order of the mean free path of the atoms.
A similar meaninglessness is apparent if we consider the millionth decimal
place of a temperature in a “normal sized” volume. The millionth decimal place
might well change radically as particles enter and leave the volume. So at this
resolution, again, the quantity is useless: it is pure noise.
But the above discussion does not undermine temperature as a meaningful,
useful quantity on the appropriate scales. Of course, at some level, at some degree
of precision, the whole concept of temperature breaks down; but we are not near
that limit in practice. Even if the thousandth decimal place of a temperature
Let’s pretend we’ve never heard of vacuum energy: we are being good Newtonians. . .
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reading might well be meaningless, there are meaningful significant figures that
we aren’t measuring. It does not mean that striving for more accuracy is wasted
effort: it simply means that there is a limit.
The limit isn’t an absolute limit on what science is capable of: if we were
working on the tiny volume scale, we simply wouldn’t be using quantities like
temperature. We would be using the resources of quantum mechanics, rather than
classical statistical mechanics and thermodynamics. So while arbitrarily precise
temperature readings don’t make sense as the ultimate goal of better measurement,
it is still the case that there are meaningful significant figures we aren’t capturing
(again assuming there is a fact of the matter). Those significant figures that are
meaningful that we aren’t measuring could well be worth knowing about.
... Realism and the “True” model of the world
I want to highlight a couple of points about the above discussion that have a
bearing on our attitude towards the model. I mean by this the attitude we ought
to take vis-à-vis whether the model is adequately representing the target system.
Throughout this chapter I have been talking as if there really is some set of
equations that “Nature” uses to evolve the real world system. Our aim is to get
our model as close to these equations as possible. Is this true? Does it even make
sense? Whatever the answer to those questions, it is certainly the case that it is
unreasonable to assume that the “True” equations of the world are in the class of
models we are currently exploring. We know there are myriad ways our model
class must fail to contain the True equations if they exist.
So how ought we talk about the practice of modelling? It seems it can only be a
verbal shortcut to talk of our getting at the True model: a metaphorical flourish.
Indeed, the model and the system are just very different kinds of things. I’ve pointed
to some of these differences above, but let’s make them clear again. First, the
target system – the physical world – is a physical thing. The model is. . . what? A
computer program? A mathematical construct? Some combination of the above?
So it’s not even clear what it means to say that the model “gets things right” about
the world. What does it mean for a model to be “like” its target system?
One might want to retreat to a kind of instrumentalism here and say that the
model is “like” the target system in that the things in the model that represent
the observables – temperature, wind speed and the like – are “like” those things
in the world. That is, one might take the view that the model and the system
agree on the level of the observables: on the level of the temperature data and
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precipitation data; one could then refrain from making any claim about whether
the way the simulation manipulates the data bears any resemblance to the physical
processes. So temperature data in the model is like temperature in the world. But
there is still a concern that these are quite different kinds of things. That this
particular part of computer memory registers a value interpreted as “13.45 ˝C”
doesn’t straightforwardly translate into a fact about the world. Is comparing
data measured in the world with data generated by a model comparing apples to
oranges? Perhaps we would like to say that all we are really trying to do when we
are modelling is to summarise the actual data as best we can. But then why run
simulations into the future?
First, there is a certain sense in which we really do take the models as telling
us something about the world. These models are supposed to be predictive: they
are supposed to tell us how the actual climate will actually vary. So there are
certain parts of the model that it seems we really have to be realist about. And
this isn’t an idle philosophers’ realism: decisions costing billions of pounds are
made on the basis of these predictions’ correctness. How’s that for ontological
commitment? Recall also the commitment to model processes in “the right way”
that Parker () mentions.
However, there are still parts of the model that we know are unphysical: all
the sub-gridscale parametrisations are simply ad-hoc ways of keeping predictive
accuracy. There’s no attempt to model the phenomena, we are merely trying to
accommodate the measurements. So taking this “trying to get at the True Model”
line too seriously is misleading. We have a commitment to accurate predictions
too and sometimes this leads us to approaching things in unphysical ways. This
line might bolster my earlier response to Petersen () on “bad empiricism”.
.. When to take probabilistic predictions seriously
In this section I aim to outline what needs to be the case in order for a probabilistic
prediction based on statistical or model evidence to be a reasonable guide to
decision. When, in short, are the worries about severe uncertainty of the previous
chapters not applicable?
Norton () attempts to ground inductive inference in local facts, as opposed
to giving a global, formal theory of induction. When various local facts about
These projections are conditional on a particular emission scenario, but they are still supposed
to be saying something conditional about the actual world.
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there being some stable background for the induction hold, inductive inference
can go ahead. As a theory of induction this just pushes the problem back a level:
what could possibly ground the local facts about the background remaining stable
in the future? But Norton’s theory is helpful in that it emphasises what we must
take for granted in order to warrant induction.
Let’s take a specific case of statistical inference and see where the assumptions
enter. The plan is to start with a discussion of an idealised case, and then pro-
gressively remove idealisations to see which results survive which idealisations.
We are tossing a coin of unknown bias. After N tosses it has landed heads HN
times and tails TN times (obviously, HN ` TN “N ). As N increases HNN becomes a
better and better estimate of the objective chance of heads, with probability one.
This is so because of the Law of Large Numbers (LLN). What assumptions are we
making in the above inference? What properties of the set-up does LLN rely on?
The LLN holds for independent and identically distributed (iid) samples. What this
means is that each coin toss has the same chance whatever the previous outcomes
were, and each toss has the same chance of heads as the previous tosses. For coin
tosses we can take these properties for granted. If we are sampling from a large
population, we need to be careful to control for various sorts of statistical bias
before we can make this sort of assumption. If you were making decisions that
depended on the next coin toss, the value HNN is appropriate for use as a decision
weight, provided N is large enough. If N “ 1 then the above fraction will be 0 or
1, and it won’t provide good enough evidence to be useful for decision.
Let’s move now to the less simple case of weather forecasting. We have several
decades of daily weather data, and in some cases we have records stretching back
a hundred years or more. Using this data we can estimate the average temperature
or rainfall. This isn’t, however, a particularly useful calculation. In temperate
climes, the effect of the seasons means that the mean temperature isn’t a useful
piece of information. If you were interested in tomorrow’s rainfall in a region that
has a monsoon season and a dry season, total annual rainfall divided by  is
unhelpful. Maybe we have just got the reference class wrong here. If it is July
and you are interested in tomorrow’s temperature, what you want is the average
temperature of past Julys. But even this will typically be too coarse-grained a
statistic to be useful. Weather forecasting goes beyond these crude statistics by
I am going to help myself to objective chance talk here. I don’t think anything fundamentally
different happens when you don’t allow yourself this kind of talk, but things get slightly more
complicated. See Kreps (, Chapter ) for a treatment of statistical inference in purely
subjectivist terms.
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measuring weather patterns and using physics-based models to run simulations
of future weather. We know roughly how areas of low pressure affect wind speed
and direction, we know how areas of cloud will move so we can predict where they
will drop their rain. In these ways, we can do better than the brute statistics in
predicting weather outcomes. The models that centres like the UK Meteorological
Office run are ensemble models (see section ..). Thus they give probabilistic
predictions of future weather. These predictions seem formally similar to those
offered in the climate case. I was critical of the possibility of such forecasts for
climate, so it will be instructive to see what the distinction is that means that the
weather probabilities can be legitimate. Indeed, we have already seen all the parts
of the difference: there are certain sources of error that climate models are subject
to that weather models aren’t, and there are certain sources of confidence that
apply to weather models but not to climate models.
Short range weather forecasts – one to five days ahead – don’t suffer from the
problems with lead times that climate models do. That is, the small errors don’t
have time to blow up on the timescales that weather forecasters deal with. Weather
forecasters can afford to build models with higher spatial and temporal resolution,
since they don’t have to be run so far into the future. The state of the art in  –
when the last IPCC Assessment Report was published – had climate models with a
resolution of around 100 km, while the Met Office’s Numerical Weather Prediction
(NWP) model boasts a resolution of 1.5 km over the UK.
As well as these advantages, weather forecasts benefit from some extra sources
of confidence. As well as copious weather data, we have copious data on how well
our weather models predicted. This information has helped improve the model
and also gives us confidence that the model is generating useful, decision relevant
information. We can be confident that weather models are adequate for purpose,
to use the phrase from Parker (). Given that we have only really had big
GCMs for a couple of decades, and that the prediction lead times of interest are
thirty, forty, fifty years in the future, we don’t have the same kind of confidence
that the information generated by the current generation of climate models is
http://www.metoffice.gov.uk/news/in-depth/science-behind-probability-of-precipitation
Retrieved  July .
In this respect long range and seasonal weather forecasts are a little more like climate than
short-range weather. To make the distinctions clear, I will focus on short range forecasts, but
there is a spectrum of forecasts between weather and climate.
http://www.metoffice.gov.uk/research/modelling-systems/unified-model/
weather-forecasting Retrieved  July .
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accurate or decision relevant. Ultimately, the same basic physical processes – heat
transfer, fluid flows – are responsible for climate processes and weather processes.
However, the proximate causes are different and the weather-processes are better
understood than the climate processes. For example, we don’t know how much
heat the deep ocean can absorb. Our better knowledge of the weather processes is
due to the wealth of information we have about the weather’s behaviour and the
timescales involved. To take up the deep ocean again, we don’t know its capacity
for absorbing heat energy because we don’t have enough data on how the deep
ocean responded to previous increases in temperature.
On the sort of timescales that weather models deal with, we can take for granted
that we have the stable background that we need to ground the right sort of
inductions. For climate, the situation is rather different. We have no historical
data on how the climate responds to the high levels of CO currently in the
atmosphere. We don’t know that the response will be similar to the responses that
our models predict. For the reasons given above, we have some confidence that the
model response adequately captures the important features of the system response,
but as we saw, climate models haven’t passed the same stringent confirmation
tests that weather models have. The models are based on the data we do have,
and we know that those data are relevantly different from the actual situation.
On some more basic level – at the level of the thermodynamics – we know what
the effect of the CO should be. At this level, we do have the stable background.
But this isn’t enough to scale up our predictions to the climate system, with all
its unknown feedbacks and nonlinear dependencies. The situation is, in some
ways, like the following: I roll a green die several times and record the outcomes.
I then give you this information. You use this information to make predictions
about what will happen when I roll a blue die. There’s a sense in which the data
I have given you shouldn’t be taken to be decision relevant, given the important
differences between the data generating regime (green) and the current decision
regime (blue).
I take the above discussion to show what it takes to be confident of your models’
probabilistic predictions, and also to show how we don’t have that confidence
in the climate case. We can of course make probabilistic predictions for climate
events: many people do. But the aim of the above discussion was to show how these
predictions should not be used as a basis for decisions. The kind of epistemological
warrant for taking the probabilistic predictions seriously just isn’t there in the
climate case. We are in a state of severe uncertainty and that should affect how
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Figure ..: A caution against overstretching your inference: a blue die (l) and a
green die (r)
decision making proceeds. Thus the pessimistic decision theoretic conclusions of
the previous chapter hold. What climate models can give us already is a “non-
discountable climate change envelope”: a set of possible futures that we cannot
rule out (Stainforth et al. b). Can imprecise probabilities help here? Perhaps
we could take each ICE or PPE as providing a “non-discountable PDF”, and then
we take the set of them as representing the current state of knowledge. This
contrasts with the actual current methodology of model-averaging in a number of
sophisticated ways to generate a single probability distribution function (Murphy
et al. ; Tebaldi and Knutti ). So instead of using sophisticated model-
averaging techniques, we just take each member of the multi-model ensemble
as providing a probability in your representor. Decisions would then be made
on the basis of this representor. This would focus attention on those parts of the
evidence where the models disagree, and on those parts of the evidence where
there is a agreement. I take the important point of such an exercise to be the focus
on which conclusions are robust, and on which conclusions are not: such a focus
is important, and the model averaging techniques are in danger of sweeping such
important information under the carpet. Note however that robustness may be
due to incomplete or biased sampling of the “model space” rather than due to
some feature of the world. So this imprecise probability approach is not a panacea
for all model-error worries.
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If we take this non-discountable PDF approach, we will be stuck with the prob-
lem that we ended the last chapter with: there will be circumstances when the
imprecise decision rules fail to discriminate among different acts. The evidence
will not be good enough to give us advice. The next chapter will discuss what to
do when we end up in such a situation.
. Climate decisions
All models are wrong, but
some are useful.
(George Box)
In the last chapter we saw that climate science has many sources of uncertainty.
In previous chapters we have seen that decision making in the presence of such
uncertainty can be very difficult. This short chapter will look at what we can do
when faced with climate decisions.
The main aim is to argue that only the weaker standard of rationality is applica-
ble given the uncertainties present, and to show what this means. The aim is not
to argue directly for the use of imprecise probabilities in climate decisions. I will
argue that just because we don’t have a decision relevant probability that we can
use to find the optimal decisions, that does not mean that there is no advice that
the climate evidence can give to decision makers.
.. Uncertainty and decision making
We have seen that there are a variety of sources of uncertainty in climate modelling,
and we have seen that the myriad ways of dealing with these uncertainties are
often indirect and fraught with possible errors as well. There is no question on the
basic science: increase in greenhouse gases will increase the temperature of the
planet. This conclusion only requires some basic physics. The uncertainties are
all in what this conclusion means for local climate. Modern climate simulations
are tremendously complex beasts: they have a horizontal spatial resolution of
about 100 km which means the surface of the Earth is represented by about fifty
thousand grid points. They have a vertical resolution varies much more, but
thirty vertical levels is a reasonable headline figure. Temporal resolution is also
quite variable, but it is of the order of about half an hour. The models track
Recall the basic Energy-Balance Model we constructed in section ...
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something like a million variables, and involve about  adjustable parameters.
All of these components are interacting in myriad sophisticated ways (McGuffie
and Henderson-Sellers ). What modern GCMs are not doing is working out
whether climate change is a real phenomenon: It has been uncontroversial for
a long while that increasing concentrations of greenhouse gases will cause an
increase in global mean temperature. As far back as  scientists were studying
the effect CO on temperature (Fleming ; Weart ).
If these conclusions are well-established, what are modern climate models
doing? Knowing that annual global mean temperature will rise over the next
fifty years doesn’t tell us very much about what will happen to the climate on
smaller scales: what will the weather be like in the Norwegian fjords, or in
subsaharan Africa in this eventuality? How will temperature increase affect large
scale atmospheric or oceanic phenomena like El Niño, the Gulf Stream or the
hurricane season? How will rising temperatures affect number of rainy days in
central London? Will climate change increase the risk of flooding in Oxford? These
are the questions that climate models are now aiming to answer. Climate models
are now part of the process of predicting finer-grained climate outcomes which
are of more decision relevance to local and regional decision making bodies. The
detailed climate evidence is used as input into more detailed models of regional
climate and this in turn feeds in to assessments of the impacts of climate change.
Each link in this chain of inferences has its own sources of uncertainties.
Let’s say you are a policy maker who needs to decide some details of policy. The
success of the policy will depend on the future evolution of the climate in some
way. Let’s say you are in charge of flood defences and you need to decide how high
to build them. You can look at past data on maximum river height. This gives
you some evidence about what appropriate defence heights should be. However,
it would be naïve to stop there. Given the reality of global warming, you know
that the climate state that will produce future floods is relevantly different from the
state that produced the past data.
So you must turn now to projections of the future climate. Given the evidence
of some corpus of climate models – say the crop of models discussed in the latest
IPCC assessment report – what should you believe about the climate? As we have
said, the basic physics is not in dispute and this alone sanctions general claims
about increasing global mean temperature. We are interested in local effects. Let’s
These figures come from email conversations with Lenny Smith, Dave Stainforth and Erica
Thompson.
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say we are using something like the UK Climate Impacts Programme (UKCIP)
data.
The UKCIP offers maps like Figure . for very fine grained predictions of pre-
cipitation seventy years into the future. A range scenarios (and their likelihoods)
is offered (Jenkins et al. , p. ).
Figure ..: UKCIP Projections for precipitation in 
For example, UKCP say this:
The development of new techniques, together with increased comput-
ing power enabling them to be exploited, has allowed us to quantify
the spread of future projections consistent with major known sources
of uncertainty. . . Uncertainty in this case is dealt with by presenting
projections which are probabilistic in nature. This sort of presentation
is more informative than the single projection (for a given emissions
scenario) in UKCIP, or even a range of different projections from
different climate models. . . but is also necessarily more complex. It
gives the user the relative probability of different outcomes, based
on the strength of evidence, and more openly reflects the state of the
science. This is why probabilistic projections were adopted by IPCC
for the first time in their most recent science assessment. The UKCP
Projections respond to demands from a wide range of users for this
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level of detail. Jenkins et al. (, p. )
This probability then forms the basis of decisions that depend on the future
evolution of the climate. That is, it is with respect to this ensemble probability
that expected value is calculated, and decisions are taken that maximise this
expectation. For example, perhaps the ensemble distribution is peaked around a
small value for future precipitation in Oxford. On the basis of this prediction, flood
insurance premiums in Oxfordshire are set relatively low, since the probability
tells you that floods are unlikely. The worry about this sort of procedure is
that the probabilistic projection doesn’t account for all the possible sources of
error discussed above. And this worry leads to scepticism in the use of these
probabilities in decision support.
UKCIP’s costings case studies, for example, use explicit probability numbers
in their analysis: The “Heritage building in Lewes” example depends on the
following claim:
By the s, under the UKCIP medium-high emissions scenario,
% of years will experience a wet “- type” winter.
Taylor, Metroeconomica Ltd. And University of Bath (n.d. p. )
This probability forms the basis of a system of decision weights that is used to
decide how much to spend adapting to these increased flood risks. So UKCIP
really are selling these projections as giving you the probabilities of future climate
outcomes. Buried in UKCIP’s “Risk, Uncertainty and Decision-making” hand-
book, there are some caveats and warnings, but they seem to get lost in what gets
sold to policy makers. For instance
The ability of mathematical risk models to handle a large number of
complex interrelated issues is well tested. However, problems may
be so large and complex that they cannot be resolved through the use
of sophisticated models, although such models can still be of help in
understanding the problem. Willows and Connell (, p. )
I claim that standard probability theory doesn’t allow us to represent the kind
of severe uncertainty we see in the case discussed here. The evidence we can glean
from climate models is genuine evidence – so we are not in a state of ignorance
http://www.ukcip.org.uk/costings/case-studies/ retrieved  October 
UKCIP don’t make it clear how the ensemble output is dealt with in the process of producing
the probabilistic projections. But as Frigg et al. (b) argue, probabilistic forecasts seem to
have inherent problems.
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– but it falls short of characterising an appropriate decision relevant probability
function. So there is a question about what exactly we should believe on the basis
of this evidence.
The last few chapters offered a formal theory of severe uncertainty and decision
making. This theory is applicable in the climate case. This claim is backed up by,
for example, the findings of Frigg et al. (b): probabilistic forecasters seem to
be pragmatically worse off in a quite striking way.
.. More trouble for climate decisions
It gets worse before it gets better. As we have seen, climate science suffers from
a number of difficult sources of error. But climate decisions also involve taking
into account the difficulties of the economics of climate change. Weitzman ()
points out some of these problems. First, given the long time that CO stays in the
atmosphere, it is very difficult to control the amount of it in the air. This inertia
limits the options we have available. There is no reasonable method available to
us that would even keep CO levels constant.
Our evidence of the likelihood of the extreme events – the extreme costs we
would like to avoid like catastrophic warming – are the events we have less
evidence about. It is harder to learn about the tails of a distribution than it is
to learn about those values around the mean that come up more often. It is the
extremes of, for example, precipitation or temperature that will lead to the large
costs that we want to avoid.
These are uncertainties at the global level. Then we have the unknown local
responses to certain levels of global mean temperature change. These are the sorts
of things that climate models are now trying to pin down.
Even if we had a good understanding of these facts about the future climate,
there are uncertainties associated with how exactly these contingencies should be
valued. What is the cost associated with this much extra flooding in Oxfordshire;
with this sort of change in where storms make landfall on the Eastern seaboard of
the United States? And that’s just for the economic costs attached to certain kinds
of possible climate contingencies. What about the unquantifiable human costs
of hundreds of millions, possibly billions of people being displaced by climate
induced extreme weather events and concomitant human problems; famines, wars
and so on? I have in previous chapters just assumed that we can take precise utility
functions for granted, but this is obviously a gross simplification. One problem
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with climate change and what the human response to it should be is that climate
change happens on longer timescales than humans are used to dealing with. This
typically means that the possible sacrifices we could make now will improve the
lives of future generations. There are deep questions about how exactly we should
value future generations.
Indeed, there are problems at an even deeper level. It isn’t obvious that we have
a good grasp of what acts are available to us in our climate decision problem. We
don’t know how effective the various policies on the table will be if implemented.
We don’t know how effective a particular carbon tax scheme will be at limiting
emissions. We don’t know how effective various technological solutions will be if
funded. To put things in terms of a Savage-style decision problem, we don’t know
which functions from states to outcomes our policies match up with.
All of these things taken together prompt me to echo Weitzman’s point that:
such numbers and specifications must be imprecise and. . . this is a sig-
nificant part of the climate-change economic-analysis problem, whose
strong implications have thus far been ignored.
Weitzman (, p. , Weitzman’s emphasis)
And again:
Perhaps in the end the climate-change economist can help most by not
presenting a cost-benefit estimate for what is inherently [uncertain] as
if it is accurate and objective. . . but instead by stressing somewhat more
openly the fact that such an estimate might conceivably be arbitrarily
inaccurate depending upon what is subjectively assumed about [the
loss function]. Even just acknowledging more openly the incredible
magnitude of the deep structural uncertainties that are involved in
climate-change analysis – and explaining better to policy makers that
the artificial crispness conveyed by conventional IAM-based CBAs
here is especially and unusually misleading compared with more-
ordinary non-climate-change CBA situations – might elevate the level
of public discourse concerning what to do about global warming.
Weitzman (, p. , Weitzman’s emphasis)
Given these worries, we should be sceptical of strategies that focus too much
on optimising: we don’t know enough to properly determine what actions would
 Integrated Assessment Model-based Cost-Benefit Analyses.
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be optimal. Imprecise probabilism refocuses attention on what we can do with
respect to making choices: ruling out the bad acts. It may be that for certain
kinds of climate decision, even this is too much to ask. There may be so much
uncertainty surrounding a certain decision relevant question that only trivially
worse acts are ruled out given the current state of evidence. I would argue that
being stuck with such intractable decisions is better than optimising on the basis of
too-sharp ensemble probability estimates. In the next section I discuss some kinds
of strategy for dealing with even these apparently intractable decision problems.
If the evidence really is that bad, then we are just stuck. What I would like to
point out is that there could be cases where the evidence does not determine a
decision relevant probability, but where it still provides enough guidance that
some acts can be ruled out using some decision rule weaker than “optimise with
respect to the decision relevant pr”.
There are further problems with climate decisions, since there isn’t just one
agent in these scenarios. There is a strategic element to climate decisions: it doesn’t
matter if Britain commits to cutting CO output by % if other countries don’t
agree to do the same. There is something of a “tragedy of the commons” about
certain climate decisions. All countries want to emit CO since industry, which
generates wealth, emits CO. And let’s say all countries know that we overall
need to cut down on carbon output. But for each country, it would be better if
the sacrifices came from other countries. Various international mechanisms for
enforcing caps on emissions have proven to be fairly toothless, and unilateral
action doesn’t look appealing if the sacrifice isn’t enough to mitigate the bad effects
of climate change.
So climate decisions are difficult. I take one of the important things about the
imprecise probabilities model I favour to be that it makes decision making difficult
when decision making should be difficult, instead of seeming to make distinctions
it shouldn’t. Once it is emphasised that the cost-benefit analysis model seems to
struggle to make appropriate discriminations, and thus fails to determine which
acts are best given imprecise information, this leaves open the possibility for other
kinds of concerns to help determine which acts will be the best ones. It is to these
extra concerns that I turn in the next section.
One way we might go forward is to abandon the whole probabilistic framework
and look at something different, like the “case-based decision theory” of Gilboa
and Schmeidler (). The basic idea of this theory is instead of trying to con-
struct a belief model of the current situation, one can solve a decision problem by
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looking at how successful your past actions have been in similar problems. Gilboa
and Schmeidler offer a fairly complex mathematical theory of “problems” and the
similarity relation between them. I have my doubts about the usefulness of this
approach. First it relies on there being a history of similar problems that you or
people you know have found themselves faced with. In the case of climate change,
no such similar decisions have ever been faced. Never in the course of human
history have we ever encountered a problem on this scale. One might be able to
draw some analogies between climate change and smaller scale ecological policy,
or with regulating nuclear power, or with phasing out CFCs. Despite certain simi-
larities, none of these previous decisions is similar to the climate change problem
in the way I think Gilboa and Schmeidler need. As an aside, I think that in cases
where you do have similar cases, then you have enough previous information to
get a moderately discriminating probabilistic model off the ground.
The imprecise probability model at least allows you to make some discrimi-
nations. It allows you to make choices only where the evidence sanctions the
goodness of the choice. Consider deciding whether to offer tax breaks to green
energy companies. There are many contingencies in play in this decision, but lets
just focus on the possibility for green technology to slow global warming. The
tax break is obviously a costly measure for the government but the new green
technology might stop severe warming and all the disastrous effects it would cause.
The cost of the tax break is minuscule compared to the possible economic damage
the unmitigated warming would cause. This looks like a case where the tax break
option “almost dominates” the no tax break option, since the revenue from the
extra taxes is basically irrelevant in the case of a global disaster.
This is not just a re-articulation of the famous precautionary principle, (Hansson
; Sandin et al. ; Steele ). I am not just saying that it is best to avoid
actions (or omissions) that might cause massive harm. I am saying that some of
the options available to us are so cheap compared to the harms that they might
stop that they can be effected even based on the limited knowledge we now have.
This sort of concern won’t justify the large scale changes that have been advocated
by, for example, the Stern Review (Stern ), but some beneficial actions can
be justified in this way. But these large scale decisions aren’t really my focus. On
a global scale we know to some degree what will happen to the climate. I am
Seen as an investment in a growth industry, it needn’t even be viewed as a cost, but that is beside
the point in the current context. Lord Stern has argued that the best way to make progress
on climate change is to make green investments seem economically advantageous as well as
ecologically.
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interested more in the local-scale decisions like how high to build flood defences,
how to modify building codes in areas at risk from tropical storms, how to set
insurance premiums and so on. So what can we use to help with those sorts of
decisions?
Before we move on, I should say something about whose utility function we are
using in these decisions. Let’s say you are deciding whether or not to implement
a carbon tax. If you are CEO of a heavy industry company, then a carbon tax is
going to be a significant cost, and the benefits of a carbon tax for yourself will
be small. From an impersonal perspective, however, the economic damage of a
carbon tax is offset by the huge benefits that will accrue to future generations who
live in a significantly better world than the one they would have lived in had the
tax not been implemented. So of course the value of an action depends on the
utility function. The CEO’s utility might be such that he prefers no tax, while
the impersonal benevolent utilitarian’s utility will likely favour the tax. In what
follows, I am going to sweep all of the deep and interesting problems of the utility
function under the carpet. My aim is to look at how uncertainty and evidence affect
decision making. I think the important and difficult questions of what values we
should be using when making these decisions – how to value future persons; how
to spread the cost of mitigation – are orthogonal to the current project. One might
want to use a similar “set of functions” approach to representing the multiplicity
of values, and some of what I have said above will carry over straightforwardly.
This is a worthwhile project, but not one I pursue here. Let’s assume from now on
that we are looking from the perspective of this impersonal benevolent utilitarian.
.. A more robust decision framework
We have seen how severe uncertainty both in the chances of climate contingencies,
and in the value attached to those contingencies, makes orthodox decision making
difficult or possibly inapplicable. We are faced then with a number of possible
alternatives and no good way to choose between them. Let’s say that we have at
least ruled out the uncontroversially bad options with some sort of dominance
reasoning. I ended chapter  with the claim that this is, essentially, as far as
rationality can get you. This is an important point. Cost-benefit analysis based on
spuriously precise probability estimates is not a better way to make decisions. I
think this negative point is possibly more important than what little I have to offer
by way of positive suggestions. The point is to emphasise that just because we can
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generate precise numbers doesn’t mean that we can be confident of decisions made
with them. And recognising this point – that decision making should be difficult
– opens the way to an appropriate acknowledgement of the following sorts of
concerns. My claim that severe uncertainty only allows for a weak standard of
rationality – a standard that needn’t determine which option to choose – is only
half the story. There are cases where we need to make decisions, even though the
evidence doesn’t give us enough guidance. What criteria ought we adopt in these
circumstances?
Stainforth et al. (b) offer a framework for using climate evidence to inform
decision making. One of the important steps is working out whether the scientific
evidence can usefully tell us about the variables of interest in the decision. At the
level of the ensemble distribution, the ensemble is equally informative about all
variables: it provides a marginal distribution for any variable it describes. So this
step of deciding whether the evidence can tell us about the variables of relevance
requires more than just looking at the ensemble distribution: it requires reflecting
on which distributional features of the ensemble evidence can reasonably be taken
to tell us something about the future evolution of the climate. Note the parallel
with the earlier discussion of evidence and decision in the abstract: it is important
that we allow our decision support mechanisms to fail to determine a best option
when the evidence fails to support choosing one over the other. A naïve attitude
to IAMs and ensemble evidence doesn’t do this.
The severity of model inadequacy suggests a more qualitative inter-
pretation than one might wish. In particular, it is not at all clear that
weighted combinations of results from today’s complex climate models
based on their ability to reproduce a set of observations can provide
decision-relevant probabilities. Furthermore, they are liable to be mis-
leading because the conclusions, usually in the form of PDFs, imply
much greater confidence than the underlying assumptions justify.
Stainforth et al. (a, p. )
So what do we have left to help us decide what set of policies is best to pursue?
I want to suggest a few values we might want to take into account: robustness,
reversibility, adaptability. These are properties of acts that could be seen as sui
generis good-making-features of those acts. This isn’t to suggest that these are
properties that cannot be folded into some sort of complicated expected utility
calculation. They are features that are intuitively valuable, and recognisable
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as such outside of expected utility calculations. Given that we’ve seen that EU
calculation becomes difficult if not impossible in cases of severe uncertainty,
folding these features into an EU calculation would be a step backwards.
Lempert et al. () offer an alternative framework which also seeks to build
in a concern for the sorts of factors I discuss below. They contrast the standard
predict-then-act approach with their favoured assess-risk-of-policy approach. The
former is the standard procedure of optimising with respect to some probability.
They characterise their alternative approach as follows:
[T]he assess-risk-of-policy framework envisions a process that generates
policy options whose satisfactory performance is maximally insensi-
tive to uncertainties and outputs a small number of probabilities to
characterize the residual risks of choosing such a policy.
Lempert et al. (, p. )
They emphasise the value of insensitivity to uncertainties in the evidence: this
relates to what I will call “robustness” below. They also emphasise the possible
bad consequences of optimising with a possibly faulty probability.
How does the formal discussion of decision making in chapter  relate to the
qualitative discussion of the current one? First both share a concern to represent
uncertainty adequately; and this commitment entails allowing the decision making
machinery to fail to deliver unambiguous answers. We might also see the concerns
discussed below as being a particular instance of a set of tie-breaking heuristics
that come into play in a particular context. Other sets of heuristics might come
into play in other contexts.
... Making decisions now
As more information comes in, as climate science improves, we will be able to
make better decisions. Thus, we should make decisions now so as to facilitate the
better decisions we will be able to make in the future. However, many decisions
have to be made now. One thing we do know about the future of the climate is that
the changes that will happen will be irreversible. Various inertias in the system
(like how long CO stays in the atmosphere) mean that it is already too late to stop
some change, and the longer we wait to do the things we can to slow the change,
the more change will be inevitable. The “wait and see” strategy of carrying on
as normal until we have enough evidence to act decisively may lead to our being
unable to change the course of the evolution of the climate. Better to cut emissions
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now, and then relax the constraints later as we learn more about what a reasonable
“safe” level of emissions is; rather than leave emissions unchecked and run the risk
of having to deal with GHGs with long residence times in the atmosphere.
The decisions we make now obviously can only rely on the evidence we currently
have. We don’t know enough to select some optimal strategy for possible future
climates. What other criteria might we fall back on instead?
... Robustness
There is some intuitive value to an act that leads to good outcomes a lot of the
time. Take the example of building a bridge over a river. The changing climate
might make the river more liable to flooding, or perhaps sea-level rise might cause
the river level to be higher in the future. It seems like in this sort of circumstance,
it is worthwhile to build bridges higher so that they would be above the level of
the river even if the river level were to rise. This is related to the idea that acts
that “nearly dominate” or are “ε away from dominating” seem like good acts.
Lots of possible actions – perhaps most actions – aren’t sensitive to small changes
in probability. In many cases, maximising with respect to some “middling” proba-
bility will produce an act that does pretty well in most cases. Consider the decision
of whether to make building codes more stringent in an area that might be at
increased risk of tropical storms due to climate change. In some scenarios, the area
is at increased risk to storms, and the decision to tighten up building codes saves
a great deal of money. In some scenarios, the storm risk stays the same or reduces,
the costs associated with conforming to the more stringent building codes are
smaller than the damages that would accrue in the previous scenarios. So as long
as the probability of increased storm risk is at least x, the decision to tighten up
the building regulations will be better than not doing so. This is a robust decision
in the sense that the choice isn’t sensitive to details of the probability distribution,
as long as probability of increased risk is at least x. The value of x will depend
on the values of the damages avoided and the costs accrued as discussed above.
This is an example of a decision that can be taken without knowing the full PDF
of possible futures. All that needs to be known is that the probability is at least
this much. This is a criterion for decision making that relies on a weaker kind of
evidence than optimising does. We don’t need to know a full PDF, all we need
is a lower bound on the probability. Recall the hierarchy of uncertainties from
Kandlikar, Risbey, and Dessai () that I mentioned in the introduction.
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... Reversibility
This virtue of possible strategies is often understood in the negative: we disvalue
acts that are irreversible. One argument against many of the more extreme geo-
engineering possibilities that have been mooted is that they are not reversible; or
consider the debate on genetically modified (GM) crops. One argument against
their use is that there’s a danger that they could spread beyond the fields where
they are being trialled. If we later learn of some bad side effect from having used
these crops, we have no way of reining in their spread. This sort of irreversibility
tends to be disvalued.
It is a virtue of some act that if it turns out that it isn’t effective, we can undo
any adverse effects it might have. Let’s say we learn that we are in a situation
where some strategy has some bad side-effect which outweighs its benefits. We
would prefer to return to the way things were before we effected this strategy:
and therefore, to a situation where we don’t have the bad side effect. Drastic
measures will seem more palatable if we know that we can “rewind” things so
that they are as they were before we started meddling. What reversibility of an
action guarantees is that the “worst case scenario” for the action is only a little bit
worse than the status quo. Being only a little worse than the status quo in the
worst case is a kind of “almost dominating” property.
... Adaptability
Let’s say you are in charge of flood defences. It seems a sensible strategy to build
defences such that, if it turns out that larger defences are needed, the existing
defences can easily be upgraded. This might involve making sure that people
don’t build too close to the defences, designing the foundations such that they can
support bigger defences than are originally built on them, and so on.
This virtue, like the last, puts value on the possibility of “mid-course correction”;
of being able to change tack in the light of new information. As our information
improves, we hope to be able to make more targeted interventions. We should act
now so as to allow our future decisions to be as effective as possible. Stainforth
et al. (b) suggest this sort of thing when they say that even showing that the
evidence doesn’t support any particular option can be helpful:
I am not endorsing this argument, merely using it as an example. As I understand it, GM crops
are designed such that they cannot spread in the way this scenario imagines.
It is the status quo, minus whatever costs are associated with reversing the effects of the previous
action.
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Even this information can be useful to the decision maker in terms of
focusing attention not on a particular response but on options which
allow flexibility for adjustments in the future. (p.)
.. Conclusion
When evidence is incomplete, uncertain or error prone in the way that evidence
from climate models is, we need an appropriately subtle and permissive represen-
tation of that uncertainty. This allows us to avoid spurious accuracy and spurious
determinacy of choice. This leaves open the question of what choices should be
made, among those options that cannot be ruled out on purely rational grounds. I
have suggested a number of aspects of an option that might be considered valuable
and that could feed into decision theory. This was done informally, because I think
that the important conclusions of a previous chapter were that such decision
making cannot be done purely formally.
Synopsis
I have argued that the multidimensional nature of uncertainty undermines the
claim that standard probability theory is always the right formal model of belief
and uncertainty. I have discussed several arguments for the claim that probability
theory is the right model of belief and found flaws in each. Probabilism still serves
as a regulative ideal, and the alternative framework I suggest is a conservative
extension of it. I have discussed decision making with imprecise probabilities,
although more work still needs to be done on this topic. There is no generally
acceptable decisive imprecise decision rule: there are cases when rationality does
not determine a choice. I concluded with a case study of uncertainty and decision
making in climate science.
A. A proof of Joyce’s theorem
A.. Preliminary results
We are going to split the proof of the main theorem into several smaller parts.
Joyce lists, without proof, six facts that allow him to prove his main theorem. I
aim to provide the short proofs Joyce leaves out. First Joyce defines something
like a notion of distance between belief functions.
Definition A.. Dpb,cq “ Ipv`pb´cq,vq
I list these lemmas in order, so my Lemma A.. corresponds to Joyce’s Fact I
and so on.
Lemma A.. Dp‚,cq is continuous for each c P B
Proof If we fix some c, it follows from Structure, that Dpb,cq “ Ipv`pb´cq,vq
is continuous for any b. 
There are two places in the proof where continuity of D is important. One of them
is just a use of the intermediate value theorem. For this, he doesn’t really need
continuity across the whole space, just continuity on lines and this follows from
allowing the λ parameter to range over the reals. There is still the question of
fundamentally relying on Euclidean distance, but that is unavoidable it seems.
The other use of D’s continuity is an application of the extreme value theorem.
This relies on V` being closed and bounded as well. This result needs more
topological baggage.
Lemma A.. D’s value does not depend on the choice of v PV.
Proof For all X P SL and v,v1 PV with b,c P B:
|vpXq´ pvpXq` pbpXq´ cpXqqq| “ |bpXq´ cpXq|
“ |v1pXq´ pv1pXq` pbpXq´ cpXqqq|
So, by Normality it follows that Ipv`b´c,vq “ Ipv1`b´c,v1q. So D does not
depend on the choice of v. 
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Joyce has this fact following from Structure but Maher is right in pointing out
that it actually follows from Normality .
Lemma A.. Dpb,cq goes to infinity as bpXq goes to infinity for any X P SL.
Proof Ipv`pb´cq,vq goes to infinity as bpXq goes to infinity for any X, by Struc-
ture. 
This is intuitive since bpXq tending to infinity is like moving away from the
origin parallel to some axis. So the distance between b and some fixed c is going
to increase in an unbounded way.
To prove the next result, we need something stronger than Dominance. Dom-
inance says that if b and b1 differ only at X, then which one is more accurate
depends on which gets closer to the truth at X. What we need is: if b and b1 differ
only on some collection, X1,X2, . . .Xn, and one function is universally closer to the
truth on those Xi , then that function is less inaccurate. What we really need is:
Strong Dominance If bpY q “ b1pY q for all Y R Φ Ď SL and if |vpXq ´
bpXq| ě |vpXq´b1pXq| for all X P Φ , then Ipb,vq ě Ipb1,vq.
This condition follows from Dominance by induction on the size of Φ . So we
don’t really need a stronger axiom, but it’s worth pointing out this intermediate
step in the proof.
Lemma A.. Dpb,cq ěDpb1,c1q if |bpXq´ cpXq| ě |b1pXq´ c1pXq| holds for all X P
SL and the former equality is strict if the latter is strict for some X.
Proof If |bpXq ´ cpXq| ě |b1pXq ´ c1pXq| then |pvpXq ´ vpXqq ` bpXq ´ cpXq| ě
|pvpXq´vpXqq`b1pXq´c1pXq|. From this it follows byDominance that Ipv`b´c,vq ě
Ipv`b1´c1,vq. So Dpb,cq ěDpb1,c1q. 
This lemma is saying that if b and c disagree more about everything than b1 and c1
do, then there is more distance between b and c than there is between b1 and c1.
Lemma A.. If c lies on bb1, and if c‰ b then Dpb,b1q ąDpc,b1q.
Proof c“ λb`p1´λqb1, for some λ P r0,1q. For all X:




So, by Lemma A.., we know Dpb,b1q ąDpc,b1q. 
A. A proof of Joyce’s theorem 
Lemma A.. Dpb,cq “ Dpb1,cq if and only if Dp‚,cq has a unique minimum along
bb1 at its midpoint m“ 1{2b`1{2b1.
Proof First, the “only if” part: Dpb,cq “Dpb1,cq. So Ipv`b´c,vq “ Ipv`b1´c,vq.
From Symmetry it follows that for any λ P r0,1s:
Ipλrv`b´cs ` p1´λqrv`b1´cs,vq
“ Ipp1´λqrv`b´cs `λrv`b1´cs,vq
By Weak Convexity, it follows that this quantity is always greater than Ipm,vq
with equality only when λ“ 1{2 (that is: the minimum is unique). 
As yet, I’ve found no proof of the “if” direction of this claim that Joyce makes.
This direction is needed in the proof as Joyce sets it out, so this is a flaw in my
presentation at the moment. That is, I currently have no proof that if Dp‚,cq has a
unique minimum on bb1 at m then Dpb,cq “Dpb1,cq.
There are three more quick facts that Joyce uses, but does not state explicitly.
For the sake of completeness, I offer them here.
Lemma A.. D is a symmetric function in its two arguments. That is, Dpb,cq “
Dpc,bq for all b,c.
Proof |bpXq ´ cpXq| “ |cpXq ´ bpXq| for all X so by Lemma A.. we have that
Dpb,cq “Dpc,bq. 
Lemma A.. Ipc,vq “Dpc,vq for all v PV and c P B.
Proof Follows from the definiton of D 
Lemma A.. Dpb,bq is the unique minimum of Dp‚,bq on any region containing b.
Proof |bpXq ´ bpXq| “ 0 for all X. So for any b1 ‰ b, there is some X such that
b1pXq ‰ bpXq. From this it follows that |bpXq´bpXq| ă |bpXq´b1pXq| for that X.
So by Lemma A.., Dpb,b1q ąDpb,bq. 
A.. Proving the “main theorem”
To reiterate, the theorem we are trying to prove is the following:
(Main Theorem) If gradational inaccuracy is measured by a function
I that satifies Structure, Extensionality, Dominance, Normality,
Weak Convexity and Symmetry, then for each c P BzV` there is a
c1 P V` such that Ipc,vq ą Ipc1,vq for every v P V. (Joyce , pp.
–)
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So we are considering some agent with credences c R V`. We break down the
proof of the main theorem into three parts. The first part shows that there’s a c1 that
uniquely minimises Dp‚,cq on V`. The second part shows that there’s an m such
that for arbitrary v, Ipm,vq ě Ipc1,vq. And finally we show that Ipc,vq ą Ipm,vq.
So, for every c RV`, there’s some c1 PV` that accuracy-dominates c.
Theorem A.. There is a point c1 P V` such that the function Dp‚,cq attains its
unique minimum on V` at c1.
Proof V` is a closed and bounded set by definition of being a convex hull. Dp‚,cq
is a continuous (Lemma A..) real-valued function (by definition). By a classic
result from topology we know that a continuous real-valued function on a closed
bounded region attains a minimum on that region. So Dp‚,cq attains a minimum
on V`. Call this minimum c1.
We now need to show that c1 is unique. Assume there were another minimum,
b1 PV`. Dpc1,cq “Dpb1,cq. So by Lemma A.., Dp‚,cq attains a unique minimum
on c1b1 at 1{2c1`1{2b1. V` is convex and contains both c1 and b1, so it contains
this mixture of them. That is c1b1 ĂV`, so since c1 is the unique minimum on V`
it must be the unique minimum on c1b1. So c1 and 1{2c1`1{2b1 are both unique
minima on c1b1. This is only possible if b1 “ c1. So c1 must be a unique minimum.
We have found our probability measure that will accuracy dominate c. We need
to now show that c1 is indeed always more accurate than c. There are two parts to
this. First we construct an m which is less accurate than c1. Then we show that
this m is still more accurate than c.
If c1 “ v, then it follows trivially from the strong version of Dominance that
Ipc,vq ą Ipc1,vq. Fix some arbitrary v ‰ c1. We need to show the same inequality
still holds.
Definition A.. Let L “ {λc1`p1´λqv : λ P R}. Let Lλ be the particular member
of L with that value of λ. Let R be L restricted to λě 1.
L0 “ v and L1 “ c1. R is the ray of L beginning at c1 not containing v. The
idea of the proof is to find some m that we can compare easily with both c and
c1. We start by defining a line through c1 and our arbitrary v. Now, any m on the
“c1 side” of this line (that is, with λ ě 1) will be less accurate than c1. So all we
need to do is find some such m that is easily comparable with c (See Figure A.).
This is probably best understood geometrically. Joyce can’t help himself to all the
ideas of geometry suggested by the pictures, but he can do some things. He can
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help himself to all of the “betweenness” notions of geometry on lines defined by
mixtures (for example Hilbert’s “Axioms of Order” Hilbert ()). The idea is
that some point on the line between v and k must minimise the distance from c on
that line. Geometrically, this is obvious since one can just “drop a perpendicular”
from c onto the line. Joyce can’t really assume enough geometrical structure to







Figure A..: The geometry of Theorem A..
Theorem A.. There is a point m P R such that (a) m uniquely minimises Dp‚,cq on
R, (b) c1 Pmv and (c) Ipm,vq ě Ipc1,vq.
Proof There is an X P SL such that vpXq “ 0 and c1pXq ‰ 0 (c1 P V` so if c1
and v agree on all zeroes, they agree on all ones too: they are identical). So
LλpXq “ λc1pXq, which tends to infinity as λ does. By Lemma A.. we have that
DpLλ,cq goes to infinity as λ does.
Dpc1,cq ăDpv,cq, since c1 minimises Dp‚,cq on V`. As a function of λ for λě 1,
DpLλ,cq ranges over at least the interval rDpc1,cq,8q and is continuous. So, by the
intermediate value theorem, we know there is a λ such that DpLλ,cq “Dpv,cq. For
this value of λ, let Lλ “ k.
Let m“ 1{2k`1{2v. By Lemma A.. this m uniquely minimises Dp‚,cq on kv.
This proves (a).
m cannot be strictly between c1 and v, because it would then be in V`, and this
would contradict c1 being the unique minimum of Dp‚,cq in V`. That is, we know
that Dpm,cq ăDpc1,cq, since c1 P kv. Note that all of c1v is in V`. So if m P c1v, m
would be in V`. But c1 is the unique minimum of Dp‚,cq in V`, so m can’t be in
there. So (b) c1 Pmv.
By Lemma A.. and (b) we know that Dpm,vq ą Dpc1,vq. So Ipv`m´v,vq ą
Ipv`c1´v,vq, and thus (c) Ipm,vq ą Ipc1,vq. 
 This way of speaking about the proof is due to Williams (b)
 Say c is strictly between b and b1 if c P bb1 but c‰ b and c‰ b1.
A. A proof of Joyce’s theorem 
The next theorem can be understood by use of a similar diagram to before, but









Figure A..: The geometry of Theorem A..
Theorem A.. Ipc,vq ą Ipm,vq
Proof By construction of m and k we know that Dpk,cq “ Dpv,cq. Now, con-
sider the line from k to 2c´k. The midpoint of this line is c and Dp‚,cq at-
tains a unique minimum at c (by Lemma A..). So by the “if” direction of
Lemma A.., Dpk,cq “ Dp2c´k,cq. These two equalities together give us:
Dpv,cq “Dp2c´k,cq.
The other direction of Lemma A.. (that is, the “only if” direction) then
says that Dp‚,cq attains a minimum at the midpoint of v and 2c´k, namely at
1{2pv´kq`c. By this result and Lemma A..we get that: Dpc,vq ąDpc,1{2pv´kq`
cq.
Ipc,vq “Dpc,vq By Lemma A..
ąDpc,1{2pv´kq` cq by the above inequality
“ Ipv`rc´1{2pv´kq` cs,vq By Definition A..
“ Ip1{2v`1{2k,vq
“ Ipm,vq By definition of m
So, Ipc,vq ą Ipm,vq. This concludes the proof. 
The three theorems together show that, if c P BzV` then whatever I you use,
there is some c1 PV` such that, for all v PV, Ipc,vq ą Ipc1,vq.
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